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I.1. General background 
1. Under the Standards and Codes Initiative of the 
International Financial Architecture, the World Bank was 
mandated by the Financial Stability Forum – now the 
Financial Stability Board – to develop a unified standard for 
the comparative examination of business insolvency and 
creditor/debtor regimes (the “ICR Standard”).  
2. The ICR Standard is composed of the recommendations 
from the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (the 
“Guide”) (2004) and the World Bank Principles for Effective 
Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems (the “Principles”), 
which were originally formulated in 2001, and subsequently 
revised in 2005 and in 2011, in consultation with UNCITRAL, 
the IMF and the World Bank’s international partners. As 
presented together in the ICR Standard, the Principles and 
the Guide’s Recommendations represent a single point of 
reference for the evaluation of enterprise distress resolution 
regimes. The World Bank is responsible for supporting the 
efforts of developing countries to strengthen the legal, 
regulatory and institutional frameworks that govern ICR 
regimes through the preparation of in-depth diagnostic 
reports (Reports on the Observation of Standards and Codes, 
“ROSCs”), the provision of technical assistance and the 
development and dissemination of knowledge and expertise 
on insolvency-related issues. 
3. The World Bank’s Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor 
Regimes Task Force (the “Task Force”) is fundamental to the 
implementation of the World Bank’s mandate. Bringing 
together experienced judges, expert practitioners, academics 
and policymakers from around the world, the Task Force 
provides an important forum for a collaborative and inclusive 
dialogue on the ICR Standard to further increase 
understanding and expertise on law and policy in the 
insolvency area.  
4. The World Bank convened the Task Force on January 10-
11, 2011 to discuss revisions to the ICR Standard as well as a 
number of insolvency-related issues that arose in the wake 
of the global financial crisis. As part of this discussion, the 
Task Force was asked to consider, for the first time, the topic 
of the insolvency of natural persons. This issue was brought 
into sharp focus upon the occurrence of national mortgage 
crises and the resulting global financial crisis, and is 
characterized by the different regulatory treatment afforded 




financial stability and for economic development and access 
to finance. 
5. The World Bank conducted a preliminary survey on the 
laws of insolvency of natural persons in effect throughout 
the world.1 The survey covered 59 countries, of which 25 are 
high-income economies and 34 are low- and middle-income 
economies. The countries surveyed covered 67.5% of the 
world population. The main objective of the survey was to 
gather information about the existence of legislation 
addressing consumer insolvency, and it was found that in 
more than half of the low- and middle-income countries 
surveyed there is no legislative system at all for the 
insolvency of natural persons.  
6. The January 2011 meeting of the Task Force recognized 
the significance of this issue and discussed the feasibility of 
utilizing the expertise of the Task Force for the study of the 
key regulatory aspects underlying the insolvency of natural 
persons, the variation in legal treatment under national legal 
regimes and the implications of these divergences for 
international collaboration and coordination.2  
7. In the closing statement to the January 2011 Task Force 
meeting, it was stated that: 
 [O]ne of the lessons from the recent financial crisis was 
the recognition of the problem of consumer insolvency as 
a systemic risk and the consequent need for the 
modernization of domestic laws and institutions to enable 
jurisdictions to deal effectively and efficiently with the 
risks of individual over indebtedness. The importance of 
these issues to the international financial architecture that 
has been recognized in various ways by the G-20 and by 
                                                          
1 The survey was directed by Adolfo Rouillon, from the World Bank. The 




2 See Best Practices in the Insolvency of Natural Persons , report by 
Professor Susan Block-Lieb, at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTGILD/Resources/ 
WB_TF_2011_Consumer_Insolvency.pdf. The Task Force meeting 
devoted two sessions to the treatment of the insolvency of natural 
persons. The first session gave a panoramic view of comparative 
approaches to the insolvency of natural persons. The session was 
chaired by Adolfo Rouillon (World Bank) and the panellists were Jason 
Kilborn (USA), Alexander Byriukov (Ukraine), P. R. Chinien (Mauritius), 
Kazuhiro Yanahira (Japan) and Luiz Fernando Valente de Paiva (Brazil) 
The second session examined the issue of the lack of guidance for 
personal insolvency regimes from the point of view of international 
organizations and international NGOs. Adolfo Rouillon (World Bank) 
chaired the session, and the panel included representatives from 





the Financial Stability Board has today been reconfirmed 
and emphasized by this Task Force. It is important to 
recognize the diversity of policy perspectives, values, 
cultural preferences and legal traditions that shape the 
way jurisdictions may choose to deal with the problems of 
individual over indebtedness. Yet recent events suggest 
that the expansion of access to finance, the extension of 
modern modes of financial intermediation, and the 
mobility and globalization of financial flows may have 
changed the character and scale of the risk of consumer 
insolvency in similar ways in many different economies. In 
response to these concerns, the World Bank, through the 
Legal Vice-Presidency, will organize an appropriate 
Working Group of the Insolvency Law Task Force to begin 
work on identifying the policies and general principles that 
underlie the diverse legal systems that have evolved for 
effectively managing the risks of consumer insolvency and 
individual over indebtedness in the modern context. The 
World Bank will work with its international partners and 
use its convening power to bring together a representative 
group of internationally recognized experts in order to 
address these important issues.3 
8. Following up on the Task Force Meeting discussion, the 
World Bank and the Task Force created a special working 
group of expert academics, judges, practitioners and policy-
makers (the “Working Group”) to study the issue of natural 
person insolvency and produce a reflective report on this 
matter, suggesting guidance for the treatment of the 
different issues involved, taking into account different policy 
options and the diverse sensitivities around the world.  
9. The Working Group met in Washington DC from 
November 16-17, 2011. Over the course of the sessions, the 
participants debated numerous issues relevant to the 
insolvency of natural persons and commented on the draft 
that was submitted to the Working Group. Written 
comments were also received during the sessions and 
afterwards, in subsequent revisions of the draft. The 
comments enriched the document and were taken into 
account in the preparation of this report.   
I.2. Objectives and nature of this report 
10. The main objective of this report is to provide guidance 
on the characteristics of an insolvency regime for natural 
persons and on the opportunities and challenges 
encountered in the development of an effective regime for 
                                                          
3Concluding remarks of the Task Force meeting, by Vijay S. Tata (Chief 






the treatment of the insolvency of natural persons. In this 
regard, the report intends to raise awareness about the 
importance of a regime for the treatment of the insolvency 
of natural persons, and explores the advantages and 
disadvantages of the solutions to the numerous practical 
issues that have to be confronted in the design of an 
insolvency regime for natural persons. 
11. This document, therefore, is a report that provides 
guidance on policy issues that need to be addressed in 
developing modern legal regimes for the treatment of the 
insolvency of natural persons, but it does not purport to 
identify any set of “best practices” for the regulation of the 
insolvency of natural persons. The report addresses issues 
that fall outside the scope of the benchmark (or assessment 
“standard”) used in the ICR assessments under the Reports 
on the Observance of Standards and Codes program of the 
World Bank and the IMF. In this regard, it is important to 
recall that the ICR ROSC assessment standard, consisting of 
the World Bank Principles and the UNCITRAL Legislative 
Guide (the ICR Standard), seeks to address the treatment of 
business insolvency, both for corporate entities and for 
business activities of natural persons. This report 
acknowledges the value of the ICR Standard in its treatment 
of business insolvency and recognizes its fundamental role in 
providing guidance for the development of business 
insolvency regimes.    
12. There is general consensus that it would be premature 
to identify a single approach (or “best practice”) for the legal 
treatment of the insolvency of natural persons not engaged 
in business activities. The insolvency of natural persons is 
intertwined with social, political and cultural issues that 
present too many differences to be treated uniformly. It 
would be difficult for a uniform approach to emerge out of 
this effort. Policymakers should be aware of the social, legal 
and economic peculiarities that may affect the functioning of 
a regime for the insolvency of natural persons. 
13. The fact that the development of a common set of “best 
practices” is unlikely at the present state of affairs does not 
imply that the insolvency of natural persons should be left 
out of the scope of research and of the reform efforts of 
policymakers worldwide. Indeed, this report presents a case 
for the analysis that policymakers should carry out in their 
own legal systems, to better understand the effects and 
benefits of the various policy choices in designing an 
effective system for the treatment of the insolvency of 
natural persons. By setting out the advantages and 
disadvantages of the different and sometimes competing 
approaches to the regulation of the insolvency of natural 
persons, this report is designed to help policymakers develop 








14. This report offers a reflective, non-prescriptive approach: 
by describing specific problems, and specific solutions with 
their positive and negative consequences, it aims to provide 
a map of the questions faced in the complex task of creating 
a regime for the treatment of the insolvency of natural 
persons, as well as ideas and alternatives for the benefit of 
those involved in insolvency reform and of those affected, in 
any capacity, by the application of insolvency laws.  
15. The report presents ideas and solutions to problems 
experienced in the regulation and implementation of 
systems for the insolvency of natural persons. The countries 
on which these observations are based are not identified, for 
the sake of the universality to which this report aspires, and 
on the understanding that the lessons learned in certain 
systems may provide very valid precedents for other 
countries. At any rate, the observations included in the 
report are based on tested models and practical experiences.  
16. The report also references a number of empirical studies. 
Legal scholarship on the insolvency of natural persons has 
benefited from the work of specialists who have produced 
research based on the empirical analysis of the 
implementation and application of systems of insolvency of 
natural persons. Those invaluable empirical studies have 
been taken into account for the elaboration of this report, 
and many of them have been referenced in footnotes to 
provide ready examples, though these references should not 
be regarded as an exhaustive list of all available studies that 
have influenced the observations provided in this report.    
I.4. Terminology 
17.  By “insolvency,” this report refers not to a particular 
legal structure or approach, but rather to the distressed 
condition of the debtor and the constellation of potential  
approaches to treating that condition. This report uses the 
term “insolvency” rather than the variety of terms in use 
throughout the world today to describe various systems 
offering some combination of collective creditor redress and 
alleviation of the burdens of debt on an insolvent debtor. 
Whether it be called “bankruptcy” or “sequestration” or 
“debt relief” or “debt adjustment,” the common, unifying 
factor is the focus of this report; that is, any system for 
alleviating the burdens of excessive debt and allocating 




creditors and natural person debtors, falls within the 
intended ambit of “treatment of insolvency of natural 
persons.” If such a system exists or is contemplated in any 
given country, to whatever extent, its characteristics and 
effects are intended to be encompassed within the 
discussion to follow, whatever label might have been 
assigned to that system. 
18. This report refers, generically, to the “insolvency of 
natural persons”. As discussed below, the coverage of all 
situations of insolvency of natural persons presents some 
problems of delimitation (see below, section I.8.C). The focus 
of this report is on all the questions that affect the debtor as 
a person, and the report does not adopt the approach of 
defining painstakingly the debtors who are natural persons 
and who are the objects of the analysis here developed. 
Having recognized the value and relevance of the ICR 
Standard, and stating clearly that the ICR Standard governs 
the insolvency of natural persons who are engaged in 
business activities (traders or merchants), this report centers 
its attention on the personal aspects of insolvency: these 
aspects are prevalent in the insolvency of persons who 
cannot be said to be engaged in significant business activity, 
but they also exist in the cases of individuals who can be 
classified as “traders”, “merchants”, or “entrepreneurs”. The 
report avoids the use of the expression “consumer 
insolvency” because it would raise similar questions as to the 
distinction between consumers and non-consumers in 
numerous legal systems. Therefore, the report uses the 
expressions “insolvency of natural persons” and “personal 
insolvency” indistinctly. The report is addressed to the 
questions posed by the insolvency of individuals, rather than 
to those questions raised by the interaction of business 
activities and commercial credit, and it is for policymakers to 
determine the relevance of the analysis contained in this 
report to the specific circumstances that affect insolvent 
individuals in any particular system.    
I.5. Precedents 
19. This report is built on numerous sources for, and 
experiences in, the regulation of the insolvency of natural 
persons around the world. 
20. The national experiences in the design of a functional 
insolvency regime for natural persons are too numerous to 
be listed, but they have served as the basis for the analysis 
developed in this report.  
21. The study of the regimes of the insolvency of natural 
persons has benefited from reports from different 




(a) The Consumer Debt Report of INSOL International (I, 
2001 and II, 2011); 
(b) The report on Legal Solutions to Debt Problems in 
Credit Societies of the Council of Europe (2005); 
(c) The reports of the European Commission, Consumer 
Overindebtedness and Consumer Law in the European 
Union, for the Commission of the European Communities 
(2003); and Towards a Common Operational European 
Definition of Over-Indebtedness (2008);  
(d) The Model Law on Family Insolvency for Latin America 
and the Caribbean, of Consumers International (2011). 
I.6. Intended users of this report  
22.  The potential readership of this report comprises all 
those who are interested in the development of regimes for 
the insolvency of natural persons.  
(a) Policymakers wishing to design a balanced system for 
the treatment of the insolvency of natural persons; 
(b) International organizations, both governmental and 
non-governmental;  
(c) Members of the judiciary;  
(d) Lawyers and insolvency practitioners;  
(e) Financial and credit institutions that provide credit to 
natural persons; and 
(f) All persons and institutions involved in insolvency 
reform and reform assistance. 
23. Not all of these potential readers will have legal training. 
Accordingly, the report is intended to be formulated in an 
accessible “plain language” style.  
24. The report has been formulated in a fashion that enables 
it to be used by countries with diverse legal traditions. It uses 
neutral generic terminology, except where the analysis 
requires the use of specific legal terms belonging to certain 
systems. 
I.7. Context and coordination of insolvency treatment 
for natural persons 
25. Any consideration of a regime for addressing the 
insolvency of natural persons should take into account the 
surrounding context of laws, policies, and practices with 
which such a regime must necessarily coordinate. Perhaps 
most directly, a regime for addressing the insolvency of 
natural persons is essentially an extension, a final stage of 




for enforcing debt claims and property rights. Less directly, 
but no less importantly, insolvency regimes for natural 
persons implicate salient issues of data protection and 
personal privacy, as well as a whole host of social and 
economic regulatory issues, such as individual counseling, 
education, social welfare provision, and family and housing 
policy. Both practically and as a matter of legal policy, 
financial distress and insolvency are inextricably linked with 
credit extension, banking, taxation, and business 
entrepreneurship, as well as with the more fundamental laws 
of contractual and delictual obligations and property—and 
the interaction of the obligations and property regimes. How 
any society regards debt will impact on any consideration of 
treating the excessive burdens of that debt. For example, a 
given legal or cultural system might regard debts as a 
collective obligation of a family, tribe, or some larger group 
beyond the individual debtor most directly responsible for 
the onset of the obligation. In such a situation, the need for 
and proper structure of a system for treating insolvency 
would be profoundly affected by such a perspective, which 
differs from the basic notion of individual liability upon 
which the discussion in this report—and most present 
insolvency systems—is premised. 
26. The degree to which each of these coordinate systems 
functions satisfactorily -or not- in any given country will 
necessarily impact on a proper assessment of a potential 
insolvency regime for natural persons, both in general and 
with respect to specific provisions and implementation 
strategies. Many countries, for example, continue to struggle 
with “rule of law” issues, including low popular acceptance 
of and adherence to law generally, an insufficiently 
supported or qualified judiciary, and even corruption in one 
or more levels of government. The degree to which an 
insolvency mechanism might function against—or in spite 
of—a backdrop of such systemic weaknesses is an important 
consideration to be taken into account. 
27. The need for and desired extent and operation of an 
insolvency system for natural persons will not only be 
influenced by such coordinate areas of law and society, an 
insolvency regime will also influence the structure and 
operation of these surrounding systems. To take a simple 
example, a country without a robust system of lending and 
borrowing may well have far less need for a system of natural 
person insolvency—though other sources of obligations and 
their enforcement may produce the pernicious effects 
discussed below, and an insolvency system may well have at 
least a limited role to play in achieving some of the benefits 
described below. Conversely, the existence or absence of a 
system of natural person insolvency might well impact on the 
willingness or ability of creditors to make financing available 
to consumers or entrepreneurs, though the specific direction 




substantial uncertainty, despite a wealth of research and 
academic debate on the issue.  
28. Likewise, a country may choose to deal with the 
challenges of personal financial distress not through a 
specific system concentrated on the treatment of insolvency, 
but through broad limitations on the enforcement of 
judgments and other claims. Another alternative could be an 
aggressive regime of what might be called “consumer 
protection,” even if such a system protects small business 
people and others who are not “pure” consumers.  
Conversely, the existence of an insolvency regime for natural 
persons may well alleviate or exacerbate pressure in other 
areas of a country’s legal and social infrastructure.  For 
example, issues of inefficient claims enforcement, poor 
counseling and financial education infrastructure, weak (or 
liberal) credit regulation, and incentives for entrepreneurship 
might be dealt with to a greater or lesser degree in an 
insolvency system rather than through more direct 
regulation.  
29. Different policymakers may well come to different 
conclusions as to the proper methods and places to guide 
and influence behavior through social or economic 
regulation (or the lack thereof). Part of an assessment of an 
insolvency regime for natural persons, however, must be to 
take into account how such a system might fit within broader 
societal factors and the policy choices made in other areas of 
law that constrain or allow the kinds of practices and 
behaviors implicating or implicated by the insolvency of 
natural persons. Some of these practices and behaviors are 
discussed in section I.9, below, and section I.8.E again 
emphasizes that diversity of approach is all but inevitable in 
a world marked by different policy choices in what might be 
called “non-insolvency law.” 
I.8. Scope, General Goals and Distinguishing 
Characteristics of an Insolvency Regime for Natural 
Persons 
30.  The notion of an insolvency regime for natural persons 
is by no means a monolithic concept. Natural persons engage 
in a wide variety of activities with implications for debt and 
indebtedness. Financial distress can manifest itself in very 
different forms, insolvency can arise from a diverse range of 
causes, and policymakers might select from among a range 
of very different approaches to combating one or another 
form or degree of financial distress. Therefore, any 
discussion of a regime of insolvency for natural persons must 
begin by considering the scope of the topic to be 
encompassed—or left aside for treatment elsewhere. This 




focusing on the characteristics of the debtors and the type of 
financial distress treatment addressed here. It also clarifies 
the primary distinctions among the general goals and key 
elements of different kinds of regimes for responding to 
financial distress involving natural persons, especially those 
engaged to a greater or lesser degree in business activity.     
 
A) Treatment, not prevention, of insolvency 
31. As discussed in section I.7 above, the relatively narrow 
subject of this report is situated in the midst of an extremely 
broad constellation of topics with a direct or indirect 
relationship with the financial distress of natural persons. 
One topic especially closely related to treatment of 
insolvency is prevention of insolvency. Policy discussions and 
legal reforms in many current systems have incorporated a 
desire to attempt to address insolvency by avoiding it 
altogether through such techniques as more expansive credit 
reporting and financial literacy training. Financial literacy 
education in particular might be implemented within a 
system for treating existing insolvency, though the primary 
purpose of such education is not to treat existing insolvency, 
but rather to prevent repeat insolvency.  
32. An entire separate report could well be devoted to an 
exploration of the need for, proper structure, and 
effectiveness of such preventive measures. These issues are 
quite complex and subject to substantial debate and 
disagreement among experts. Accordingly, to avoid getting 
mired in a parallel series of disputes and to maintain focus, 
this report will not address preventive measures. Rather, this 
report will address only the treatment of already existing 
insolvency in the context of natural persons. 
B) Treatment of insolvency, not poverty 
33. Regimes for providing insolvency relief to natural 
persons are commonly compared to regimes for providing 
social assistance (welfare), especially to the impoverished. 
While insolvency and social support regimes can work in 
tandem, and there might be a small area of overlap in 
coverage, these distinct systems are designed with distinct 
goals in mind. As discussed in section I.9, below, most of the 
goals of insolvency regimes are economic in focus, avoiding 
waste and enhancing productivity. While the structures and 
goals of social assistance regimes vary greatly, they are 
generally driven primarily if not exclusively by humanitarian 
concerns for social solidarity and social planning, often 
whether or not this has any positive economic impact on any 




also involve compassion and a general desire to relieve 
suffering, goals relating to economic performance and 
efficiency are at least equally as prominent, if not 
predominant. 
34. The primary goal of most social support regimes is 
simply to redistribute income or other types of resources to 
individuals who lack those resources and are somehow 
inhibited from accumulating appropriate resources for 
themselves. This redistribution often occurs over extended 
periods of time, and it might be offered regardless of “need.” 
Social assistance systems generally are designed to ensure 
that every member of society has access to a baseline level 
of resources to meet their basic needs for necessities such as 
food, shelter, and healthcare. Of course, this goal is marked 
by conflicting visions of an appropriate baseline. Some social 
assistance is extended to support other social goals, such as 
reproduction and parenthood (e.g., child allowances). One 
need not have any debt burden to qualify for social 
assistance.  
35. Insolvency regimes are less like social assistance, and 
more like social insurance, protecting individuals from 
financial tragedy. For some debtors, an insolvency regime 
might function somewhat like a social assistance program 
designed specifically to support individuals with 
unmanageable debt and prevent unnecessary suffering and 
social exclusion. But insolvency systems do not offer cash 
support payments, and far from every overburdened debtor 
faces social exclusion and utter destitution. Lack of resources 
to meet basic needs may well lead to problems managing 
debt, but these two problems do not always appear together. 
Indeed, some have questioned the appropriateness of 
extending insolvency relief to impoverished debtors totally 
and permanently reliant on social assistance. Many of the 
benefits for creditors and society discussed below in section 
I.9 are not available in such cases. Others have pointed out 
that several of the advantages are present even in such cases; 
e.g., those relating to reducing wasteful collections costs and 
reducing stress and health problems, not to mention the 
humanitarian and religious concerns for offering relief to 
debtors themselves. These advantages are present even—
and perhaps especially—in cases involving so-called 
“judgment-proof” debtors, with no assets or income that can 
be seized by creditors under ordinary restrictions on 
enforcement.  
36. Most debtors served by an insolvency regime will rely on 
social assistance only temporarily -e.g., unemployment or 
medical assistance-, if at all. An insolvency regime serves 
mainly individuals who do not suffer from a long-term 
disability or general surfeit of resources and who thus do not 
need affirmative social support. Insolvency regimes are 




capable of producing sufficient income to support 
themselves and their families, but an overwhelming debt 
burden saps their initiative and depresses their productive 
capacity. These debtors do not seek more government 
intervention in their lives; they seek less government 
intervention from officially sanctioned wasteful and 
destructive debt enforcement action. The goal is to stop 
counterproductive debt collection, not to receive financial or 
other resources.  
37. Fundamentally, the core distinction between regimes to 
combat poverty and insolvency is that the problem of 
poverty cannot be “solved” in one procedure for any given 
individual, whereas the practical problems of insolvency can 
be solved in one procedure. The real problems of insolvency 
flow not from the fact of inability to pay, but from creditors’ 
and the state’s failing to recognize inability to pay and to 
appropriately curtail the pointless and destructive pursuit of 
uncollectible debts. Stopping these pursuits, or at least 
striking a rational compromise for satisfying them, is an 
almost instantaneous solution to the core practical problems 
that distressed debt poses for creditors, debtors, and society.  
38. One might argue that an insolvency regime indeed does 
impose a redistribution of resources away from creditors, but 
as discussed below, preventing creditors’ pursuit of an 
illusion of collectable debt does not deprive creditors of a 
real “resource”; it simply prompts them to accept reality and 
stop the wasteful and destructive continuing pursuit of 
chimerical returns. The losses confirmed in this process may 
well be financed indirectly by society -much like a social 
assistance regime- as creditors increase the cost of credit, 
but this is in many cases the result of the fact of the debtor’s 
insolvency, not the result of the insolvency relief process 
itself. 
39. Also, a properly functioning insolvency regime should 
provide relief only to those debtors in need, and relief should 
be delivered in a brief procedure. Most debtors are able to 
manage their reasonable debt burdens, even if they 
experience some measure of distress along the way, so only 
a limited percentage of all debtors should expect to obtain 
relief through an insolvency procedure. Such a regime is 
designed only to provide relief needed by debtors whose 
means are expected to be overwhelmed by their debt 
servicing obligations for some extended period of time.  This 
state is often referred to as “overindebtedness.” Though this 
term is variously defined,4 the core concept generally is the 
                                                          
4For a discussion of the definitional challenges here, especially in 
contrast to other measures of financial distress, such as insolvency, see 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Credit, Debt & Financial 
Difficulty in Britain, 2009/10:  A Report using data from the YouGov 




debtor’s ongoing inability to service current obligations on all 
outstanding obligations as they become due. This situation 
often leads to a downward spiral of growing indebtedness 
from which the debtor cannot escape without intervention 
from the type of relief system envisioned in this report. Most 
likely, this mismatch between disposable income and debt 
service will have been triggered by one of the many 
accidents of life, such as unemployment, illness, divorce, or 
other income interruption or unexpected expense. Any well-
designed insolvency regime will impose some entry 
requirements, as discussed below. By removing or alleviating 
the unserviceable debt burden and reinvigorating the 
debtor’s capacity for self-support, an insolvency procedure 
should provide relief not gradually over an extended time, 
but quite quickly. Within a relatively short period of time 
following an insolvency procedure, most debtors who can 
benefit from an insolvency system should be back on solid 
financial footing, and most of these debtors will not be 
expected to seek more relief later. 
 
C) Insolvency of natural persons: “Pure” consumers 
versus those engaged in business 
40. One particular area of law with which a regime for 
natural person insolvency must coordinate is business 
insolvency. Many of the same issues of law, policy, and 
practice that arise in business insolvency might also arise in 
the context of addressing the insolvency of natural persons. 
This is especially true when the insolvent natural person is or 
has been also engaged in business, whether or not the 
insolvency arises as a direct consequence of business activity.  
See the following section I.8.D for a discussion of the 
principal policy distinctions between business insolvency and 
the insolvency of natural persons. 
41. In some insolvency systems, traders, artisans and self-
employed professionals can become debtors in general 
insolvency procedures, whereas other natural persons may 
be excluded from these procedures. In many other countries, 
the debtor in an insolvency procedure can be, in principle at 
least, any legal subject, including natural persons who have 
become indebted in their private, non-business capacity. 
However, if the insolvency law of such a country does not 
include a discharge of debt—or makes it quite difficult to 
obtain a discharge—natural persons not engaged in business 
rarely file for the insolvency procedure, even if it is 
theoretically possible. In recent decades, many systems have 
developed specifically to provide debt relief to natural 
persons, and some of these systems exclude debtors with 




notable trend to find specific solutions for debtors with 
relatively limited ongoing business activity.   
42. As explained in section I.1, above, the ICR Standard 
governs the proper treatment of business insolvency. For 
natural persons with substantial business activity 
representing most or all of the indebtedness giving rise to 
the situation of insolvency to be treated, the ICR Standard 
represents the source of guidance on the proper structure of 
and approach to a regime of business insolvency. This report 
does not diminish the relevance of the ICR Standard. 
43. Two essential differences distinguish this document from 
the ICR Standard: First, unlike the ICR Standard, this 
document is a “reflective report (. . .) suggesting guidance,” 
as explained above in section I.1. It is explicitly non-
prescriptive, leaving readers to arrive at their own 
conclusions “taking into account different policy options and 
the diverse sensitivities around the world.” This document  
does not create a “standard,” and it contains no 
recommendations or “best practices”; rather, it simply 
identifies particularly salient issues and offers empirical 
observations from experts regarding evolving practices and 
the results of those practices around the world. 
44.  Second, while the ICR Standard concentrates on the 
resolution of business insolvency, whether the debtor is a 
natural or artificial entity, this report focuses on those issues 
most relevant to natural persons as debtors, whether or not 
engaged in business. To be sure, the ICR Standard contains 
discussion of several topics that are equally relevant for the 
treatment of insolvency of natural persons not engaged in 
business; for example, the functions and qualifications of 
insolvency representatives and other system administrators, 
and the importance and design of a moratorium or stay of 
actions against the debtor and the debtor’s property to 
provide “breathing space” for the development of a payment 
plan or other resolution. Nonetheless, the ICR Standard was 
not designed to address the specific and often unique 
concerns of natural person debtors whose insolvency has 
limited or no connection to business activity. Consequently, 
such concerns are the primary focus of this report. Legal 
issues that are relevant primarily to the insolvency of 
businesses or traders are only referred to here when some 
salient distinction is to be drawn between the operation of 
such issues in business cases and in those involving natural 
persons engaged in little or no significant business activity.   
45.  This report is not restricted, however, to debtors with 
little or no business activity. The animating premise of this 
report is that insolvent natural persons face a shared core of 
key issues, whether or not business activity is a part of the 
context of the insolvency, and these concerns differ in 




the ICR Standard. All insolvency regimes have the potential 
to share key elements and issues; nonetheless, this report 
proceeds from the standpoint that any debtor’s status as a 
natural person raises unique considerations that are at least 
equally central, if not more so, to the proper structure and 
assessment of a system for addressing natural person 
insolvency. A multi-national corporate conglomerate 
certainly has relevant similarities with the individual 
proprietor of a local food stand in terms of regulating the 
insolvencies of these businesses. The shared characteristics 
are at least as central, if not significantly more so, however, 
as between the local food stand owner and a “pure” 
consumer with no business activity.  
46.  This report concentrates on the issues that differentiate 
any natural person’s insolvency from that of an artificial 
entity, and it addresses common insolvency issues, if at all, 
only from the distinct perspective of individual natural 
persons and their specific needs, motivations, and other 
characteristics. In other words, as discussed in section I.8.D, 
below, this report focuses on issues most implicated by the 
“human factor” inherent in any insolvency case involving a 
natural person as debtor. 
47. Similar “scope” observations might be made with 
respect to natural persons engaged in other specific business 
or professional activities. For example, this report highlights 
concerns that will inevitably arise in the context of natural 
persons engaged in farming operations, so it does 
conceivably apply to the insolvency of farmers. Once again, 
however, the focus here is on natural persons and the issues 
that unite a farming debtor and a non-farming debtor in that 
context. Little or no specific reference is made to the specific 
concerns of natural persons engaged in agricultural 
production or any other specific industry, though this report 
should not be read to downplay the existence or importance 
of specific challenges related to, for example, the insolvency 
of debtors engaged in farming (e.g., land tenure, government 
subsidies, and farm financing).  
48.  As the ICR Standard expressly acknowledges, it is often 
quite difficult to draw a meaningful distinction between 
“business” and “non-business” or “pure consumer” debtors. 
Natural persons quite commonly carry heavy debt loads after 
a termination of business activity. This kind of debt load may 
derive from a business that debtors have carried out in their 
own name or in a partnership, in which the partners have 
personal liability for the debts of the partnership. Quite 
often debtors have become personally liable for debts 
because they have given personal guarantees for the loans of 
a company with limited liability. Such debtors may have 
different connections with that company, for example, as 
shareholders or directors of the company or as next of kin of 




business activity in their own name are often essentially in a 
similar situation as wage-earning debtors who have become 
insolvent. For example, if the main source of debt is a 
housing loan or a guarantee for another person’s loan, there 
is little salient difference between a wage earner and a 
debtor who earns her living by providing services to a small 
number of different clients. While this kind of business 
activity has traditionally been common among artisans, 
craftsmen, traders, farmers, and many providers of 
professional services, the transformation of the labor market 
during the past few decades has transformed many providers 
of low-skill services from employees into self-employed 
service providers. 
49. Where and whether to draw a boundary line in the law 
at the point where business (or farming) considerations end 
and personal considerations begin, or where business (or 
farming) insolvency considerations predominate over natural 
person insolvency considerations is, once again, a matter for 
individual readers to assess. This report highlights the 
considerations most salient for natural person debtors of all 
kinds, to allow policymakers to evaluate for themselves 
whether and to what degree the specific and unifying 
concerns of natural person insolvency warrant special 
treatment in the distinct context of any given country.  
D) Distinction between business insolvency and the 
insolvency of natural persons 
50. The contrast between business and natural person 
insolvency regimes is essentially the opposite of the contrast 
between insolvency and social assistance relief, discussed 
above in section I.8.B. Whereas social assistance programs 
usually rest almost exclusively on humanitarian sentiments, 
insolvency relief for natural persons also involves a powerful 
element of economic concern. Business insolvency regimes 
lie at the other end of this spectrum; that is, while insolvency 
relief for natural persons does include some element of 
humanitarian empathy, business insolvency policy is driven 
almost exclusively by economic concerns. At the very least, 
arguments supporting business insolvency that are not 
entirely economic in nature usually appeal to a desire to 
support communities and jobs as a positive side-effect of 
saving failing businesses. The desire to relieve individual 
suffering is more direct and more central in the context of 
natural person insolvency. In the insolvency of companies 
and other legal entities, the debtor can be and often is 
completely dismembered and allowed to die. One of the 
primary goals of a regime of insolvency for natural persons, 
in contrast, is avoiding this fate for the debtor, not just in 
light of the negative consequences for other people in the 




51. As explored in section I.9, below, many of the goals of 
the two types of insolvency regimes overlap, such as 
increasing and more fairly distributing payment to creditors, 
reducing waste and redundant burdens on official organisms, 
and enhancing economic performance for the ultimate 
benefit of society. The human element often adds a slight 
but important twist to several of these economic goals. Take, 
for example, the goal of reinvigorating natural person 
debtors and offering them an incentive to engage in income-
producing activity. Artificial entities need not be 
“incentivized” to remain productive; their human owners can 
simply shut down and restart their business activity 
somewhere else, though at significant expense. Nonetheless, 
the process of restructuring a company’s debt burdens 
results in continued productivity, avoiding a long interruption 
while the entrepreneurs re-launch their business elsewhere. 
Often in the context of business insolvency, it is 
fundamentally the human element behind the business that 
needs to be protected. If the entrepreneur is ruined with no 
access to personal insolvency relief, the opportunity for 
accessing future productive, entrepreneurial energies is lost. 
Only a regime of insolvency relief for natural persons can get 
to the heart of this problem. 
52. Not only the goals and techniques, but also the 
assumptions underlying the two different types of insolvency 
systems differ for important reasons. For example, business 
insolvency rules are often crafted on the -usually unstated- 
assumption that the actors involved, including the debtor, 
are fully rational economic actors who took on -or should 
have taken on- debts with full and adequate information. A 
wealth of behavioral studies now makes clear that this 
foundational assumption is wholly inappropriate in the 
context of most natural persons.5 Especially if the debtor has 
not had the benefit of expert advice—as will usually be the 
case for debtors with mainly consumption-type loans—
natural persons seldom behave in a way consistent with the 
classical economic ideals on which business insolvency 
systems are founded. Likewise, the incentives, both positive 
and negative, benefits and sanctions, built into business 
insolvency systems are less likely to influence natural persons 
-especially those not engaged in business- in the same way 
as sophisticated commercial entities with well-supported 
advisory resources.  
                                                          
5 See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373 
(2004); Saul Schwartz, Personal Bankruptcy Law:  A Behavioral 
Perspective, in CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 61 (Johanna 
Niemi-Kiesiläinen, Iain Ramsay & William Whitford eds., 2003); Russell B. 
Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science:  Removing the 
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics , 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051 
(2000); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism 
Seriously:  The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630 
(1999); Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, and Richard Thaler, A Behavioral 





E) The divergence in the treatment of natural person 
insolvency under national legal regimes  
53. In the design and implementation of an insolvency 
regime for natural persons, it is most likely the case that one 
size does not fit all. As acknowledged above in section I.7, 
various regions, nations, groups, and even individuals have 
starkly contrasting views on the religious, moral, cultural, 
and economic implications of debt, risk, and forgiveness. 
Other important topics are similarly subject to widely 
divergent viewpoints, including notions of collective versus 
individual responsibility, obligations running from society to 
individuals and vice versa, and formal versus informal 
dispute resolution. More concrete factors also create very 
different foundations for supporting an insolvency system, 
including institutional capacities of a variety of kinds, the 
stability of the banking or other lending sector, and the 
scope and nature of economic activity, especially the 
prevalence of personal versus impersonal exchange and 
activity involving credit and borrowing. Not all creditors are 
large institutions, and the ripple effects of declaring some 
claims to be uncollectible can wreak havoc on a small 
economy, especially one based on close personal 
relationships—though, as discussed below, it is likely the fact 
of insolvency, not the system for confirming and relieving it, 
that is responsible for this problem. The many factors that 
might impact on and be impacted by an insolvency system 
were mentioned above in section I.7. 
54. In light of these widespread and fundamental 
divergences in circumstance, philosophy, and capacity, 
international institutions must take care in avoiding a 
“mainstreaming” approach, compelling countries to adopt 
regimes or aspects of regimes that are incompatible with 
local conditions. The many benefits of such regimes may be 
more or less attractive, and more or less applicable, in 
various countries. Likewise, discrete aspects of these regimes 
might be more appropriate for some social, cultural, 
economic, political, and judicial structures than for others. 
The current state of insolvency regimes for natural persons 
demonstrates this. Despite the close connections and 
similarities among the some two dozen nations that have 
adopted full-fledged insolvency regimes for natural persons 
today, the structure and operation of these systems differ, 
often dramatically, from country to country, even in the 
closely clustered nations of Northern, Central, and Western 
Europe. Many of these differences will be explored in this 
report, though the reasons for these differences remain 




55. In light of these considerations, this report offers not 
prescriptions and direct recommendations, but simply 
reflections. It represents the thoughts of expert observers 
not on the state of the art, but on the variety of approaches 
taken to various aspects of insolvency relief systems, and the 
benefits and obstacles that have revealed themselves over 
the past several decades of especially vibrant growth in 
these systems. It identifies issues to be considered in any 
insolvency regime for natural persons, alternative means of 
addressing those issues, and the consequences of making 
one or another choice, based on empirical observations from 
existing systems. This report thus endeavors not to convince 
policymakers throughout the world to follow the example of 
the various regimes existing today, but rather to enrich their 
own independent development process by considering the 
successes and struggles of a growing number of countries 
that have reaped the benefits of an insolvency regime for 
natural persons. 
 
I.9. Foundations of insolvency for natural persons 
56. In order to evaluate any regime of insolvency for natural 
persons, one has to consider the particular salutary effects of 
such a system. In particular, as discussed above, one has to 
distinguish these effects from those pursued by other similar 
systems, such as social safety nets (welfare) and business 
insolvency. In considering whether to adopt an insolvency 
regime for natural persons, and which approach might be 
taken with respect to various aspects of the structure of that 
system, lawmakers should bear in mind the broad range of 
purposes to be served and the degree to which each of these 
purposes is relevant for any given country’s cultural, political, 
and economic circumstances.  
57. In the past several decades, lawmakers from a variety of 
regions have explicitly identified and evaluated a wide range 
of desired benefits to be achieved by an insolvency regime 
for natural persons. The desired benefits fall into at least 
three distinct categories: First, benefits for creditors have 
historically constituted the main objective of insolvency 
regimes, which until the late 1900s had been often primarily 
if not exclusively designed for business debtors. Second, 
more recent discussions of insolvency regimes, especially 
those specifically designed for non-business debtors, have 
focused on benefits for debtors and their families. While the 
creditor-debtor relationship often has been viewed in simple 
binary terms, a third category of much more substantial 
benefits has also received substantial attention recently: 
benefits redounding broadly to significant segments of wider 
society and to society as a whole. As the discussion below 




and more significant list of benefits and purposes for an 
insolvency regime for natural persons. It is this category on 
which lawmakers seem to have concentrated most attention 
in evaluating the need for and the desired effects of such 
systems. Policymakers have taken care, as they should, to 
maintain a balanced approach in evaluating the distribution 
of benefits and burdens among these three interest groups.  
  
A) Benefits for creditors 
58. A legal regime of insolvency never exists in a vacuum. 
From the perspective of creditors, such a system is necessary 
in large part in response to a weakness or failure in a 
coordinate system. An insolvency regime benefits creditors 
primarily by addressing two major weaknesses of the system 
of ordinary enforcement (collections) of obligations; namely, 
(1) ineffective mechanisms for finding value and the resulting 
waste resulting from individual creditors’ blindly pursuing 
enforcement actions to the detriment of themselves and 
other creditors, and (2) inequitable distribution of available 
value to one or a few aggressive or sophisticated creditors, to 
the detriment of the collective of all creditors. These 
weaknesses theoretically could be overcome without a 
separate insolvency system if the enforcement system were 
restructured. Proposals for such an approach have arisen in 
some countries, though to date, lawmakers seem to have 
concluded that adopting an insolvency system represents a 
more efficient and effective means of increasing payment to 
creditors and enhancing the fair distribution of such 
payments among all creditors. These benefits and the 
arguments that support them are largely identical in the 
context of insolvency of both debtors engaged in business 
and “pure” consumers, and they have existed largely 
unchanged since the very advent of the idea of a formal 
response to financial distress. 
(i) Increasing payment to individual creditors 
59. Most fundamentally, an insolvency regime might 
address weakness in the ordinary system of enforcement of 
obligations by supplanting it entirely as the collection 
mechanism of choice. When the ordinary enforcement 
system is hindered by formalities and restrictions and 
inefficiencies of a variety of kinds, independent insolvency 
regimes might offer creditors a more effective means—
perhaps the only effective means—to coerce payment from 
debtors. Even if the ordinary enforcement regime works 
relatively well, however, an insolvency regime might 




60. The simplest enhancement of a collective insolvency 
system is eliminating the waste inherent in multiple 
individual enforcement actions and fire sales of the debtor’s 
assets. Without a collective insolvency regime, each creditor 
has to engage and finance its own investigation of the 
debtor’s assets. If the debtor claims financial distress, each 
creditor has to decide whether the debtor’s claims of 
inability to pay are credible and further investment in futile 
collections efforts should be avoided. In close cases, each 
individual creditor has little incentive to maximize the value 
of a limited pool of assets or to avoid wasting value in 
depressed “fire sales.” Laboring under the dual burdens of 
information asymmetry and uncertainty, each creditor has 
an incentive to spend money on enforcement action, acting 
hastily to extract as much value as possible to protect its 
own interests. Individual, uncoordinated enforcement 
actions might represent a dead-weight loss if the assets 
produce no return beyond the enforcement costs. Even if 
significant asset value is available, such actions inevitably 
destroy value and increase losses for many if not most 
creditors that could be avoided by coordinated, collective 
action. An insolvency regime can offer creditors more 
convincing evidence of the folly of further collections, 
allowing creditors to avoid the expense of a multiplication 
of unsuccessful enforcement actions. For whatever assets 
are available, a collective insolvency regime concentrates 
the administrative expenses of enforcement into one 
proceeding in which an administrator has an interest in 
maximizing the value of assets for all creditors. 
61. A related enhancement concerns identification and 
location of the debtor’s assets. Maximizing the value of 
assets requires creditors first to find assets. Even if some 
source of value is found, individual creditors face significant 
costs in pursuing those sources of value, often in 
competition with a debtor intent on evading or at least 
hindering these pursuits. Ordinary enforcement proceedings 
generally contain some mechanism for coercing the debtor 
to reveal the location of assets, but positive incentives 
generally work more effectively than negative threats.  
Debtors can be made to reveal their assets much more fully 
and readily with a warm positive incentive, rather than a 
cold blustery threat. At the very least, debtors might be 
more forthcoming with respect to the location of assets if 
they can rest assured that they will have to undergo such an 
interrogation only once in a collective proceeding, avoiding 
a multiplicity of inconvenient interruptions of their lives. 
More likely, an insolvency proceeding can provide an 
incentive in the form of a global delay or even discharge of 
renewed collections actions in exchange for debtors’ being 
forthcoming about the location of their present assets. 
62. As attractive as these “asset-based” benefits are in the 




context of natural persons, especially those with no ongoing 
business activity. Though natural persons engaged in 
business might have business assets to distribute among 
creditors, most individual debtors have little or no available 
asset value by the time enforcement actions have begun to 
multiply. As discussed below in section II.5.B, creditors are 
likely to recover payment from a natural person only if they 
can gain access to some source of future value. Luckily for 
creditors, natural persons cannot fade out of existence like 
corporations, dissolving upon the conclusion of insolvency 
proceedings. Individuals will continue to produce income 
from business or work or receive external support of some 
kind. More important than locating assets, the benefit of an 
insolvency system lies in creating asset value by 
encouraging debtors to be productive, facilitating 
compromise payment of some of that future value to 
creditors, and monitoring compliance with that compromise 
over a period of years. Experience suggests that such 
benefits can be severely limited in the context of natural 
persons not engaged in business, as discussed below in 
section II.5, but even the promise of a limited benefit is 
better than a certain loss. Another effect of the existence of 
an insolvency system for natural persons is that it 
encourages proper valuation of claims, and in this way 
creditors admit their losses and, in most systems, claim tax 
deductions for them (see below, section I.9C (i)).  
63. Most ordinary enforcement systems contain no 
mechanism for forcing debtors to work to produce future 
value for creditors. Indeed, the abolition of slavery and debt 
peonage in most areas by the mid-19th century rendered 
unlawful most forms of legally coerced labor to pay off debt. 
Even debtor’s prison is not a sure method of coercing 
debtors to pay, and the tragic irony of imprisoning a debtor 
in order to goad him into working to pay creditors ought to 
be obvious. Imprisonment for debt was abandoned in most 
areas at the same time and for many of the same reasons as 
slavery and debt peonage, though also because it was 
spectacularly ineffective in producing payment for creditors.   
64. Though the debtor’s person today is largely insulated 
from debt enforcement, the debtor’s property is not, and the 
most important type of property—wages and other 
earnings—has become the dominant target of collections 
actions. Garnishment of wages and other debts owed to 
debtors was limited in the middle of the 20th century in 
many systems, but even these limitations expose a significant 
portion of debtors’ income to expropriation by creditors.  If 
most or all of their future earnings are destined for creditors, 
debtors have little incentive to produce income and, indeed, 
a natural incentive to “go on strike” and simply refuse to 
work for the benefit of their creditors. Debtors might simply 
rely on public assistance to support themselves and their 




“black market” economy, producing value that cannot be 
accessed by creditors. Indeed, even in the regular economy 
of some especially large nations, natural person debtors can 
easily move from job to job and hide business income 
entirely, temporarily or permanently hindering creditors’ 
efforts to find value.  
65. Here again, positive incentives are far more effective 
than punishment, and an insolvency regime can offer a 
respite or discharge as a very effective incentive for debtors 
to produce value to share with creditors. Without the 
incentives an insolvency system can offer, the alternative for 
creditors of natural persons is generally not payment; it is a 
lifetime of fruitless pursuit by creditors of debtors 
completely withdrawn from regular economic life. 
Experience in many countries over the past several decades 
attests to the effectiveness of insolvency regimes in 
incentivizing debtors to produce value for creditors that 
simply would not have been realized otherwise. 
66. An essential aspect of getting debtors to produce value 
is striking a compromise that binds all creditors in exchange 
for a distribution of that value. In the ordinary enforcement 
system, each creditor has to decide whether the debtor’s 
compromise offer of less than full payment should be 
accepted as reasonable. As discussed in section II.1, below, 
informal workout negotiations are just as common among 
natural person debtors as they are in the corporate context, 
but for a variety of reasons, creditors often find natural 
persons less trustworthy than corporate managers. Also, 
creditors’ perspectives and expectations in the context of 
natural persons often differ markedly from the corporate 
context with respect to reasonable sacrifices and the moral 
compulsion to fulfill obligations. A settlement proposal that 
creditors might accept as a reasonable business measure for 
a corporation tends to be viewed in much more moralistic 
and judgmental terms when advanced by an individual, 
especially those not engaged in “morally neutral” business 
activity. Questions of appropriate personal sacrifices and 
standards of living make the process of deciding whether to 
pursue an individual debtor all the more complicated. 
67. Coordinating the decision by numerous individual 
creditors to accept whatever the debtor has to offer presents 
a classic collective action problem that is unlikely to be 
overcome without some external control. In an insolvency 
regime, a neutral administrator might more efficiently and 
effectively coordinate the investigation, evaluation, and 
negotiated division of the debtor’s productive  capacity. 
Creditors are more likely to accept the conclusions of a 
neutral administrator, and empowering one administrator to 
strike the most reasonable compromise deal for creditors 




irrational holdouts and conflicting strategic behaviors by 
isolated creditors. 
68. A final potential benefit of an insolvency system for 
creditors concerns continuous monitoring. Once a 
compromise deal is in place with the debtor, someone has to 
ensure that the debtor abides by the new arrangement. In an 
informal workout, each creditor would bear its own costs of 
monitoring the debtor’s ongoing financial situation and 
performance under the workout agreement. An insolvency 
system might again eliminate wasteful duplication of 
monitoring costs, concentrating that task on one 
administrator who might well have greater authority to 
scrutinize the debtor’s activities than any individual creditor 
would. The insolvency representative might be empowered 
to take remedial action in case of default by the debtor, 
further alleviating the burden on creditors in pursuing 
maximum payment from the debtor. 
 
(ii) Enhancing fair distribution of payment 
among the collective of creditors 
69. In addition to increasing payment to any one creditor, an 
insolvency regime might enhance the ordinary enforcement 
system simply by its collective nature. Taking into account 
the interests of all creditors at once, an insolvency regime is 
better able to ensure a fair distribution of available value 
among all creditors. This redounds to the particular benefit 
of unsophisticated creditors, who are unable or unwilling to 
pursue individual collections actions, or who have weak 
bargaining positions with respect to the debtor. Indeed, this 
effect is enhanced in an insolvency system where debtors 
have an incentive to seek relief themselves, rather than 
waiting for creditors to engage the insolvency system. If 
individual sophisticated creditors are better off engaging the 
ordinary enforcement system, seizing all available value and 
leaving nothing for other creditors, a system that encourages 
the debtor to engage the collective redress system offers the 
potential of all of the benefits discussed above to 
unsophisticated creditors without any action or expense on 
their part.  
B) Benefits for debtors and their families 
70. Perhaps even more obvious than increasing payment to 
creditors, providing relief to “honest but unfortunate” 
debtors has long been a primary purpose of insolvency 
regimes for natural persons. Though business insolvency 
systems have developed in the past several centuries with an 




insolvency systems have been used also to provide relief for 
debtors for an even longer period. Policymakers for millennia 
have engaged insolvency systems based on a variety of 
motivations related to relieving the suffering of debtors, 
including religious conviction, ideals of social solidarity, and 
basic sentiments of empathy and humanitarian concern for 
reducing long-term suffering. 
71. Unmanageable debt burdens cause a host of serious 
psychic, and ultimately physical, problems for debtors.  
Empirical studies have documented widespread and 
profound debtor suffering from the fear and anxiety 
produced by constant worry about inability to repay debts, 
as well as nagging feelings of failure. 6  Constant anxiety 
arising from inability to pay or from harassment by creditors 
can cause serious emotional and other problems for debtors, 
including depression and social withdrawal. Ironically, 
overwhelming debt burdens might cause debtors to be 
unable to concentrate on work and other responsibilities, 
thus preventing debtors from responsibly managing their 
own financial distress and plunging debtors into a 
descending spiral of failure. This situation of hopelessness 
can sap not only the debtor’s motivation to engage in 
productive work, but also the debtor’s essential joy or even 
desire for living. 
72. Left unaddressed, these psychic maladies can manifest 
themselves in serious physical problems. High stress levels 
and constant anxiety have been known to produce a wide 
range of physical ailments in debtors, ranging from sleep 
deprivation to inability to concentrate at work to more 
serious maladies, such as indigestion, heart and nerve 
problems, weakness and depression, and even thoughts of 
suicide. In one country, the system of insolvency for natural 
persons arose largely in response to a call by a doctor who 
observed a high incidence of physical ailments directly linked 
to the counterproductive operation of the debt collection 
system. In another country, media reports have drawn 
attention to the desperate plight of numerous debtors who 
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have taken their own lives as a result of their hopeless 
insolvency. 
73. Systems for treating insolvency generally provide quite 
direct and often immediate relief from the stress, anxiety, 
and other negative emotional and physical reactions 
associated with inability to manage debts. Studies of debtors 
in insolvency systems have reported on the tremendous 
sense of relief that a simple respite—even a temporary 
one—can offer to debtors plagued by anxiety, guilt, shame, 
and helplessness. 7  Many policymakers around the world 
have concluded that relieving the long-term pain and 
suffering of these debtors is a worthy goal in and of itself.  
74. As discussed below, however, most of the benefits for 
debtors have spillover effects on broader society, and 
modern discussions of insolvency regimes for natural 
persons most often rely on these wider benefits rather than 
concentrating on compassion for individual debtors.  
75. One important set of wider benefits moves only slightly 
beyond the debtor to the debtor’s family. The spouses and 
especially children of distressed debtors suffer through no 
fault of their own and so are especially deserving of 
compassion and relief. Children of hopelessly distressed 
debtors suffer serious deleterious effects growing up in a 
household constantly hounded by creditor calls and financial 
strain, especially if the parent debtor withdraws from 
productive economic activity as a result of this constant 
pressure. These childhood effects can manifest themselves 
later in life in the form of poor socialization due to social 
exclusion, as well as unconstructive attitudes toward 
financial responsibility, paying taxes, and productive 
engagement. Already moving toward the next, broader set of 
goals, ensuring that children grow up in environments of 
constructive engagement with obligations, work, and society 
redounds to the benefit not only of the debtor and his 
children, but also to the benefit of society. 
C) Benefits for society, national and international 
76. If financial distress were an isolated phenomenon, 
affecting only small pockets of individuals, an official regime 
for treating insolvency would most likely not be regarded as 
a moral or political imperative. The benefits to the few 
creditors and debtors involved would be the same as 
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discussed above, but these benefits would not warrant the 
efforts and other significant costs of setting up and 
administering a relief system. Even where levels of financial 
distress have risen high enough to justify consideration of 
formal relief, the numbers of creditors and debtors directly 
impacted have been quite limited, representing only small 
fractions of the total population. The primary goals of an 
insolvency regime for natural persons are thus not so much 
based on isolated benefits to specific creditors and debtors, 
but rather on the more widespread benefits to the broader 
society on which those creditors and debtors have a variety 
of important indirect influences.  
77. The most powerful driving concerns behind an 
insolvency regime are about ameliorating the negative 
systemic effects of unregulated distressed debt. Thus, as 
mentioned above in section I.7, in societies that lack a broad 
base of instances of distressed debt, or if those problems are 
addressed effectively by cultural responses such as collective 
responsibility within families, tribes, or villages, an 
insolvency regime for natural persons might well not serve a 
sufficiently substantial purpose to warrant the costs of 
implementation. But where traditional methods of collective 
redress have begun to break down, a societal response may 
well be warranted in light not so much of the desired 
benefits to individuals, but of the desired follow-on benefits 
flowing through the web of relationships in complex societies.  
78. These benefits to society can be grouped loosely into 
two categories. One category encompasses a variety of 
benefits associated with disciplining creditors to 
acknowledge the reality of their low-value claims against 
distressed debtors, internalize the costs of their own lax 
credit evaluation, and more effectively and fairly redistribute 
those costs among the society that benefits from the 
availability of credit. The other category focuses on the intra-
national and inter-national benefits of maximizing 
engagement and productivity by debtors, especially in light 
of the increasingly competitive global marketplace. 
(i) Establishing proper account valuation 
79. For institutional creditors, the value of their own 
accounts receivable plays an important role in a variety of 
interactions with broader society. Properly valuing those 
accounts is vitally important to providing a proper basis on 
which investors and regulators can manage their 
relationships with such creditors. Investors’ decisions with 
respect to properly managing and investing in such 
companies depend, often to a very significant degree, on an 
accurate vision of the expected cash flow and value to be 
derived from these accounts. More broadly, government 




especially for lending institutions, in assessing the strength 
of these institutions, in judging the need for regulatory 
intervention, and in allowing these institutions to take 
deposits and otherwise manage the money of individual 
accountholders. 
80. An essential aspect of valuing an account receivable is 
assessing the likelihood that the account balance will, in fact, 
ultimately be collected from the account debtor. While the 
overwhelming bulk of accounts are collected in the ordinary 
course, a rising tide of financial distress among account 
debtors can quickly erode the real value of accounts. Even if 
creditor institutions honestly perceive this erosion of value, 
the full scope and extent of the problem may be difficult to 
assess. To maintain good standing with external interests, 
creditors have powerful incentives to underestimate the 
degree of distress, perhaps grossly underestimating a delay 
in collecting on a series of accounts or failing to charge off 
uncollectible accounts as worthless. A human propensity for 
over-optimism, combined with a desire by creditor 
institutions to report pleasing figures to investors and 
regulators, can all too often lead to overly optimistic 
estimates of the collectability and therefore the value of 
accounts owed by distressed debtors.  
81. If the value of a key asset like accounts is improperly 
inflated, a chain reaction of negative effects can flow quite 
quickly once the reality of the situation is discovered. If this 
occurs as a result of a series of unexpected defaults by 
account debtors, the negative effects can be immediate and 
quite severe. The housing crisis that spread from the United 
States to infect the global economy in the late 2000s offers a 
vivid illustration of this problem. Banks and investors with 
interests in loans secured by home mortgages generally 
failed to admit until it was far too late that borrower 
financial distress had severely undermined the value of these 
accounts, a problem that was exacerbated by inflated 
valuations of many homes securing such loans. For distressed 
accounts that could be saved, creditors failed to take proper 
remedial action to put debtors back into a position from 
which they might reasonably service their debts. Similar 
stories have played out with respect to many different kinds 
of receivables. 
82. Accounting standards reflect the need for proper 
discounting of distressed account assets, and banking 
regulations often require non-performing loans to be written 
off after a relatively short period of time. Regulations and 
regulators in some countries are quite strict about this, but 
in many countries, the substantial flexibility inherent in 
accounting and banking regulatory standards often allows 
institutional creditors to convey a misleading picture of the 
value of their accounts. If this situation is allowed to drag on 




grow extensively, and by the time when the reality of the 
value-destroying insolvency is acknowledged, it is too late to 
avoid serious disruptions reverberating far beyond the 
creditor’s own balance sheet. 
83. An insolvency system cannot avoid this problem entirely, 
but it can force creditors to acknowledge in a more timely 
fashion the reality that financial distress has destroyed or 
undermined the value of their accounts—and compel 
creditors to accept proper remedial action. An official 
declaration and confirmation of the account debtors’ 
inability to pay prompts a more effective reevaluation of 
creditors’ non-performing loan portfolios and more sound 
decisions with respect to investment in and regulation of 
such creditors. In addition, the confirmation of the debtor’s 
inability to pay may have a tax effect in most systems, 
allowing creditors to claim tax deductions for their losses. 
Ultimately all of these effects produce a healthier climate for 
investing and managing the increasingly important role that 
such creditors play in financial society.  
84. The fear that an insolvency relief system will undermine 
the balance sheets of institutional lenders—or of an entire 
lending industry—may well ignore a difficult but important 
reality: It is not an insolvency relief system that might 
destroy value, but the fact of account debtor insolvency itself 
that has already destroyed that value. Propping up a creditor 
institution and even an entire industry of such creditors may 
well simply delay the inevitable. Acknowledging the fact of 
account debtor insolvency and swallowing the bitter 
medicine of an insolvency relief system can put creditors and 
their troubled industry back on the right path toward healthy 
financial dealings. Delaying this adjustment by treating non-
performing loans as potentially performing will likely 
increase the severity and duration of a lending industry crisis 
when the reality of account debtor insolvency can no longer 
be ignored. 
(ii) Reducing wasteful collections costs and 
destroyed value in depressed asset sales 
85.  Policymakers in several countries have expressed 
concern that the enforcement system commonly sustains an 
illusion that certain debts are enforceable. This phenomenon 
becomes a problem when creditors engage the official 
collections apparatus against debtors who have either no 
assets at all or too few assets to cover anything beyond the 
costs of collection. In cases where the debtor’s assets are 
seized and sold to no effect other than paying the costs of 
seizure and sale, the use of the collections process produces 
little more than a dead-weight loss. The question is whether 




rather than redistributing their value in a socially 
counterproductive way to enforcement officials and 
distressed auction buyers.  
86. When creditors are allowed to pursue enforcement 
actions against hopelessly insolvent debtors, at least three 
negative effects follow. First, the courts are clogged with 
ordinary enforcement actions that strain their often already 
overtaxed resources. In most countries, the ordinary courts 
of first instance are charged with debt collection cases in 
addition to most other sorts of general disputes. Liability in 
debt collections cases is often not disputed, yet because 
creditors sustain a sliver of hope of collecting on judgments 
against insolvent debtors, they engage the scarce resources 
of the general court system to obtain a default judgment that 
often proves to be practically uncollectible. Though creditors 
bear part of the costs of such proceedings, their filing fees do 
not fully cover the direct and indirect costs of burdening the 
judicial system with a formalistic and fruitless process.  
Second, if an official authority is charged with enforcing 
these fruitless judgments, its time and resources are 
expended in vain as well. These costs may also not be 
recovered fully by charging the pursuing creditor. Finally, if 
available assets are located, their value is often consumed in 
covering enforcement costs, leaving the creditor’s position 
largely or entirely unchanged, as much of the real objective 
value of these assets is wasted in an inefficient piecemeal 
sale process. Indeed, many policymakers have identified a 
fourth negative effect in having deprived the debtor of assets 
that likely had far greater personal value to him than to any 
third party, an effect further exacerbated by imposing a 
significant replacement cost on the debtor. 
87. An insolvency regime can reduce or eliminate this waste. 
Rather than imposing on the courts to manage multiple 
collections actions, a single collective proceeding can 
efficiently and effectively establish the essential fact of the 
debtor’s insolvency and save time and other resources for 
the court system. If an objective evaluation compels 
creditors to accept that their claims are not covered by the 
paltry value of the debtor’s assets, creditors themselves 
avoid wasting their own resources, as discussed above, but 
they also avoid wasting the official resources of the judicial 
and enforcement authorities. Moreover, the dead-weight 
loss of value in seizing and selling the personal effects of 
insolvent debtors can be avoided, and property can remain in 
a context where it has its greatest value, if a dispassionate 
neutral administrator is able to properly evaluate the lack of 
real available value in such property. This advances more 
than simple humanitarian concern for the debtor’s comfort 
and convenience; it achieves a more appropriate distribution 




(iii) Encouraging responsible lending and 
reducing negative externalities 
88. The variety of harms that an insolvency regime seeks to 
avoid all represent costs caused at least in part by creditors’ 
inaccurate risk assessment. Particularly in the context of 
modern individual lending, with aggressive advertising and 
computerized credit scoring, sophisticated institutional 
creditors are in a far better position than most borrowers to 
manage the inevitable risks of default and debt distress.  An 
insolvency regime can encourage creditors to engage in more 
responsible credit underwriting and loan extension by 
concentrating the risks of overly aggressive credit decisions 
on lenders themselves. 
89. When creditors make loans that ultimately default, they 
incur costs themselves, but they also externalize costs onto 
others. For creditors, these costs may be expected, almost 
welcome casualties of an aggressive business model of high-
risk, high-profit lending. Even substantial losses can be 
managed if an aggressive lending model produces 
countervailing substantial returns from the “can-pay” 
debtors. Creditors can reduce the impact of their own lax 
credit underwriting decisions by factoring a loss ratio into 
their costs of doing business. They can plan for and adjust 
accordingly to expected losses, reducing the effect if not the 
incidence of default.  
90. Debtors and society, in contrast, are either unable or ill-
equipped to do this. While one might think that debtors are 
in the best position to simply avoid taking loans if the risk of 
default is too great, this is easier said than done. A 
voluminous literature on behavioral economics has revealed 
that human cognition is not well suited to decision-making 
under circumstances of uncertainty. Borrowers suffer a bias 
toward overconfidence, inflating their perceived likelihood of 
success and underestimating the risk of default. They also 
discount the ultimate cost of credit more powerfully than 
they discount the expected future value of a present good. 
These tendencies are known to and often exploited by 
sophisticated lenders. While the lenders can factor 
statistically likely losses into their investment and lending 
decisions, debtors are all but incapable of striking the proper 
balance of future risks.  
91. Indeed, for some creditors, the cost of anticipated 
defaults might well be less than the cost of a more diligent 
credit assessment and underwriting process. The “payday” 
and other “subprime” lending industries offer an extreme 
illustration of this business model. These creditors can 
predict with virtual certainty that a substantial number of 




their loans timely. Consequently, their business model 
accounts for such losses and recoups it on the front end with 
substantial fees charged to every borrower, in addition to 
steep default fees and penalties charged to those who fail to 
pay on time. This industry has enjoyed spectacular 
profitability despite an expected high rate of debt default; 
indeed, arguably because of an expected high rate of default.  
92. These and many other creditors simply externalize the 
losses resulting from their lax credit underwriting onto third 
parties. Other borrowers pay substantially higher fees than 
they would if their own credit were properly evaluated, the 
communities where these borrowers live suffer from the 
stultifying effects of constant chain indebtedness, the court 
system devotes time and other resources to entering 
uncollectible default judgments, and society suffers from the 
existence of a constant underclass of debtors trapped in a 
never-ending debt spiral. In extreme cases, this process has 
even resulted in the loss of some debtors to suicide. Not only 
are these costs not visited on the creditors whose business 
model caused them, but they represent the leverage that 
produces the elevated returns on investment that are the 
core of the subprime lending model. 
93. Once again, an insolvency regime cannot eliminate these 
problems, but it has the distinct potential to reduce them. In 
addition to directly alleviating other negative externalities as 
discussed in this section, an insolvency system can sharpen 
creditors’ attention to a more responsible lending model.8 
Creditors who know that their borrowers have ready access 
to an escape hatch have an incentive to engage in more 
careful underwriting. They have an incentive to bring to bear 
their own risk calculations on their lending decisions, rather 
than relying on their debtors’ innumeracy and 
overconfidence and creditors’ ability to externalize or 
counterbalance expected default losses. Ultimately, direct 
regulation of certain extreme lending practices is necessary 
to avoid a continuing expansion of risk and externalized 
leverage from subprime lending. And given the costs 
involved in challenging unlawfully predatory lending, a 
collective insolvency proceeding may be the only forum in 
which such practices might meaningfully be challenged by 
debtors. For both prime and subprime lending, an insolvency 
regime puts a greater premium on responsible lending and 
avoiding losses that are more foreseeable to and can be 
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more quickly and directly redirected back onto lenders. This 
produces a safer and healthier lending industry for all. 
Naturally, the issues of the regulation of the credit industry 
and lending practices are much broader than the impact of 
insolvency law on that industry, but natural personal 
insolvency law can have a prominent role in the promotion 
of responsible lending practices. 
(iv) Concentrating losses on more efficient and 
effective loss distributors  
94. The other side of the responsible lending and loss 
avoidance coin is the closely related benefit of concentrating 
inevitable losses on actors best suited to distribute the pain 
efficiently, effectively, and fairly. If failure to fulfill obligations 
were solely a function of debtors’ irresponsibility or 
immorality, redistributing the consequences of undesirable 
behavior onto the rest of society would itself be undesirable. 
But default is rather seldom solely the consequence of 
factors within the debtor’s control. Debtors in agricultural 
societies are at the mercy of weather and other 
environmental factors. Debtors in industrial societies are at 
the mercy of business cycles and commercial developments.  
Debtors in modern financial societies are at the mercy of 
swings in currency valuations and actions taken by finance 
houses seemingly far removed from the debtors’ lives.  
Similarly, economic cycles may take their toll on debtors’ 
home purchase and investment decisions. Indeed, the 
globalization of many world economies has placed debtors at 
the mercy of forces in far-flung areas of the globe whose 
influence is neither anticipated nor controllable. Debtors in 
all societies are at the mercy of potential health problems, 
divorce, childbirth, and all manner of life events that strain 
an otherwise manageable budget to the breaking point. 
Many individuals live paycheck to paycheck, and it may well 
be the loss of a job, a medical emergency, or a divorce that 
pushes the debtor over the edge and leads the debtor to 
seek insolvency relief. Indeed, the mere fact of living for an 
extended period “on the razor’s edge” in a situation of 
poverty or near poverty may expose low-income debtors to a 
constant risk of inability to service even modest debts, even 
if such debtors incur debts during a period of relative 
prosperity or, perhaps more commonly, in an instance of 
extreme desperation. 
95. One tragedy concentrated on a few debtors is likely to 
destroy these individuals. But dividing and dispersing the 
burden of tragedy among all members of society produces an 
equitable and solidary solution. Everyone contributes a little 
in exchange for the promise of salvation from devastating 
demands. Rather than using such a direct collect-and-




insurance to fairly and effectively redistribute the inevitable 
casualties of expected but unpredictable phenomena like fire, 
weather, and auto accidents. An insolvency regime fills a 
similar function in redistributing the inevitable casualties of 
expected but unpredictable financial distress. No one can 
accurately predict where financial distress will strike, but the 
lenders in charge of a substantial portion of the debts behind 
any given instance of financial distress are able to factor 
aggregate losses into their business model and incorporate 
the costs of such casualties into the rates they charge all 
borrowers. Lenders who increase the likelihood that 
individual borrowers will experience financial distress should 
bear the resulting losses, as discussed above, and some 
measure of official regulation might be an appropriate 
response if such behavior becomes extreme. But for “honest 
but unfortunate” borrowers who fulfill the entry 
requirements for an insolvency regime, a natural role for 
lenders is to concentrate and redistribute the increased costs 
of inevitable financial distress among all borrowers. All 
borrowers benefit from the availability of credit despite the 
risk of default, all borrowers benefit from the variety of 
positive effects that flow from the availability of a safety-
valve insolvency regime, and so all borrowers can fairly be 
expected to share in the widely distributed costs of default 
and rehabilitation. 
96. Some have argued that this approach imposes an unfair 
penalty on “responsible” borrowers who would never default.  
This perspective, though, is akin to equating auto insurance 
premiums with a penalty on safe drivers who would never 
experience an accident. No matter how carefully one drives, 
one never knows when, through forces beyond one’s control, 
an auto casualty will occur. Likewise, no matter how carefully 
and responsibly one manages one’s finances; one can never 
be sure when financial distress will strike unexpectedly as a 
result of distant and perhaps unexpected forces. Some 
element of “moral hazard” will always be present, as there is 
with auto insurance. Some people will choose to drive in a 
riskier way, and some people will consume credit in a riskier 
way. But the answer to these hazards is not to eliminate 
either auto insurance or insolvency relief. Proper 
enforcement of driving rules will isolate and punish those 
who drive in an excessively risky way, and careful entry and 
exit requirements for an insolvency regime will isolate and 
exclude debtors who engage in excessively risky credit 
behavior.  
97. Auto accidents and distressed debt could both be 
entirely avoided, of course, by never driving or borrowing 
against future earnings. This raises distinct issues and a 
different debate, however. The societies to which this 
discussion is directed do not wish to discourage driving or 
borrowing. A society that wishes to discourage borrowing 




directed at societies that have accepted the benefits of 
lending; e.g., smoothing consumption and reducing the 
volatility of financial supply and demand over time. A society 
that has embraced the good of lending is in a similar position 
to one that has embraced the benefits of driving. Each 
carries inevitable risks and casualties, and some form of loss 
spreading is a healthy way of maximizing and smoothing the 
benefits for all. An insolvency regime thus represents a sort 
of trade-off for deregulation of consumer lending. If natural 
persons are to be exposed to inevitable risks that they do 
not—and likely cannot—understand or avoid, insolvency 
restores fair equilibrium by offering insurance against those 
risks, with the “premiums” financed through small and 
appropriately distributed increases in the cost of credit.  
98. Natural persons have a variety of creditors, not all of 
which are well suited to aggregating default losses and 
distributing the costs of financial distress throughout society.  
More direct and effective methods of redistributing these 
costs might well be identified, such as taxation or even a 
specific regime of mandatory credit insurance. These 
alternatives, though, require careful regulation, they are 
subject to inaccuracy and undesirable manipulation, and 
they are sufficiently unwieldy and costly that no significant 
movement for regulating default risk for natural persons has 
arisen anywhere in the world today. Insolvency regimes are 
increasingly serving a second-best alternative means of 
concentrating risk on creditors, who are the most efficient 
redistributors of default risk available. Once again, at the 
very least, these creditors are in a much better position to 
redistribute the costs of financial distress than are the 
natural person debtors stricken by unexpected financial 
tragedy. 
(v) Reducing the costs of illness, crime, 
unemployment, and other welfare-related 
costs 
99. Turning from creditor-oriented benefits to debtor-
oriented benefits, a second series of goals of insolvency 
regimes for natural persons involves advantages to society of 
lifting the debilitating thumb of collections pressure from 
debtors and reinvigorating their productive potential in the 
mainstream economy. This series of benefits can be viewed 
from two perspectives: removing negatives and enhancing 
positives.  
100. As for removing negatives, an insolvency regime can 
reduce or eliminate a variety of direct and indirect social 
costs of leaving debtors to languish in a state of perpetual 
debt distress. Individuals trapped in an endless debt cycle 




exclusively in states that provide some measure of social 
support (welfare). Most obviously, debtors discouraged from 
working might collect unemployment benefits. In states that 
offer other sorts of transfer payments (e.g., child allowances), 
this money directly or indirectly might find its way into the 
pockets of creditors rather than being applied for its 
intended purpose. Even more troubling, as discussed above 
in section I.9.B, constant harassment by creditors has been 
identified as the cause of chronic health and medical 
problems in debtors. States that provide medical support 
thus face an increased burden from greater numbers of 
patients suffering from debt-related maladies. Even in states 
that do not offer direct medical support, emergency rooms 
and other forms of last-resort health care can be clogged 
with people suffering from man-made distress. Moreover, 
simple medical problems often become much more serious 
and resource-intensive as a result of debtors’ having 
foregone preventive care due to inability to devote resources 
to avoiding future health problems. At the extreme, financial 
desperation has driven many debtors to  take out grey- or 
black-market loans at usurious interest rates, to engage in 
crime, or even to commit suicide, thus imposing significant 
costs on society. 
101. No one system could ever eliminate all of these costs, 
but an insolvency system can reduce or eliminate the 
artificial causes of such problems. If a neutral arbiter can 
confirm that the debtor is not able to pay, or that a more 
rational, long-term repayment plan is appropriate, the acute 
stress of constant creditor pursuit of immediate payment can 
be alleviated. The unwarranted costs of unproductive 
enforcement pressure can thus be substantially reduced if 
not eliminated in very short order. Even if a full discharge of 
liability is not available, any process for coordinating and 
humanizing the collections process can put debtors on a 
healthier path to supporting themselves, addressing their 
obligations in a more measured and regular way, and 
participating in society rather than viewing themselves as 
victims of it. 
(vi) Increasing production of regular taxable 
income 
102. Along with reducing social costs, an insolvency system 
can affect the other side of the ledger by increasing social 
contributions, again both directly and indirectly. The direct 
benefits of offering debtors an incentive to re-enter society 
and again have the opportunity to produce regular income 
were discussed above in terms of benefits to creditors. The 





103. Active and engaged debtors contribute to society in a 
variety of ways, some of which are explored in the following 
section. One obvious and often cited contribution involves 
tax revenue. Debtors pushed into the grey or underground 
economy might produce revenue, but taxing authorities are 
unable to benefit from that production. Insolvency regimes 
can provide incentives for debtors to apply their productive 
energies to the regular economy, maximizing their long-term 
future productive potential and making income tax and social 
security contributions from their income. The renewal of tax 
and benefit contributions from hopelessly indebted potential 
workers has been a prime consideration in the adoption of 
many current insolvency regimes. To be sure, unemployment 
and a lack of available jobs are among the primary causes of 
insolvency of natural persons, so the problem of a lack of 
suitable job opportunities may well need to be addressed as 
a prerequisite to achieving the benefits of returning debtors 
to active, formal employment. 
104. Where regular jobs are available, some lawmakers have 
perceived a pernicious competition between creditors and 
society when creditors continue to pursue insolvent debtors 
for years on the slim and likely illusory hope of a small 
payment. For example, policymakers in one country 
acknowledged the undesirable but understandable tendency 
for debtors to go “on strike” and refuse to work to produce 
regular income if most or all of the fruits of their efforts will 
be siphoned off by creditors. This lost income harms not only 
the pursuing creditors, but society as a whole, and the losses 
to society far outstrip the losses to creditors, especially in 
light of the fact that continuing pressure from creditors often 
produces not payment from debtors, but their continued 
self-exclusion from the regular workforce. By keeping 
potentially productive debtors under threat of expropriation 
of any excess income, these creditors for the sake of a 
relatively small sum rob society of the potentially much 
larger long-term productive energies of these repressed 
debtors.  
105. The pursuing creditor can often be the state taxing 
authority. Even if the state itself is the pursuing creditor, 
inhibiting future productivity by pursuing fruitless collections 
on past obligations is no less undesirable. The moral hazard 
of relieving debtors of duties to the state (and society) might 
be theoretically more troubling in this context (see below, 
section I.10.A), but many countries’ legislators have accepted 
the stark reality that it makes little practical sense to sacrifice 
a large potential future benefit in pursuit of a smaller past-





(vii) Maximizing economic activity, encouraging 
entrepreneurship 
106. The benefits of an engaged citizenry extend far beyond 
mere tax receipts. Legislators in some countries have been 
especially concerned about the problem of social exclusion in 
general, and particularly as it affected the hopelessly 
indebted. Effectively removing citizens from active 
participation in public life carries many costs, not only in 
terms of economic productivity, but in terms of fostering a 
vibrant society. One desired effect of an effective insolvency 
regime, as envisioned particularly by lawmakers in the 
countries just mentioned, is reinvigoration and reinsertion of 
the hopelessly indebted into engaged society. 
107. Activating as many members of society as possible has at 
least two prominent positive impacts. First, removing the 
weight of creditor pressure not only encourages regular 
income production, it can also enhance debtors’ willingness 
and desire to be creative, even entrepreneurial. When 
debtors know that they will enjoy most of the value of their 
creative enterprise, they are more likely to push beyond 
mere subsistence and maximize returns for themselves and, 
indirectly, society. Moreover, if potential entrepreneurs know 
beforehand that the risks of failure are mitigated by an 
insolvency regime, they are more likely to confront the risks 
involved in entrepreneurship. Small- and medium-sized 
business is a major driver of many world economies, and a 
well-functioning insolvency regime can provide a powerful 
impetus to undertake the risks that necessarily accompany 
the rewards of starting a business. Facilitating 
entrepreneurialism was the primary goal behind the 
fundamental revision of at least one insolvency law for 
natural persons in the early 2000s. 
108. Second, enhancing entrepreneurialism and general 
social engagement maximizes national economic activity and 
international competitiveness. Every disengaged citizen is a 
link in a long chain of now lost economic and social potential.  
In closely integrated modern economies, one person’s 
activity leverages the activity of many others. This is 
especially true in countries whose economies are heavily 
reliant on individual service and consumer spending. A few 
distressed debtors here and there are likely to have little 
impact on national GDP, but the substantial numbers of 
debtors seeking relief each year in many nations today 
represent a significant, even if not particularly substantial, 
portion of these nations’ economic potential. As countries 
compete in foreign markets and vie for foreign direct 
investment, a maximally engaged citizenry is essential to 




109. Ultimately, part of achieving maximum economic activity 
is reasonable individual consumption itself. Though spending 
from available means is generally regarded as the optimal 
approach to sustainable consumption, many policymakers 
from around the world today recognize an important value in 
individual borrowing from future income to smooth and 
optimize consumption patterns over time. Simply engaging in 
modern economic life is a sort of entrepreneurial risk, and 
international competitiveness calls for nations to encourage 
individuals to take reasonable risks in smoothing 
consumption through credit transactions. Excessive 
borrowing is surely a problem to be avoided, but as 
discussed above, avoiding all risk is not a cost-free 
proposition. Excessive saving and avoiding financial risk 
altogether can lead—and has led in some countries—to 
stagnation and accompanying economic potential lost.  If 
individuals are overly cautious, saving more than necessary 
to appropriately hedge against potential income 
interruptions, unnecessarily voluminous savings represent 
lost potential to the present economy.9   
110. The optimal rate of insolvency is not zero if reasonable 
maximization of economic activity is desired. Risk is an 
inevitable aspect of pushing an economic system to 
acceptable limits. An insolvency regime accounts for 
inevitable miscalculations, spreading the costs across society 
(as discussed above) in exchange for the societal benefits of 
this approach. It offers individuals a backstop, a safety net, 
encouraging them to be as economically active as society 
believes is reasonably appropriate. As discussed below in 
section I.10.A, identifying the line between reasonably 
appropriate risk and moral hazard is a challenging task, but 
one goal of an insolvency system is to signal where the line is 
and to police access to the recovery system for those who 
honestly miscalculated its location or who suffered the 
misfortune of having been pushed beyond it.  
(viii) Enhancing stability, predictability in broader 
financial system, economy 
111. Many of the benefits discussed in this section are 
derived, at least in part, from a more fundamental and 
nuanced benefit of an insolvency system: the stability and 
predictability that such a system lends to the broader 
financial and economic environment. Insolvency systems 
function essentially as a safety valve, to release pressure that 
builds up in a financial system as a result of excessive 
leverage and pent up productivity. Indeed, many lawmakers 
have described their new insolvency systems for natural 
                                                          
9 See International Monetary Fund, “Dealing with Household Debt,” 




persons in precisely these terms: to offer a safety valve in 
order to regulate financial and economic activity more 
smoothly. Supervisory regulation can maintain stable and 
predictable economic activity by preventing excessive 
incentive for activity, a build-up often called a “bubble,” in 
one or more segments of the economy. Conversely, an 
insolvency system can help to maintain stability and 
predictability in the opposite situation, where activity is 
excessively burdened by widespread debt. Rather than 
relying on natural, long-term economic forces to correct the 
negative imbalance, an insolvency system can assure a more 
timely and less disruptive treatment of the casualties of 
economic activity, ensuring a smoother, more stable and 
predictable continuation of economic activity throughout the 
system.   
I.10. Countervailing factors: Combating moral hazard, 
fraud, and stigma 
112. Despite the many advantages offered by a system for 
treating the insolvency of natural persons, three particularly 
salient concerns might hinder the adoption or proper 
implementation of such a system. As the following short 
discussion will suggest, these concerns have been overcome 
in many existing insolvency systems, and these concerns 
need not stand in the way of legislators hoping to reap the 
benefits described above. 
A) Moral hazard 
113. Applying a classical theoretical economic concept, many 
policymakers have expressed concern about the “moral 
hazard” created by offering improper incentives for debtors 
to act irresponsibly with respect to their finances and 
obligations. The classical idea of moral hazard appears most 
prominently in the context of insured risks, the concern 
being that the availability of insurance or other protection 
against downside risks will produce undesirable incentives 
for insured parties to act less prudently and carefully than 
they would in the absence of insurance. If the extraordinary 
option of escaping one’s obligations is made widely available, 
the theory goes, debtors will have a greater incentive to act 
in an immoral or irresponsible way, both by recklessly taking 
on more debt than they can reasonably service, and by 
abdicating their responsibility to deal with their obligations 
once insolvency has set in.  
114. As discussed above, however (see especially section I.9.C 
(iv)), the specter of moral hazard is an inevitable part of 
accepting the broader benefits of a system of insolvency 
treatment. Some debtors may well consume credit in a 




case of failure, and some debtors will attempt to evade their 
obligations by seeking insolvency relief when they could 
address their obligations through reasonable sacrifices and 
modifications to their budgets and lifestyle choices. 
Nevertheless, as mentioned above, the most sensible 
response to moral hazard in this context, and the one 
adopted by many existing insolvency systems, is to design 
and implement proper access requirements—both for entry 
into the insolvency system and for receipt of a discharge or 
other relief—to isolate and exclude debtors who engage in 
excessively risky or other undesirable credit behavior.  
115. To be sure, the goal of offering relief to debtors and their 
families is tempered by a countervailing goal of preventing 
the dishonest evasion of responsibility by debtors capable of 
paying their debts with reasonable sacrifices. The 
importance of abiding by one’s obligations if reasonably 
possible is a bedrock notion that need not be undermined by 
the introduction of an insolvency regime, no matter how 
generous the relief offered might be. An overarching goal of 
any insolvency system is striking a careful balance between 
two competing considerations: first, demanding much of 
those who incur obligations, but second, not demanding 
more than can be reasonably borne by the victims of 
economic volatility and other common dangers of life. Just as 
an insolvency relief system carries a risk of undermining 
payment morality, there is an equally significant risk in losing 
the many benefits of an insolvency system by failing to 
provide effective relief. Some danger of moral hazard (and 
fraud, see below) will be present in any system, but these 
slippages should not overshadow the substantial benefits of 
providing relief in the overwhelming majority of cases 
involving debtors who have tried and failed due to factors 
largely or entirely beyond their control. Care should be taken 
to avoid sacrificing the great good of such a system simply 
because perfection cannot be assured. 
116. Finally, as mentioned in sections I.9.C (iii), above, 
policymakers in recent years have increasingly considered 
the countervailing positive effect that an insolvency system 
has on reducing creditors’ moral hazard. In making lending 
decisions, creditors face their own moral hazard in balancing 
the desire for maximum profitability with the need to engage 
in careful underwriting and evaluation of borrowers’ ability 
to pay. The possibility that an insolvent debtor will now have 
access to a relief system sharpens creditors’ incentives to 
engage in responsible credit extension behavior. Thus, the 
moral hazard issue has both potentially negative and 
potentially positive aspects, which should be considered 
together, further reducing the concerns that moral hazard 





B) Debtor fraud 
117. Closely related to the issue of moral hazard is a 
commonly expressed concern related to debtor fraud. 
Policymakers have for centuries expressed deep concerns 
about debtors improperly gaining the extraordinary 
advantages of an insolvency system and evading their 
legitimate obligations by means of fraud. Debtors might 
perpetrate this fraud in a variety of ways, including lying 
about their financial situation or concealing assets or income. 
Preventing an insolvency relief system from being perverted 
to advantage fraudulent debtors is, on the one hand, a 
serious concern, and no easy or perfect solution to this 
problem presents itself. Careful monitoring by administrators 
and creditors is the only effective way to minimize debtor 
fraud.  
118. On the other hand, one should not overemphasize the 
danger that such fraud represents. Empirical observation of 
many existing insolvency systems has confirmed repeatedly 
that the instance of real fraud is vanishingly low (on the 
order of 1-3% of all cases).10 Proper monitoring by system 
administrators and creditors seems to have rooted out most 
instances of debtors’ attempting to take improper advantage. 
This is an issue to which system designers and policymakers 
remain sensitive, and appropriate safeguards can and should 
be incorporated into the system to detect and deter 
fraudulent conduct by debtors and others. This might be a 
particularly relevant concern in areas where cultural or other 
differences lead to greater tolerance for fraud. But in the 
final analysis, isolated anecdotes never provide a solid basis 
for policymaking. For every shocking instance of material 
fraud in existing systems, all available evidence suggests that 
many hundreds or even thousands of honest debtors seek 
and receive relief legitimately.   
119.  As with moral hazard, isolated instances of debtor fraud 
are present in virtually every system that has ever existed, 
and perfect exclusion of fraud is not an achievable goal. All 
                                                          
10 Unfortunately, most of this empirical observation has been informal 
and not recorded in published studies. The sparse available evidence 
from formal insolvency system oversight, however, confirms the 
widespread anecdotal accounts; see, e.g., The Insolvency Service, 
Annual Report and Accounts 2010-11, at 33-35, 
www.bis.gov.uk/insolvency/Publications; US Department of Justice, US 
Trustee Program, Annual Report of Significant Accomplishments 2010 , at 
17-19, www.justice.gov/ust/eo/public_affairs/annualreport/index.htm. 
Voluminous academic empirical study has more clearly belied the notion 
of “fraud” in the broader sense of solvent debtors’ attempts to evade 
their obligations. See, e.g., Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay 
Lawrence Westbrook, Less Stigma or More Financial Distress: An 
Empirical Analysis of the Extraordinary Increase in Bankruptcy Filings,  59 




existing systems accept the risk—indeed the certainty—that 
some limited amount of fraud will creep into the system and 
some undeserving debtors will take improper advantage. 
This has not dissuaded policymakers from pursuing the 
greater good of relief for the vast majority of honest but 
unfortunate debtors who can derive legitimate benefit—and 
pass on significant benefits to creditors and society, as 
discussed above in section I.9 —and it need not dissuade 
policymakers in the future. 
C) Stigma 
120.  A much more intractable challenge relates not to the 
problem of keeping undeserving debtors out of an insolvency 
system, but to enticing honest but unfortunate debtors into 
the system. Even in well-developed insolvency regimes, 
significant numbers of debtors continue to avoid seeking 
relief, or they seek relief far later than would be optimal—for 
themselves and the other beneficiaries of an insolvency 
system.  
121.  The notion of announcing one’s failure, either in writing 
or in person before a public or private administrator, is a 
deeply embarrassing and stigmatizing event. Formal and 
informal surveys of debtors in many well-established 
insolvency systems reveal pervasive and profound feelings of 
guilt, shame, and stigma. These feelings act as powerful 
disincentives to debtors considering seeking insolvency relief. 
Indeed, if inability to pay is dealt with through private 
cultural traditions, or if a powerful stigma is associated with 
debt and admission of failure, an “official” mechanism for 
administering such problems may turn out to be superfluous, 
as debtors and creditors alike refrain from using it.  
122.  Declaring oneself unable to manage one’s obligations 
has for centuries signaled a sort of social and economic 
death in many parts of the world, and such connotations are 
difficult to overcome. Policymakers should be particularly 
sensitive to the cultural context of shame and stigma in the 
context of admission of financial failure, as these notions can 
prevent the effective uptake of debtors even in the best 
designed system.  
123.  Some aspects of the problem are easier to address than 
others. For example, if debtors are unaware of the benefits 
of the system, or if they overestimate the downsides and 
dangers of seeking relief, a public campaign of education and 
awareness can correct misimpressions as to new options for 
relief. At least one country launched an aggressive campaign 
of public information regarding its new insolvency relief 
system to overcome the potential problem of low debtor 
acceptance. Some countries have redesigned their insolvency 




stigmatizing elements that had undesirable effects. In several 
countries in which insolvency law had subjected debtors to a 
long list of civil disabilities and restrictions following an 
insolvency case, lawmakers have reduced or eliminated 
these disabilities and restrictions, thereby reducing in part 
the stigma. Similarly, the  enactment of discharges from debt 
and the liberalization of property exemption have a similar 
effect. Such steps over time may create incentives for natural 
person debtors to seek relief. 
124.  There is certainly nothing inherently wrong with a 
healthy bit of stigma to deter debtors from seeking an easy 
way out of their legitimate obligations. Debtors should be 
prompted to do their utmost reasonably to address their 
own debt problems on their own. But policymakers in many 
countries in recent years have discovered to their dismay 
that excessive stigmatization of debtors seeking relief can 
powerfully undermine an otherwise well-designed system 
and curtail the many benefits outlined in section I.9 above. 
125.  Attitudes about debt and cultural stigma change slowly, 
and relatively little can be done to affect such an expansive 
and disperse notion directly, but policymakers can make and 
have made choices to minimize stigma by avoiding or 
repealing judgmental language and punitive measures in 
existing laws, such as by referring to the “debtor” as opposed 
to the “bankrupt,” or by reducing post-relief restrictions on 
activity by debtors. The process of reducing stigma thus goes 
hand in hand with appropriately containing concerns about 
moral hazard and fraud, as discussed above. 
 
II. Core legal attributes of an insolvency regime for 
natural persons 
 
II.1.  General regime design: procedural options and 
the relation with informal workouts 
126. An essential aspect of the design of a regime of formal 
insolvency treatment for natural persons is its interaction 
with informal systems for resolving financial distress 
amicably. One important function of a formal insolvency 
system is to encourage informal negotiation and resolution, 
as creditors and debtors “bargain in the shadow of 
insolvency.” A clear trend has emerged in natural person 
insolvency policy to favor informal, negotiated alternatives 
and to avoid formal intervention between debtor and 
creditors. The methods by which this preference is expressed, 
especially the degree to which debt-and-credit counseling 
might support negotiated alternatives, and the results of 




a discussion of formal regime design. As for the design of the 
formal regime itself, legislators face another important 
preliminary choice of where to locate the system, either 
within an existing insolvency regime—probably designed for 
business debtors—or in a separate, perhaps even free-
standing law. This section addresses these two key 
preliminary considerations. 
A) Informal alternatives to insolvency procedures for 
natural persons 
127. Legislators in many regions have emphasized the priority 
of preventing formal insolvency proceedings, in part by 
favouring negotiated solutions to debt problems. This 
preference is apparent in the common requirement that 
voluntary agreements between the debtor and the creditors 
should have priority over court proceedings. In several 
countries, negotiations between debtors and their creditors 
are a precondition for filing formal insolvency proceedings, 
and the law provides for an institutionalized debt negotiation 
and settlement framework. In some countries, before a 
formal insolvency procedure for natural persons came into 
force, an institutionalized network of consumer and debt 
counselors had developed, and the counselors in this system 
had acquired significant expertise in advising debtors and 
negotiating on their behalf with creditors. Therefore, it was 
natural to continue and buttress the role of these debt 
counselors in the new context of formal insolvency and debt 
relief. But also countries with relatively little experience in 
debt counseling have introduced negotiation with creditors 
as a precondition for access to formal insolvency procedures 
for natural persons, at least for those debtors whose debts 
arise predominantly from non-business sources. 
128. The preference for voluntary settlement has, in many 
countries, led to a two-stage procedure in the natural person 
insolvency laws. In such systems, debtors are required to 
make an effort to reach a voluntary settlement with their 
creditors before they are allowed to file for formal insolvency 
relief. A debt counselor is usually available and obliged to 
assist the debtor in the negotiations for a voluntary 
settlement. In some countries, the attempt to reach a 
voluntary settlement is regulated in a more formal 
framework, such as a commission for over-indebtedness or 
the debt enforcement authorities. In others, debtors are left 
to find counseling and negotiation support from semi-private 
or private-sector actors. 
129. The following arguments can be advanced in favor of 




a)  The debtor may avoid the stigma of insolvency and 
registration in the credit information data banks that 
follows from an officially recorded insolvency procedure.  
 
b)  The costs of a court procedure are higher than those of 
informal settlement negotiations.  
 
c)  The debtor may have an incentive to make a higher 
offer to creditors to avoid the inconvenience of the court 
procedure, which would benefit the creditors.  
 
d)  The filing that comes to the courts after an 
unsuccessful attempt to settle is already well prepared 
and, thus, easier to process. This preparatory work is done 
by debt counsellors, whose work is less costly than that of 
insolvency lawyers.  
 
e)  Voluntary settlements allow for more flexibility that 
can serve the needs of the debtor and the creditors. For 
example, the guarantors of loans can be included in the 
settlements in a flexible way, which is often not possible in 
judicial debt adjustments. If the debtor is a homeowner, 
the home can sometimes be better protected in a 
voluntary settlement than in judicial debt adjustment. 
 
f)  Financial institutions regularly renegotiate repayment 
terms with their debtors. It may be a desirable political 
goal to emphasize the importance of such renegotiations 
as a matter of policy.  
130. Experience in many existing systems, however, has 
revealed that the merits of voluntary settlements are often 
illusory. In practice, it is not easy for debtors to reach 
voluntary settlements with all their creditors. Debtors often 
face long delays in obtaining counseling sessions, and 
counselors often face even longer delays in collecting the 
necessary information, formulating compromise proposals, 
and receiving creditor feedback on these proposals. Delays of 
weeks or even months have plagued many systems that 
require counseling as a prerequisite to filing a formal 
insolvency case. There is also a risk that creditors will use 
their bargaining power to pressure debtors into accepting 
onerous payment plans that are not viable.  
131.  At least one system has abandoned its former position 
of requiring informal negotiation with creditors as a pre-
requisite to seeking formal insolvency relief. Policy 
investigators discovered that many creditors were simply 
refusing to participate in good faith in this process, refusing 
in principle to agree to any modification of their claims. 
Under such common circumstances, the negotiation stage 
was rendered little more than a pure formality, and 




allow debtors to proceed directly into the formal insolvency 
system if they fulfilled the standard entry requirements. 
132. Even in countries where debt counselors had more 
positive experience in negotiating settlements before a 
formal insolvency law was enacted, only a small portion of 
cases were settled voluntarily. Budget and debt counseling 
more often than not simply reveals the hopeless situation 
faced by the debtor, and the counselor has little option but 
to recommend pursuit of a formal insolvency case. In many 
countries studies have shown and counselors report that few 
debtors have any hope of achieving a consensual 
arrangement and avoiding a formal insolvency procedure.11  
133. There are several reasons for the low rates of voluntary 
settlements:  
a) Creditors demanding enforcement of their claims may 
make negotiations impossible.  
 
b)  Just one of several creditors may make the settlement 
impossible by a veto.  
 
c) Some creditors trust formal, monitored procedures 
more than informal settlement proposals. In particular, 
public creditors, such as the tax authorities, have often 
been reluctant to accept voluntary settlements, either 
because they lacked legislative authority to accept such 
settlements, or because they simply had greater 
confidence in a more transparent, formal procedure. 
 
d) Sometimes tax and banking regulations for accounting 
for bad-debt losses give preference to a formal decision as 
creditors write down (deduct) the losses.  
 
e) Some creditors are quite difficult to locate and some 
others remain passive when a proposal for voluntary 
settlement is presented to them. Unless the law stipulates 
that passive creditors are bound by a settlement, they will 
not be bound and often feel free to disregard attempts at 
negotiation.  
 
f) The law concerning third party guarantees is often a 
disincentive for creditors to agree to a settlement. 
According to general private law, the guarantor may be 
freed from liability when the debtor and creditor agree on 
                                                          
11 See, e.g., Bund-Länder-Arbeitsgruppe “Insolvenzrecht,” Probleme der 
praktischen Anwendungen und Schwachstellen des 
Verbraucherinsolvenzverfahrens (2000); Ett steg mot ett enklare och 
snabbare skuldsaneringsförfarande, SOU 2004:81; Nat’l Found. for 
Credit Counseling, Consumer Counseling and Education Under BAPCPA  
(2006); Institute for Financial Literacy, First Demographic Analysis of 




relief, whereas the guarantor has to pay in a formal debt 
relief procedure. 
134. In many countries, political decision makers favour the 
idea of informal settlements. The wish for voluntary 
settlements will not, however, be fulfilled automatically or by 
the order of the law; some institutional support and 
incentives are needed. 
135.  In the few systems where voluntary settlements have 
been most successful, achieved in as many as one-third of all 
cases, one of two factors generally explains this higher 
success rate: Either the negotiation is overseen or even 
facilitated by a particularly persuasive government 
regulator—such as a central bank—or a central, well-
established counseling agency has developed deep and 
productive relationships with key creditors, and the agency 
has leveraged this position of trust to negotiate broad-based 
concessions, such as from taxing or fine-collecting 
authorities. The widespread use of negotiation guidelines 
and codes of best practices can also represent a positive 
factor for the development of a voluntary restructuring 
practice. Only under circumstances of well-organized and 
carefully structured negotiation have informal alternatives to 
insolvency relief proven reliable, and even then, only a 
relatively small fraction of cases can be resolved through 
negotiation. Informal arrangements are more likely to 
succeed in cases where debtors are experiencing mild or 
temporary financial difficulties, rather than severe insolvency.    
136. Experience in many systems suggests that the successful 
procedures for negotiating informal alternatives to formal 
insolvency should include some elements that promote a 
plan confirmation:  
a) First, professional, low-cost or cost-free assistance has 
to be available and the advisor should have experience in 
negotiations with creditors. The counsellors or mediators 
have to have credibility in both debtors’ and creditors’ 
eyes. Experience in several systems demonstrates that, if 
creditors do not regard counsellors as dispassionate, they 
might refuse to acknowledge and cooperate with the 
negotiation process entirely. 
 
b) Second, the negotiations proceed better if they can be 
carried out without a threat of debt enforcement. Some 
reliable, formal mechanism should be available for 
stopping enforcement while the negotiations are pending.  
 
c)  Third, creditor passivity should not prevent the 
acceptance of the settlement, which should be binding on 
all creditors who have been notified. Passive creditors are 
bound by a settlement according to the laws of some 




for a meaningful debt settlement program, but it requires 
that the institutional setting in which the proposals are 
prepared be well regulated and supervised. 
 
d) Fourth, the rights of a dissenting creditor should be 
regulated. There is usually no vote on the payment plan. 
Usually, any dissenting creditor can bring the case to the 
court. Dissent by a minority of the creditors should not 
lead to an automatic dismissal of the plan.  
 
137. A different possibility consists in the use of “hybrid” or 
“semi-formal” arrangements. These debt restructuring 
arrangements are not purely contractual: the arrangements 
require a qualified majority of claims in order to bind the 
minority, and they can also have some terms prescribed by 
the law as part of the restructuring arrangement. 
Experiences with hybrid restructurings have not had, 
generally, a high rate of success. At any rate, the existence of 
these hybrid restructuring mechanisms illustrates the 
continuum of solutions to personal insolvency, from purely 
contractual restructuring to formal insolvency proceedings. 
B)  Formal insolvency law and its placement within 
the broad legislative scheme 
138. The fundamental legal issues in insolvency law concern 
the rights and obligations of the creditors and the debtor, 
both in relation to the debtor and his or her creditors and 
among the creditors generally. These are rights and 
obligations that in all systems are ultimately adjudicated and 
enforced by the courts. The recourse to courts is further 
enforced by the human rights instruments that confirm the 
right of access to courts in the determination of the civil 
rights and obligations of a person. Furthermore, most human 
rights instruments acknowledge the right to property as a 
fundamental right, even though the exercise of this right 
needs to take into account the respect for the rights of 
others and the community. Traditionally, it has been held 
that the regulation of insolvency situations is not hampered 
by the demands of constitutional rights, and this doctrine is 
today confirmed by some human rights bodies—considering 
of course that the insolvency law does not encroach on the 
(property) rights of the creditors more than is appropriate. It 
has to be kept in mind that the insolvency law seldom 
deprives creditors of any substantial claims that they would 
have been able to enforce, given that a right to enforce a 
claim against a hopelessly insolvent debtor has little or no 
practical value. The right to property may, however, have a 
special impact on the regulation of the rights of secured 




139. In addition to property rights, the right to work and fair 
remuneration and the basic social rights are also at issue in 
personal insolvency law. Even if the social rights are not 
acknowledged as subjective rights in all parts of the world, 
they should have some credence in the design of the legal 
institutions.  
140. Furthermore, all human rights instruments acknowledge 
the right to a fair trial. The content of this right is regulated 
in detail in national laws. One important aspect of this right 
is the right to be heard in matters that concern one’s rights. 
Even if the right to be heard can be regulated in an 
insolvency procedure in forms that differ from ordinary civil 
procedure, it is important to emphasize that the human 
rights instruments do not allow limitations of the right to a 
fair trial. However, it is an established interpretation of 
human rights instruments that the access to court can be 
subject to a prior processing of the case by specific boards or 
bodies, considering that the process as a whole fulfills the 
requirements of a fair trial.    
141. Thus, there is an evident need for some degree of court 
involvement in the insolvency procedure, both in light of the 
traditional law of obligations and in light of constitutional 
and human rights doctrines. There are, however, somewhat 
differing opinions on how much court involvement is needed. 
See below, section II.2.B.  Besides the civil and human rights 
considerations noted above, a number of insolvency-specific 
matters are of relevance when the issue of court 
involvement is addressed.  
142. A substantial number of countries have introduced 
insolvency proceedings for natural persons only since 1990, 
lacking a tradition of dealing with the challenges of this 
particular type of proceeding. The lack of tradition has led to 
innovative procedural solutions that vary from country to 
country. In some countries the social and administrative 
aspects are emphasized, while in some others, the rights of 
the parties are emphasized, leading to different procedural 
designs. One key question is whether the systemic context of 
personal insolvency laws should be contained either in a 
specific law or in the general insolvency law.  
143. As described above in section I.8, insolvency laws for 
natural persons have a lot in common with general 
insolvency laws designed primarily for business debtors, but 
laws focused on natural person debtors differ in their more 
pronounced interest in the rehabilitation of the debtor and 
in the social good. Depending on legal culture and traditions 
of respective countries, either the systematic similarity or 
the differences between business insolvency and personal 
insolvency are emphasized. These different approaches are 
to some extent reflected in the choice of placing natural 




insolvency law (Bankruptcy or Insolvency Code) or in a 
separate law.  
144. Historically, natural person insolvency has developed as 
part of general insolvency law, primarily in several Anglo-
American systems. As debtors have been granted relief in 
these systems, certain regulations specifically designed for 
natural persons have developed within the broader 
insolvency law. Still today, many countries have incorporated 
procedures for natural person insolvency into their general 
insolvency codes. Even if insolvency for natural persons is 
incorporated in an insolvency code, it is usually a summary 
and quite simple court proceeding, distinct from the more 
complex procedures applied in business cases.  
145. In contrast, several countries that have enacted personal 
insolvency law during the last two decades have opted for a 
separate law. These laws are often not called “insolvency” 
laws, much less “bankruptcy” laws. Rather, the titles of these 
laws refer to rearrangement or adjustment of debts. Many 
countries use a derivation of the word sanering 
(“rehabilitation”), drawing a parallel between individual 
insolvency and business reorganization.  
146. Some of these laws are specifically designed to serve 
natural persons not engaged in significant business activity. 
Quite often the term “consumer debtor” is used, either in 
law or, even more often, in doctrine, to point out that the 
purpose of these laws is to provide an insolvency procedure 
for persons who seek relief in their private capacity as 
opposed to business debtors. The term consumer does not 
necessarily mean that the debtor would have become 
indebted through the consumption of goods and services. It 
only means that the debtor is not pursuing a business at the 
time of filing (or at least that the debtor’s business activity is 
limited).   
147.  In many countries, these laws come close to traditional 
insolvency regulations, with an emphasis on rehabilitation. 
For example, the specific debt adjustment laws in one region 
offer the debtor a full insolvency procedure. These specific 
procedures tend to focus more on the evaluation of the 
debtor’s pre-insolvency behavior than the procedures in the 
insolvency context. These systems also tend to offer debtors 
counseling on budgeting and managing debts. 
148. Placing debt relief within the general insolvency context 
and enacting a separate law each seem to have their merits. 
A separate law offers a better opportunity to take into 
account the special needs of insolvent individuals as opposed 
to businesses. This is helpful where there is a need for a 
broader range of counseling services, including financial 
counseling and reference to social agencies. These services 




general insolvency regime. Also, specific regulations for 
access to the procedure and for the content and proposals 
for payment plans are easier to formulate in a separate law. 
In some countries, personal insolvency procedure is 
delegated to some other authority than the court, such as 
specific commissions or debt enforcement authorities. In 
others, specialized counselors have specific responsibilities 
to aid the debtor and prepare the case before going to court. 
These special needs are easier to take into account in the 
design of the system if personal insolvency is regulated in a 
specific law.  
149. The placement of personal insolvency into the general 
insolvency context has its merits as well. The separate laws 
are often enacted for relatively simple cases, especially for 
debtors with low income and few assets, but some 
insolvency cases for natural persons include complicated 
legal issues. Examples include cases of natural persons who 
have a considerable debt-load from former businesses or 
who at the time of filing are self-employed and/or debtors  
with notable assets to distribute among the creditors. If 
natural person insolvency is regulated in the context of 
general insolvency law, it is possible to resort to the specific 
institutions of insolvency law, such as the automatic (or court 
imposed) stay of execution and other creditor actions, 
exceptions from the stay, other effects of the opening of the 
procedure, voidable transfers and other avoidance actions, 
and protection of the family home, as well as to general 
principles of insolvency law, such as equality of creditors. As 
many natural persons’ insolvency cases have a background in 
business failure, in some cases a smooth transfer from 
business bankruptcy to natural person insolvency treatment 
is needed. The placement of natural person insolvency in the 
general insolvency law makes these kinds of overlaps 
between business insolvency and personal insolvency easier 
to manage.  
150. The political discourse about natural person insolvency 
takes quite different tones in different countries. In some 
countries, the idea of “consumer bankruptcy” referring to 
straight discharge has been difficult to accept. In other 
countries, the idea of a separate law on debt relief for 
consumers has been related to excessive consumer spending 
and use of consumer credit, whereas  the general insolvency 
regime has been understood as a more neutral area of 
regulation.  
II.2.  The institutional framework 
151. An institutional framework for the insolvency of natural 
persons should minimize overall social costs. These include 
error costs in determining the validity of debts and levels of 




It should provide timely outcomes and achieve confidence in 
its operation by stakeholders and the general public.  
152. An institutional framework for the insolvency of natural 
persons is part of the ground rules for consumer and 
commercial credit. Establishing a framework for the 
insolvency of natural persons should be integral to the 
development of consumer credit granting and debt collection 
institutions within a country. These institutions include 
banking regulations, procedures for the enforcement of 
judgment debts, credit reporting and data privacy 
regulations, financial education programs, debt counseling 
services, and housing and social welfare policy. Insolvency 
institutions are often linked closely to court systems and 
confidence in the court system by both creditors and debtors 
is a pre-condition of the effective operation of a court system. 
153. Individual insolvency cases are not a high stakes game, 
even if in aggregate they now represent large numbers of 
debtors in high income countries. The overwhelming 
majority of individual debtors has few assets to liquidate and 
limited income to repay debts or pay for advice. A significant 
percentage has no capacity to repay (see section I.8.C). 
However, individual insolvency may raise legal, budgeting, 
and social issues that are not always simple. Moreover, there 
is not one individual “insolvency type”. There are different 
reasons for insolvency, and debtor repayment capabilities. 
Several insolvency systems have developed options for both 
partial repayment or restructuring and an immediate 
discharge. “Gatekeepers” – who may be lawyers, debt 
counselors, insolvency practitioners, state officials, and 
judges – play an important role in screening and channeling 
individuals to the appropriate solution. 
154. The growth of significant numbers of over-indebted 
debtors in high-income countries has created a challenge in 
fashioning an efficient and fair system of personal insolvency 
administration. More individuals may be over-indebted but 
cost pressures on financing justice systems and public 
programs also exist. The treatment of over-indebtedness, 
which addresses both consumption and production risks, 
raises problems in public administration and governance, 
such as the relative balance of public and private actors and 
the appropriate role of legal, economic and social expertise. 
Insolvency as a modest method of redistribution raises issues 
similar to social welfare programs in terms of assuring access 
to qualified applicants, similar treatment for individuals 
similarly situated, the prevention of fraud and abuse (see 
section I.8.B), and the reduction of unnecessary bureaucratic 
requirements. 
155. Experience suggests that as the numbers of individual 
debtors needing insolvency relief increases – there is no 




routinized process where the policy issues become those of 
cost-effective targeting of relief based on relatively clear 
rules that can be applied in a straightforward manner by 
decision makers. Section II.5.B documents this movement 
from individualized discretion to standardization in 
repayment plans in those countries with substantial numbers 
of individual insolvents.  
156. Institutional frameworks are related to many factors, 
including the history and politics of insolvency reform that 
shape different countries’ conceptualization of the 
insolvency of natural persons. Insolvency relief may be 
conceptualized as part of welfare or consumer protection, 
integrated with educational and preventive measures to 
address debt, or treated as simply an issue of economic 
adjustment between private actors permitting an individual 
reentry to the credit market. This conceptualization affects 
issues such as financing of the system and access, as well as 
the type and role of intermediaries (lawyers, debt counselors, 
and accountants) involved in the system. Irrespective of the 
nature of the intermediaries, existing experience suggests 
that many countries are unwilling to invest substantially in 
support systems to address debtors’ problems in a 
comprehensive manner, so that intermediaries tend to be 
primarily concerned with shepherding individuals through 
the system. This is a modest but valuable role. Insolvency can 
also be a mechanism for referring individuals with social 
problems to other social institutions. 
157. Institutional frameworks are linked to the complexity of 
the law. Open textured provisions and complex provisions 
may increase disputes and the need for specialist expertise. 
Relatively bright line rules, while creating potential individual 
injustice, can be computerized, and processed quickly by 
individuals without high levels of professional expertise.  A 
routinized approach may work best in the context of a 
majority of cases where creditors are to receive a minimal 
distribution for their claims, if anything at all.   
158. Responsibility for the overall management of the system 
may be assigned to a Ministry or specialized agency that can 
oversee individual insolvencies and the institutional actors 
involved as part of economic and social policy. Specialist 
agencies can exercise policing, rulemaking and enforcement 
powers, as well as intervening in matters of public interest. 
The existence of a robust, yet neutral, policeman is often a 
key part of ensuring public confidence in the integrity of the 
insolvency system. Reliable data on the operation of the 
system should be collected because individual over-
indebtedness and insolvency are politically charged issues 
and the media often reports “atrocity stories” about the 




A) Existing frameworks for the insolvency of natural 
persons 
159. Institutional frameworks exist on a continuum ranging 
from: (1) systems in which an administrative agency 
dominates; to (2) hybrid public/private systems where public 
processing of insolvents co-exists with private restructuring 
alternatives; and to (3) court-based systems primarily 
serviced by publicly funded or private intermediaries. These 
are of course ideal types. Thus, courts play some role in all 
systems. Personal insolvency may be included within existing 
insolvency law, or be part of a distinct code. The comparative 
advantages of these options were discussed earlier in section 
II.1. 
160. Systems can be classified according to the balance of 
public and private sector alternatives and actors. Some 
countries ban private debt management companies and a 
public agency dominates the system. In contrast, others 
provide alternatives that include both state processing of 
bankrupts and the involvement of a significant private sector 
in administering restructuring alternatives. The main 
arguments against the existence of a large private sector are 
the potential dangers of exploitation of a vulnerable 
population of debtors and the belief that debt problems are 
a social issue that can only be effectively addressed by courts 
and/or public agencies. The existence of private over-
indebtedness industries has certainly given rise to abuses 
and necessitated public regulation, itself a cost that must be 
factored into any assessment of the role of the private and 
public sectors. However, there are benefits in terms of 
expertise and costs in harnessing the private sector to 
address over-indebtedness: any system that relies solely on 
the public sector is likely to incur delays in the treatment of 
debtors; a careful balance needs to be achieved between the 
role of the private and public sectors. 
B) Court-based systems and the role of courts 
161. The majority of countries have court-based systems for 
personal insolvency and restructuring. However, the actual 
role in practice of courts may vary significantly and include 
the following: acting as gatekeepers to entry; establishing 
repayment plans; determining issues relating to assets and 
liabilities of a debtor; monitoring insolvency representatives; 
and determining the dischargeability of debts. There is an 
increased tendency in high-income countries to reduce the 
role of courts, for example to dispense with the necessity for 
a court hearing for filing for insolvency, and to recognize that 
the court hearing is often a formality in the insolvency of 
natural persons. In some countries, individuals make an 




In other countries, judges or their deputies may ensure that 
formalities have been complied with where much work will 
already have been completed by debt counselors, lawyers or 
accountants. These observations do not mean that courts 
play an unimportant role in determining individual rights in 
insolvency, but rather that their intervention is the exception 
rather than the norm.  
162. Courts have a number of institutional advantages. 
Judges can act as impartial and trusted decision-makers. 
Indeed, courts may be required to play some role in personal 
insolvency in the light of constitutional and Human Rights 
norms (see section II.1.B). They can oversee those 
intermediaries involved in administering repayment plans 
addressing in summary procedure exceptional cases of 
disputes that may arise between the parties. 
163. However, courts have disadvantages. Courts and judges 
are costly, may be regarded as inaccessible and intimidating 
by individual debtors, and focus on legal rights. Adversarial 
legal disputes between creditors and debtors are rare in 
individual insolvency cases so that personal insolvency 
adjudication is primarily an administrative process even in 
those systems where lawyers and courts are central actors. If 
courts are to be involved, there is a need for education of 
judges on issues related to credit and debt, budgeting and 
social issues. The ability of courts to oversee and regulate 
the individual insolvency process is limited. They can act only 
when individuals bring issues before them and are heavily 
dependent on individual initiative. Given the stakes in 
individual insolvency neither creditor nor debtor may have 
adequate incentives to bring issues before a judge. 
164. Court-based systems may have significant delays. The 
pressure on public funding of the judicial system, the limited 
ability of lower courts to address economic and social issues 
of debt, and variable decision making by judges create 
pressure for increased specialization and administrative 
processing particularly for the large percentage of “NINA  (no 
income, no assets) debtors”, and more effective sorting of 
cases where private negotiation will be meaningful.  
165. Several countries responded to the upsurge of over-
indebtedness after the late 1980s recession through 
modification of court procedures to permit judicially 
sanctioned debt repayment plans with the possibility of 
discharge of debts after a period of repayment. They 
attempted to conserve judicial resources by requiring an 
attempt at a supervised negotiated settlement before a court 
application. However, this was often not successful in 
diverting cases and resulted in queuing by debtors for both 




C) The role of trusted intermediaries 
166. Intermediaries in the insolvency of natural persons may 
be lawyers, accountants, or debt counselors. These 
intermediaries may have different backgrounds, 
qualifications and roles. They may be public officials or 
private professionals; they may be acting as officers of the 
court or be subject to professional norms. In the majority of 
states, the activities of intermediaries are not subsidized by 
the state. In some countries, the local or central state 
budgets subsidize their activities where individual debtors 
are unable to finance insolvency. Thus, state-accredited 
institutions employing lawyers and social workers may 
undertake judicial mediation and act as court appointed 
administrators of debt repayment plans. In other countries, a 
combination of state-financed debt counselors and lawyers 
may assist debtors. 
167. A court-based system inevitably relies more heavily than 
an administrative system on trusted intermediaries to assist 
debtors, and negotiate, administer and supervise repayment 
plans. Their role is crucial in establishing the viability and 
integrity of the system. Trusted intermediaries can 
significantly reduce transaction and error costs. They can 
ensure realistic repayment schedules, check the validity of 
debts, identify and investigate different types of debtors, 
administer repayment plans and provide impartial advice. A 
loss of trust in intermediaries can undermine the 
effectiveness of a system of debt relief. One reason for 
creditors’ preference in one country for the use of the 
statutory court process rather than informal settlement was 
a perception of the courts as more impartial than debt 
counseling agencies. In another, a combination of complex 
legislation and a limited number of trained debt counselors 
resulted in a large backlog of cases and in a breakdown in 
trust between debtors’ intermediaries and creditors . 
168. Intermediaries often play a number of potentially 
conflicting roles – acting as counselor to the debtor but also 
administering plans, reporting to courts and ensuring 
compliance by debtors with insolvency requirements and 
repayment plans. Debtors may often lack knowledge of an 
insolvency system and the potential implications of choices, 
particularly in a multi-track system. This confers significant 
power on intermediaries, whether they are lawyers, 
accountants or debt counselors. Studies in some countries 
indicate that intermediaries may further their own financial 
or ideological interests by inappropriate steering of debtors 
to particular solutions without a debtor being aware of this 
fact.12 It is probably impossible to excise the exercise of 
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discretion by a professional, but a simplified system can 
reduce the need for extensive professional intervention and 
reduce debtor costs. 
169. Whatever their professional background intermediaries 
are generally constrained by costs—either through budget 
limitations or the limited ability of individuals to pay for 
advice. Processes become routinized to reduce costs. 
Computerization can reduce professional discretion and 
possibly ensure greater individualization of treatment.  
Careful attention to the design of computer programs for 
channeling consumer debtors to distinct solutions may attain 
long term economic and social benefits. 
170. Given the above comments it is important to promote 
strong ethical codes and/or regulation for intermediaries 
dealing with debtors. The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on 
Insolvency Law provides in section III.B 1-7 a guide to 
qualifications and personal qualities for insolvency 
representatives. The insolvency of natural persons raises 
budgeting, family and social issues as well as the legal rights 
of the parties. There are advantages to intermediaries acting 
in the insolvency of natural persons being qualified in these 
areas at least to a level of knowledge appropriate to refer an 
individual to a family or social agency. There is always a 
danger with professional licensing that it may unduly restrict 
entry to the profession. Thus, in determining who may act as 
intermediary a balance needs to be struck between ensuring 
intermediaries are qualified to address the problems of 
individual insolvents, on the one hand, and on the other 
hand, not unduly limiting the range of individuals who may 
provide advice and assistance. 
D) Administrative models of insolvency processing 
171. Public agencies play a significant role in several countries 
in sorting, processing and administering the insolvency of 
natural persons.  
172. Administrative processing can introduce a stable 
bureaucracy with the ability to develop experience in 
identifying and sorting cases that deserve examination and 
investigation and providing impartial advice and information 
to debtors and creditors. It can act proactively to deter abuse 
of the system and address moral hazard issues. The 
disadvantages of administrative processing include the 
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dangers of capture by creditors, debtors or professional 
groups, and potential conflicts of interest within the 
administration. Since public agencies often do not have clear 
measures of success (in terms of profit and loss) ensuring an 
appropriate monitoring and reporting framework for an 
agency is also necessary.  
173. Experience of administrative processing does not 
indicate the existence of capture, although using existing 
institutions such as Tax enforcement regimes to administer 
insolvency of natural persons may require retraining of 
employees. Conflicts of interest may be addressed through 
separation of administration and investigation functions.  
There are significant differences between existing public 
processors of individual insolvents. The following material 
outlines the main contours of distinct approaches that reflect 
partly historical path dependency and political factors.  
174. Several countries have a modified Official Receiver 
model where a state agency investigates an insolvent 
debtor’s affairs and acts as the administrator of small 
insolvency estates (which have always constituted the vast 
majority of estates) where the assets of the estate do not 
justify the appointment of a private insolvency 
representative and outsources the larger, more complicated 
cases. (In some systems adopting this model, there has been 
a movement to try to outsource all cases.) The original 
rationale for this state regulation was the failure of creditor 
control. State supervision might protect small creditors and 
ensure the maintenance of commercial morality. The 
transformation of individual insolvency during the past few 
decades, from a creditor-initiated process primarily used 
against small businesses, to one where individuals initiate 
the great majority of insolvency cases means that these 
agencies administer primarily individual cases. Some 
countries using this model have developed low-cost 
summary procedures, requiring no court involvement, 
available on-line for those individuals with no significant 
income or assets. These agencies can also provide 
information and advice to over-indebted individuals. The 
existence of such an agency reduces the need for (and costs 
of) professional advice and representation and may reduce 
formalities and costs through the use of modern 
technologies.  
175. Some countries have developed a state-financed “one-
stop shop” for over-indebted individuals. This institution 
determines whether a debtor meets the entry criteria, 
suggests a conciliated plan (including moratoria or 
rescheduling of debts), and, where necessary, asserts the 
power to impose an agreement or recommend a discharge of 
debts after a short period of time for individuals who have 
no possibility of putting in place a repayment plan. Courts 




the operation of the system is the secretariat staffed by state 
employees. Other countries have adapted existing 
institutions such as tax collection agencies or debt 
enforcement agencies to administer individual insolvency 
proceedings.  
176. Hybrid public-private models also exist where the 
primary actors are private insolvency practitioners who 
assess, administer and investigate debtors, but there is close 
supervision through a public regulator which licenses 
practitioners and may also intervene in the process.  
177. The existence of state processing of insolvent debtors 
who rarely have significant assets or income to pay for the 
process raises the issue of how to fund a public system of 
processing (see II.2.F).  
 
E) Comparative institutional issues in the choice of 
the institutional framework 
178. Sections II.2 C and D outlined advantages and 
disadvantages of courts and administrative agencies. A 
comparative institutional analysis of the role of courts and 
administrative agencies must take into account the context 
of existing institutions in particular countries. If there is little 
general confidence in the court system of a country or 
limited numbers of qualified professionals to assist debtors 
then court reform and the development of qualified 
professionals might precede or coincide with the 
introduction of insolvency procedures. It may be useful to 
develop ADR mechanisms or experiments with new 
procedures in some courts as a prelude to national 
implementation. 
179. Developing economies with increasing levels of indebted 
individuals may face significant costs in establishing a novel, 
nationwide infrastructure of officials and intermediaries for 
an effective personal insolvency system. Research on other 
areas of the law concludes that it may not be desirable to 
transplant overly complex procedures from richer to poorer 
countries since the courts in these countries may not have 
the administrative capacity to address these issues. There 
may be advantages therefore in building on existing 
institutional infrastructures and keeping procedures simple, 
at least initially. 
180. Several high-income countries developed an institutional 
framework for the insolvency of natural persons by 
modifying judicial procedures. Others modified existing 




for addressing consumer over-indebtedness. The process in 
many countries has generally been one of incremental 
responses to the changing nature of the demand for 
insolvency, for example the recognition of the need for NINA 
procedures. This experience also counsels in favor of 
informed incrementalism rather than comprehensive 
rationality in institutional design. Such an approach may be 
more politically acceptable in the politically contentious area 
of personal insolvency.  
181. The use of computer technology might provide an 
opportunity for reducing both processing and error costs. 
Online access to insolvency through approved intermediaries 
using standardized insolvency programs with the possibility 
of random audits and using data from credit bureaus, where 
available, could provide relief while assuring the prevention 
of abuse. Several countries have adopted this approach 
sometimes restricting it to individuals with debts under a 
certain level. Random audits are especially important; if 
debtors believe that proper investigation will not take place 
in cases in which there are no assets, some debtors might be 
tempted to “dispose” of all of their assets pre-petition. 
F) Financing issues 
182. Many individuals have difficulties in financing access to 
insolvency. Five approaches to financing exist: (1) state 
funding of the process (including both creditor and debtor 
costs); (2) cross-subsidization of low value insolvencies by 
higher value estates; (3) state subsidies to professionals 
involved in the process and writing off court costs where 
there is an inability to repay; (4) levies on creditors, such as 
taxation of distressed debt to fund those cases where 
individuals have no ability to pay; and (5) no state support 
beyond any general public good funding of the court system. 
The majority of countries have adopted the final alternative. 
In some countries, the challenge of funding individual 
debtors and providing access to insolvency has been met 
through innovative methods of private processing by private 
professionals. In other countries, the absence of state 
support is likely to undermine the possibility of relief. 
Providing high quality professional support for personal 
insolvency systems where debtors have few resources is a 
policy challenge. All of the above systems of funding have 
some disadvantages. Full public funding of the process 
subsidizes both debtors and creditors whose costs of 
recovery are reduced. Since these are paid from general 
revenues there is likely to be continuing pressure to reduce 
the level of expenditure. Cross-subsidization depends on a 
significant level of non-subsidized insolvencies that may vary 
in amount over time. Taxation of distressed debt may be 
subject to manipulation. User pay systems may result in 




poor preparation of the necessary documentation by debtors, 
increasing administrative costs.  
183. Section I.9 argued that there are economic and social 
benefits to debtors, creditors, and third parties from the 
existence of personal insolvency. If the existence of these 
benefits is accepted, there are arguments that all parties 
should contribute their fair share to the financing of the 
framework. “Fair share” may mean that creditors contribute 
through a levy. Creditors may pass along some of this cost to 
the public, but may also have incentives to reduce the 
number of debtors in default. For some debtors with limited 
resources fair share could mean no contribution.  
184. Financing issues can be softened quite effectively by 
addressing the expense side of the system. Several countries 
have reduced the costs of personal insolvency by introducing 
summary procedures, so that the traditional formalities of 
insolvency such as creditors’ meetings, or the examination of 
a debtor occur only in exceptional cases. These changes 
often reflect the reality of existing practice. As mentioned 
earlier there is the increased use of the Internet (section 
II.2.E) in the initial processing of cases. The use of online 
systems can reduce costs throughout an insolvency system, 
for example, through standardized programs for assessing 
and calculating debtors’ disposable incomes and monitoring 
repayment plans. Intelligent use of online programs could 
achieve a desired balance between uniformity and discretion 
in the treatment of debtors. 
II.3. Access to the formal insolvency regime 
185. The standards for access to individual insolvency and 
restructuring procedures should be transparent and certain 
while ensuring against improper use by either creditor or 
debtor. Both creditor and debtor can initiate individual 
insolvency proceedings in several countries. However, almost 
all countries that have introduced distinct systems of 
insolvency of natural persons in recent decades only accept 
filings by debtors for admission into these proceedings. As 
indicated in section II.1, creditors’ insolvency petitions 
against individual debtors are uncommon even in most of the 
countries where such petitions are possible. There are some 
systems, however, where personal bankruptcy is used as a 
threat in the collection efforts of creditors, and the threat is 
more intense where the stigma attached to bankruptcy is 
greater. This use of personal bankruptcy may undermine 
many of the potential benefits of a regime of insolvency of 
natural persons outlined in section 1.9.  
186. If creditor petitions are permitted then controls may be 
desirable on the extent to which insolvency can be used as 




collection tool. This may be either through a requirement 
that more than one creditor initiate a petition, or 
establishing a high financial floor for an individual debt as a 
prerequisite for a petition. The disadvantage of the latter 
approach is that the financial limits must be kept under 
review to ensure that they do not become outdated. 
187. Insolvency systems traditionally appeal to two standards 
as a gateway to insolvency proceedings: a cessation of 
payments test and a balance sheet test (see generally 
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide at 45-67; and Principle C4.2 of 
the World Bank Principles for Effective Insolvency and 
Creditor Rights Systems). The former is the primary test in 
insolvency of natural persons and is simpler to apply than a 
balance sheet test. Some countries include further “acts of 
bankruptcy” as a trigger for an insolvency application. These 
are historical criteria that fit uneasily into contemporary 
personal insolvency law where the central issue is inability to 
repay rather than wrongful actions by debtors. 
A) Debtor access  
188. Personal insolvency and debt adjustment systems differ 
on the extent to which there is open access for debtors.  
Open access may be defined as the idea that an individual 
who meets an insolvency test such as the inability to pay 
debts as they fall due may, without more, gain access to an 
insolvency procedure permitting an ultimate discharge of 
debts. Open access may reduce the hesitation  by honest but 
unfortunate  debtors, noted in paragraphs 120-133, to seek 
relief. There is a system that does not require a debtor to be 
insolvent as a condition of access. The advantage of this 
approach is that it reduces the initial screening costs of an 
insolvency test, transferring them to a later stage when a 
filing may be challenged for abuse . It also may encourage 
over-indebted individuals to petition for insolvency relief. 
There are however disadvantages. In practice individuals 
who are not insolvent do not file, but the absence of an 
insolvency requirement is politically contentious, raising 
unnecessary debate about moral hazard. Indeed although 
this system does not require an insolvency test it does 
impose both a presumption of abuse when individuals are 
classified as having excess  income available to pay creditors 
and also requires mandatory counseling for debtors as a 
condition for filing that may add over inclusive screening 
costs.  
189. Some systems provide relatively open access but require 
a debtor to undergo a period of good behavior over several 
years before being permitted to discharge debts. During this 
period, individuals must set aside a certain portion of their 




majority make no repayments because they have no surplus 
income. 
190. Access to insolvency procedures for a debtor may be 
subject to several legal and practical conditions including the 
following: a minimum level of debt; a future oriented test of 
“permanent insolvency”; “good faith”; or a requirement that 
debts are caused by events beyond a debtor’s control such as 
illness or unemployment. A debtor may have to demonstrate 
that he has consulted an approved intermediary, obtained 
counseling, or attempted a negotiated settlement before 
being permitted to make an application for insolvency. 
Access may be dependent on ability to pay. The costs of 
insolvency procedures may limit access for eligible debtors 
(see paragraphs 182-184 above, on methods of cost 
reduction).  
191. A distinction may be drawn between those systems that 
define insolvency as a current inability to meet present debts 
and those that include the possibility at a future date of a 
debtor being able to improve his/her financial situation and 
repay debts. Some countries adopt this forward looking 
perspective of “permanent insolvency”. This is a more 
speculative and consequently uncertain standard to apply 
that raises decision making and error costs and may result in 
the adoption of over inclusive proxies. Thus in certain 
systems it may be more difficult for younger debtors to 
access insolvency.  
192. This latter approach often reflects the objective of  using 
access criteria to   maintain  pacta sunt servanda 
(“agreements must be kept”), or, in economic terms, 
protection against moral hazard – in other words, for 
application where individuals may be tempted to incur 
excessive debts knowing that they can be discharged in 
insolvency. Some countries limit access to individuals who 
have experienced social force majeure such as involuntary 
unemployment or make judgments on the conduct of the 
debtor through good faith requirements. It is difficult to 
measure the effects of this approach on maintaining a 
payment morality but there is little substantial evidence of 
moral hazard in existing systems (see section I.9.A) where 
there is relatively open access. Such systems often apply 
intermediate sanctions (see paragraphs 198-199) to 
individuals after entry to the insolvency system rather than 
barring initial entry.  In addition, any reduction in moral 
hazard needs to be balanced against the increased screening 
costs and the social costs of more restricted access, which 
may include loss of productivity and effects on families and 
health. Section I.9.C outlined the potential extent of these 
costs. 
193. One method of addressing potential moral hazard is to 




accomplished by applying a bright line rule restricting access 
within a defined period of time. Various countries prevent 
repeat access within two, four, six, or ten years following a 
first insolvency case. Alternatively, some countries subject a 
repeat insolvent automatically to more intensive 
investigation, with only “exceptional” cases admitted for a 
second relief proceeding. 
194. The concept of “good faith” is an explicit criterion for 
access in several countries. This open-textured standard has 
resulted in substantial litigation in several systems with lower 
courts basing decisions on a variety of distinct perceptions of 
the debtor’s situation and conduct. It is often difficu lt to 
judge the conduct of an individual ex post facto determining 
whether his conduct was unfortunate, imprudent or 
negligent, and whether negligence should be equated with 
bad faith. As a consequence of these difficulties, most 
systems have adopted a lower standard of intentional fraud 
or the concept of honesty. It may be impossible to excise 
moral judgments from insolvency administration. However, 
the good faith requirement is likely to lead to variable 
decision making and increase disputes. This is particularly 
problematic in countries with a relatively decentralized 
judiciary.  
195. Access criteria may be a combination of rules and 
standards. Insolvency systems may both specify through 
rules conduct which might prevent access, such as failure to 
disclose assets or the provision of false information while 
also leaving a residual discretion to judges or administrators 
to police for abuse through a standard. It is difficult to 
determine the optimal balance of rules and standards in 
policy making. The over- and under-inclusiveness of rules 
(including individuals who do not fit the underlying policy 
and excluding those who do) must be balanced against the 
costs of application of a general standard. In the context of 
access to individual insolvency there are advantages to 
favoring rules with a limited discretion. This requires 
legislatures to articulate clearly the rules for insolvency relief 
and to avoid the easy political choice for hard decisions, 
namely to pass responsibility to the judiciary through the 
enactment of a standard. Rules are also less costly to 
administer, reducing the need for unnecessarily high levels of 
expertise. 
196. High access barriers to the formal system of relief may 
result in individuals being in a state of “informal insolvency”. 
Individuals unable to access debt relief lose incentives to 
participate in society, may require continuing state support 
or might go “underground” for several years to avoid 
creditors until their problems go away or passions cool off. 
Creditors may be unlikely to recover significant amounts in 
the free-for-all of individual collection but they nevertheless 




access debt relief may also result in a political backlash such 
as debt strikes. Sections I.9.A, B, and C have already 
described these issues in outlining the benefits of an 
insolvency system. 
197. In some countries, access may be dependent on a legal 
requirement of consulting an intermediary and obtaining 
advice on alternatives to insolvency. These intermediaries 
may include lawyers, debt counselors, accountants, or social 
workers.  This requirement may be premised on an 
assumption that individuals may not think through the 
consequences of insolvency or may be unaware of potential 
alternatives. It may also be intended to protect against 
potential abuse of the system. This requirement can be 
useful if there is adequate, high-quality advice and if there is 
evidence that the benefits of this intervention is likely to 
exceed its costs. Existing evidence suggests that mandatory 
pre-insolvency counseling is radically over-inclusive in 
protecting against abuse or in assisting debtors in avoiding 
insolvency. A general requirement of such counseling may 
divert limited counseling resources from those cases where 
counseling may be most productive. 
198. A distinction may be drawn between those systems that 
create high initial barriers to access based on a debtor’s 
conduct and those where individuals may be permitted to 
enter the system but may be sanctioned for their conduct. 
Thus, in some systems there is relatively open access but if a 
debtor has engaged in culpable conduct, such as incurring 
before insolvency a debt that the debtor has no reasonable 
expectation of being able to repay, then such an individual 
may be subject to a sanction or have limits imposed on the 
discharge of debts. Open access does not mean, therefore, 
that an individual’s conduct will not be reviewed or  
sanctioned in insolvency. Insolvency can provide both a 
protective and disciplinary function. Creditors or state 
agencies can play a role here through opportunities to 
challenge an individual’s discharge.  
199. An opportunity for a creditor or agency to challenge a 
discharge or otherwise sanction a debtor provides a 
protection against moral hazard and adds legitimacy to a 
system of individual insolvency by increasing participation by 
creditors. However, creditors have other opportunities to 
participate (see section II.4) and unless the criteria for such a 
challenge are relatively sharp, the increase in decision 
making and error costs may outweigh the benefits. Some 
systems that confer substantial discretion on judges to 
determine discharge issues exhibit wide variation in decision 
making. Courts face difficulties in making accurate judgments 
in hindsight on whether an individual’s behavior is, for 
example, ‘extravagant’. There is a danger that errors here can 
undermine the opportunity of a fresh start for an individual 




systems exclude from a discharge that reflect political 
decisions by legislatures. 
B) Controlling access in a multi-track insolvency 
system 
200. Insolvency systems offer a variety of options ranging 
from temporary moratoria, through restructuring to a full 
discharge. Section II.5.B discusses the role of repayment 
plans. The law may structure access to these options through 
income or asset criteria, or the requirement that all debtors 
must go through a similar procedure, for example a 
repayment program, before being able to access a discharge. 
Ideally, options should match the broad contours of the 
different types of over-indebted individuals as discussed in 
section II.2 (Institutional Framework). The existence of 
insolvency options raises the question of the extent to which 
access should be (a) dependent on consumer choice or (b) a 
decision of a public agency or official.  Existing systems differ 
on this question: Systems that permit significant consumer 
choice require public or private intermediaries to assist 
individuals in decision making. Mechanisms that permit 
creditors or public agencies to monitor and challenge 
consumer choice also exist in these systems. Systems that 
rely primarily on public agency decision making reduce 
debtor decision making costs and can provide disinterested 
decision making that will ensure the integrity of the system. 
Procedures will be necessary in these systems to ensure 
consistent application of rules and to permit challenges to 
agency decisions. The relative balance of consumer choice 
and public decision making will affect the costs to be borne 
by the debtor and the public system, and the role of 
intermediaries.  
201. The more complex an insolvency system in terms of 
distinct and overlapping procedures, the greater will be the 
difficulties facing an over-indebted individual, who may be in 
a vulnerable position, in making an effective choice.  
202. Impartial intermediaries can assist individuals. In a 
multi-track system based on consumer choice, 
intermediaries may however have significant power and may 
be tempted to steer individuals to a particular solution based 
on their financial or ideological interests rather than the best 
interests of the debtor, and this provides support for the 
regulation of such intermediaries. Simplification also reduces 
the power of intermediaries and debtors’ information costs 
and information processing costs. Appropriate information 
for debtors and creditors provided by an agency or ministry 




203. Some systems use initial screening based on income 
criteria to determine the debtor’s choice. This is based on 
the simple –but often difficult to apply in practice- 
distinction that debtors who “can pay”, “should pay” a 
portion of their income. This approach may be desirable at 
the point of entry in a system where post-insolvency income 
is not treated as part of the estate. This approach also assists 
in getting creditors to support the process. Other systems 
that do not screen as aggressively at the initial stage may 
automatically apply a surplus income requirement, based on 
regulations, which will capture any surplus income over a 
period of time (see discussion at section II.5.B). In a few 
systems, a central agency effectively decides the particular 
option for a consumer. 
204. Some systems restrict access to debt relief to individuals 
with consumer rather than business debts. Restrictions on 
access to those with only consumer debts may result in 
litigation over the nature of debts, particularly given the 
increased overlap in small businesses between consumption 
and production debts. Experience indicates that in many 
countries a significant percentage of individuals using the 
insolvency system have debts related to failed businesses. 
The advantage of a separate consumer insolvency system is 
that it will tend to ensure that the system considers more 
straightforward consumer cases. The disadvantage is that it 
increases screening costs and may deny access to individuals 
with business debts who differ in only modest ways from 
consumer debtors (see section I.8 and section II.1). 
II.4. Participation of creditors 
 
A) Creditor participation in general 
205. In business insolvency, significant value is often available 
for creditors, and the restructuring of a company and the 
regulation of debt are subject to vote by the creditors and 
often the involvement of creditors’ committees (especially in 
large cases). The voting rules may be complex and the 
outcome dependent on the number of creditors and on the 
amount of outstanding debt. 
206. In insolvency procedures for natural persons, in contrast, 
very little value is usually available, and the creditors 
normally play little or no role in the procedure. Even where 
creditors are invited to participate, creditors’ participation in 
natural personal insolvency cases cannot be taken for 
granted. Creditors will participate where they view it as 
being in their best interest to do so, and they will be 
reluctant to participate where they believe that it will be 
unlikely to increase their dividend. Thus, in the great bulk of 




to creditors is expected, creditor passivity might well be the 
rational choice. In insolvency cases involving natural persons, 
creditors have most often regarded the likely dividends from 
such proceedings to be insufficient to warrant their 
participation. Even if an objection against the 
commencement of insolvency proceedings might be 
sustained, the result is most likely to be an uncollectible 
claim against a debtor who is practically insolvent even if not 
legally entitled to relief. Consequently, in the overwhelming 
majority of insolvency cases involving natural persons in the 
world today, active creditor participation is a rare exception.  
207. Some systems deal with this issue by lowering the 
quorum for creditors’ meetings (in one system to as low as 
one creditor), though the more common reaction has been 
to find ways to limit or even eliminate opportunities for 
creditor participation in natural person insolvency cases 
altogether, except in cases where significant value from 
assets or future income is expected. Legislators in many 
areas in recent years have concluded that the paltry gains to 
be had from inviting creditors to participate in most natural 
person insolvency cases are far outweighed by the significant 
administrative costs and delays occasioned by such 
participation. As a result, a notable trend has developed to 
scrap creditors’ meetings, submission and verification of 
claims, and other forms of creditor participation in all but 
the small fraction of cases in which a significant sum is 
expected to be distributed to creditors. 
B) Creditor participation in plan confirmation 
208. An especially important contrast with business 
insolvency is that creditors generally have little if any 
meaningful influence over the establishment (confirmation) 
of a payment plan or other requirement for discharge or 
other relief. Even in those relatively few systems in which 
creditors may vote on the plan, their vote generally 
influences how much the debtor has to pay but not the issue 
of discharge as such. Some systems vest more authority over 
plan approval in creditors holding certain identified 
percentages of claims (usually at least a majority, if not 
more), though in such systems, a fully non-consensual route 
to discharge is available to most debtors if creditors refuse 
the proposed plan. In one system in particular, the 
availability of a standard discharge procedure is explicitly 
regarded as a “stick behind the door” to threaten creditors 
with undesirable consequences if they refuse to accept a 
consensual plan. 
209. In the business context, renegotiation of distressed debt 
is regarded as almost entirely a matter of private contracting, 
rather than social planning. The limited liability of business 




situations, and the state might well have little specific 
interest in preventing creditors from simply demanding that 
the debtor-company liquidate and go out of existence. To be 
sure, this position has been evolving rapidly over the past 
several decades, as a culture of rescue and rehabilitation has 
swept the world of business insolvency, as well. But the 
desire for rescue and preservation of business, particularly 
artificial entities, is generally regarded as far less pressing 
than the moral and economic imperatives to protect and 
preserve natural persons and their families.  
210. Most societies today are not willing to allow creditors to 
push their natural person debtors out of existence, or even 
to confine them in a distressed state indefinitely. Moreover, 
natural person debtors most often occupy a substantially 
weaker bargaining position than their business debtor 
counterparts, and at the very least, they are generally less 
capable of making sophisticated financial analyses or of 
engaging professional assistance to help them in doing so. 
Once the situation has deteriorated to the point where a 
natural person debtor would seek formal insolvency relief, 
natural market forces and free contract negotiation are no 
longer sufficient safeguards of the public health and welfare.  
211. For societies that have chosen to adopt an insolvency 
regime for natural persons, the decision as to how debts will 
be adjusted through legal intervention is generally regarded 
as more than a simple matter of contract. Creditors’ interests 
are protected not through their negotiating leverage, but 
through their representation by state authorities. The proper 
levels of sacrifice by distressed debtors, and the appropriate 
levels of protection of and compromise by their creditors, 
are matters of sensitive social policy. Policymakers from a 
wide variety of regions seem to have all but unanimously  
concluded that these questions in the final analysis are best 
resolved by political representatives whose task is to balance 
the competing interests of different constituencies, such as 
debtors and creditors. Rather than leaving these questions to 
private negotiations among creditors and debtors, state 
authorities have consistently been assigned to make the key 
decisions with respect to the duration and level of sacrifice 
in insolvency payment plans. If debtors are willing and able 
to fulfill the carefully structured demands placed on them by 
the insolvency system, they receive the relief offered by that 
system, despite what would be in virtually every case 
vociferous creditor objection if creditors were asked their 
opinion on the terms of relief.  
212. Even if a fully coercive endgame stands as the final 
option, some element of contractual freedom and creditor 
participation continues to play a central role in many 
insolvency systems. The discussion above in section II.1 
about informal, out-of-court arrangements offers a primary 




any individual case might be influenced at least in part by 
creditor agreement. In several systems, for example, 
creditors have an option to avoid the court-imposed 
payment-plan-and-discharge process by accepting a 
compromise plan. If a majority of creditors accepts the 
debtor’s offer of five years of projected non-exempt income, 
such a plan can be confirmed over the objection of a 
dissenting minority of creditors. This combination of creditor 
assent and court coercion has met with success in a 
substantial number of natural person insolvency cases in a 
few systems in recent years. Such intermediate approaches 
have enjoyed markedly less success elsewhere, however, 
especially where more than simple majority support from 
creditors is required. Concerns about eroding contractual 
freedom have been addressed by giving creditors a chance to 
accept the reality of the debtor’s distress. If they refuse, 
however, the underlying premise of most existing insolvency 
systems is that the goals of such a system can be achieved 
only if a higher authority is willing to step in and impose a 
compromise arrangement for the benefit of creditors, 
debtors, and society in general. 
213. The reasons why the decision on plan confirmation and 
discharge is generally assigned to the court or relevant 
administrative body rather than creditors include the 
following:  
 Creditors adopt very different policies regarding debt 
adjustment. Sometimes important creditors, such as the 
tax authorities, major banks, or debt collection agencies 
who have bought a large number of claims, make policy 
decisions to oppose all or most categories of insolvency 
filings by natural persons. In some systems, some types of 
creditors are on record as opposing relief in such cases “on 
principle.” In many systems, tax authorities and other 
governmental actors are prohibited by law from voting to 
offer relief from public debts. Such policies and laws can be 
very detrimental to the debtors, especially because those 
broad policies ignore the worthiness of the debtor or the 
quality of the payment plan, and such policies ultimately 
undermine the achievement of the many benefits of the 
system for other creditors and society, as discussed in 
section I.9, above.  
 There is a problem of creditor passivity. This can have 
serious consequences in a vote: a “majority” decision may 
reflect a random majority if most of the creditors remain 
passive. A few systems have devised a solution to this 
problem short of excluding creditors entirely from 
participation in the plan confirmation process: Creditors 
are invited to vote on a plan, but creditor passivity is 
interpreted as a lack of opposition against the plan or a 




counted as implicitly accepting the plan rather than not 
being included in the quorum.  
 Creditors may not be well informed about the debtor’s 
circumstances and situation. Thus their opinion can be 
based on partial information. According to the general 
principles of procedural law the creditors as parties have a 
right to access and examine all relevant information. But 
very often creditors lack interest and they do not attend 
the hearings nor request full documentation. The court or 
other administrator gathers the needed information and 
has a duty to study it, and to hear the debtor when 
appropriate. Thus the court or administrator is in a better 
position to make the decision on the total circumstances of 
the debtor.  
 Creditors may also find themselves in a situation where 
other motives affect their ability to make a rational 
judgment about the consequences of insolvency 
proceedings for the debtor. In these circumstances, 
creditors might be heard and be given a chance to present 
their case but conflicting interests may prevent them from 
being in the best position to judge the consequences of 
the case. 
214.  In insolvency systems for natural persons, creditors’ 
rights are guaranteed in other ways. Generally, creditors are 
given an opportunity to be heard in the court or 
administrative procedure, and they have the right to object 
to the relief. They also have the chance to offer evidence of 
circumstances that make the relief unwarranted. They may 
request that an examination of the debtor or of third parties 
be commenced. They are sometimes also allowed to make 
comments on the content of the plan and, for example, 
demand higher payments than the debtor proposes. There 
may be a hearing in the court or in front of an administrator 
if the discharge and the plan are opposed by the creditors. In 
those systems in which an administrative body or an 
insolvency representative has the main responsibility for the 
proceedings, a dissenting creditor has the right to bring the 
case to the court. After the court has confirmed a plan, a 
creditor may appeal to a higher court. As mentioned above, 
however, such instances of creditor participation have been 
vanishingly rare, as the economic stakes are usually simply 
too small to justify the investment. 
215. One particular way in which creditors’ rights are 
sometimes protected despite their lack of participation is for 
the law to include a procedure for cases in which assets or 
unexpected income are discovered post-discharge or post-
confirmation. Several systems include a mechanism for 
allowing creditors or system administrators to request re-
opening of such cases and collecting and retroactively 




systems, however, such windfalls are reserved to debtors. 
Finality is an important consideration that in some systems is 
regarded as even more important than ensuring creditors 
maximal payment from debtors’ later discovered resources. 
C) Claims submission and verification 
216. As mentioned above, an increasing number of systems 
have done away with submission and verification of creditor 
claims entirely in cases involving natural person debtors, 
except in cases where a system administrator establishes 
that value is expected to be available for distribution to 
creditors. Where claims filing has not been abolished, the 
procedures for creditors filing proofs of claim vary from 
system to system. Much of the claims process is premised on 
the voluntary and honest compliance by the parties, and 
many countries therefore have sanctions applicable to 
debtors or creditors who file incorrect or fraudulent claims.  
This topic is covered in the ICR Standard, and claims 
submission and verification raises few unique issues in the 
context of natural person debtors. 
217. At least one insolvency law developed specifically for 
natural persons, however, contains a unique provision on 
claims disallowance. This law singles out creditors who 
extended credit to natural person debtors without taking 
sufficient account of the debtor’s other existing debts, 
income capacity, or general creditworthiness. Though this 
provision has been applied rarely in practice, it represents an 
important reflection of legislators’ common desire to 
inculcate responsibility not only among debtors accessing 
credit, but also among creditors offering it. This desired 
effect was discussed above in section I.9.C (iii), and this 
provision is one unique manifestation of how the desire for 
emphasizing creditor responsibility might be effectuated in 
the claims verification process. 
218. One final issue of particular importance to natural 
person insolvency cases is the strict enforcement of claim 
filing deadlines, especially in cases involving payment plans. 
Some systems simply deny any distribution to creditors filing 
claims beyond a deadline, while others retroactively adjust 
the payment plan or other value distribution mechanism to 
take into account late-filed claims. This has caused significant 
problems in cases where debtors’ obligations are 
retroactively modified in a way that makes them unable to 
fulfill the new demands. As a result, at least one system 
specifically designed for natural persons has been revised 
recently to prohibit such post-confirmation modifications of 
payment plans and to deny recovery to the affected creditors 
unless the debtor is regarded as somehow culpable in having 





II.5. Solutions to the insolvency process and payment 
of claims 
A) Payment through liquidation of the estate 
219. Historically, insolvency systems looked to the debtor’s 
assets as the sole source of value to be distributed among 
creditors in payment of their claims. There is one system that 
uniquely relies on debtors themselves to sell their own 
assets and distribute the value to creditors before seeking 
relief, as a sign of the debtor’s seriousness about dealing 
with her debt problems and responsibly applying available 
value. In virtually every other system, however, a public 
administrator or trustee of some kind is appointed to 
inventory, collect, and sell the debtor’s assets to produce 
value for creditors. A notable trend has developed in many 
insolvency and creditor/debtor regimes to abandon exclusive 
reliance on public auctions for such sales and instead to give 
the insolvency representative flexibility to choose to dispose 
of the debtor’s assets in private sales if that solution is likely 
to produce greater value for creditors. 
220. Most modern systems continue to take the approach of 
focusing on the debtor’s assets, at least initially (for a 
discussion of payment plans, see below in section II.5.B), but 
usually this is little more than a formality. Practically, the 
overwhelming majority of debtors in every existing system of 
insolvency for natural persons have proven to have few if any 
assets of any value that are available for liquidation and 
distribution to creditors. Consequently, several systems have 
all but abandoned the step of attempting to liquidate the 
debtor’s available assets unless the debtor appears to have 
substantial assets to warrant the significant administrative 
expenses of the inventory and liquidation process. 
221. One reason for the paucity of debtor assets is that most 
societies have decided that debtors cannot be left with no 
assets whatsoever with which to support themselves and 
their families. Any discussion of liquidation of debtors’ assets 
must therefore focus on which assets are not available as a 
matter of law, as very few other assets of any value are likely 
to be available as a matter of practical reality. 
(i) Property exemptions 
222. The notion of exempting some of the debtor’s property 
from liquidation and distribution to creditors is closely tied 
to the discharge principle. It is also related to the exemption 
policy in many countries’ non-bankruptcy law safeguarding 
certain assets from post-judgment (and in some countries, 




when debtors receive a discharge, exit from insolvency, and 
obtain a fresh start, they should first be provided with 
sufficient property to meet post-insolvency minimum 
domestic needs for themselves and their families and, where 
necessary, minimum business needs. The discussion below 
distinguishes between exemptions relating to property 
existing at the time the insolvency case is commenced and 
property that comes into existence post-commencement.  
223. In some systems, property exemptions function as an 
imperfect alternative to an insolvency relief regime. In these 
systems, exemptions have played the role, historically, of 
alleviating the condition of the insolvent debtor, especially in 
the absence of a discharge. However, the effects of 
exemptions are insufficient to provide debtors with a real 
opportunity for starting anew. While insolvency relief 
conclusively limits creditors’ rights and offers debtors a fresh 
start and new incentives for future productivity, exemptions 
generally do not limit creditors’ rights over time. That is, 
while debtors derive some protection from exemptions, their 
incentives for productivity remain depressed because any 
future excess property or earnings beyond the exemption 
limits remain available to creditors, often indefinitely. An 
exemptions regime is thus insufficient to achieve most of the 
benefits of an insolvency system, discussed above in section 
I.9.  
224. Many systems have mechanisms for dealing with debtor 
abuse of exemption policies. For example, in some systems, 
if the debtor tries to hide an asset, he will not be able to 
exempt it. Avoidance actions are covered in detail in the ICR 
Standard.  
225. Historically, most systems set exempt property levels at 
very low levels. In some areas, the fact that exemption 
provisions set a low monetary limit to the total value of 
goods that the debtor may retain, inclusive of tools of the 
trade and necessary wearing apparel and bedding of himself 
and his dependents, reflects a harsh approach, operating in a 
cultural environment in which creditors were skeptical about 
the bona fides of bankrupt debtors, and granting debtors just 
the bare minimum. A problem that arises with outdated 
provision for exemptions is that they become unworkable 
and ignored in practice.  
226. There is a growing trend to liberalize property 
exemptions. When countries modernize their property 
exemptions they generally increase the levels and scope of 
exempt property. This also saves on expenses because 
valuation in many countries has become increasingly 
burdensome. 
227. There are primarily three different approaches for 




approach is to set aside a range of assets with a value up to a 
specified limit that the debtor may seek to get exempted 
from the property of the estate. This historically was a 
popular approach. A second approach currently adopted by 
many systems modernized the first approach and set out 
categories of particular assets (and values) for these assets 
that the debtor may seek to get exempted. The burden is on 
the debtor to seek to get those assets exempted from the 
estate. A third approach that has also been adopted in many 
systems is to adopt a more general standards-based 
approach that exempts most property from the estate and 
puts the burden on the system administrator to object to the 
exemption of valuable domestic or household assets so that 
such assets may be brought back into the estate.  
228. It can be seen from the operation of these three 
different approaches that the adoption of one approach over 
the other has significant ramifications for the insolvency 
procedures and processes, for example, in its effects on the 
behavior of debtors or in relation to the amount of time and 
expense that administrators must dedicate to policing the 
debtors' assets. It is important to keep in mind that, as a 
general principle, exemptions do not interfere with security 
interests granted over assets that otherwise would be 
exempt. Thus, if debtors are experiencing problems with 
mortgages over their homes, a home exemption will not 
prove of assistance. 
a) Exemption of narrow range of assets by a 
debtor up to a total value  
229. Under this approach, all of debtors’ assets existing at the 
time of the petition (or order) for insolvency relief 
automatically become property of the estate, and debtors 
are then given the opportunity to exempt a narrow range of 
assets for themselves and their families. Historically, assets 
available for exemption under this approach were often 
quite limited and only included the tools of the debtor’s 
trade, necessary wearing apparel and bedding for debtors 
and their families up to very low levels. This approach to 
exemption dated from an era in which insolvency law was 
more penal in nature. Under such a level of exemptions, 
debtors and their families would live at close to poverty 
levels. 
230. The limitations as to both the amount and the scope of 
the exempt assets in these old laws are far from reasonable 
by modern standards, and they left many debtors in a 
depressed state, sacrificing their future contributions to 
society. Over the years, in many countries adopting this 
approach, if the levels and the scope of the exemptions were 




b) Exemption of particular assets by the debtor 
231. This approach is a modern adaptation of the first 
approach. Under this approach, all of the debtor’s assets 
existing at the time of the petition (or order) for insolvency 
relief are technically available for distribution to creditors, 
and the debtor is then given the opportunity to exempt 
particular assets in particular categories and up to a certain 
amount. 
232. This approach grows out of the approach in many 
systems for providing protection for debtors from the 
execution (usually post-judgment) against a debtor’s assets. 
In such systems, the exemptions that are provided to a 
debtor depend on a variety of factors, such as where a 
debtor lives, what the debtor’s profession is, and whether 
the debtor has a family. Thus, the exemptions, and values of 
exempt property, might be different in farming and urban 
areas; or might be different for individual debtors and 
debtors with families. In the systems that follow this 
approach, the law sets out a broad range of categories of 
assets that the debtor may seek to exempt including family 
homes, automobiles, household goods and furnishings, and 
tools of the trade.  
233. The procedure will set out exemption limits for broad 
categories of assets, including the debtor’s home, motor 
vehicle (or mode of transport), general household goods held 
primarily for the personal, family, or household use of the 
debtor or the debtor’s family, professional books or tools of 
the trade of the debtor, unmatured life insurance policies, 
and health aids. 
234. In some systems, if the debtor is unable to use up the 
exemption limits in some categories of assets (e.g., the 
family home) the debtor may instead apply the unused 
amount (perhaps up to a limit) to other assets. Some systems 
even allow the debtor to sell off some assets to buy exempt 
assets. To take this to the limit, in those places where the 
exemption law places the family home entirely outside the 
reach of creditors, there are incentives for debtors to buy as 
expensive a house as they can afford. This behavior would 
not be considered fraudulent in such systems because the 
debtor is merely taking advantage of an available exemption 
in the law. To prevent these types of machinations some 
systems have established a limit on the value of a home that 
may be exempted for those debtors who have purchased the 
home within a certain period (perhaps as long as 3 or 4 years) 
leading up to the insolvency case. 
235. In situations where the value of an asset is only partially 
exempt, leaving some equity value available for creditors, if 




the debtor has an exemption, the insolvency representative 
must pay the debtor up to the amount of the exemption 
(within the limit) that the debtor has in the asset. To avoid a 
variety of direct and indirect losses associated with forced 
sales, some systems instead permit the debtor to pay the 
insolvency representative the amount above the exemption 
if the debtor wishes to keep the asset. 
236. The use of an exemption mechanism that allows the 
debtor to claim exempt property from certain categories and 
up to certain values has the advantage of general fairness. 
This approach may be of interest in countries in which many 
insolvent individuals are middle-class with many assets. 
However, this fairness comes at the expense of efficiency 
because there can be disagreement between the debtor and 
the insolvency representative (or the debtor’s creditors) 
when the debtor tries to maximize benefits under the 
broader categories. Another weakness of this approach is 
that the limits on the value of exempt assets that may be 
excluded from the estate are often too low, or become too 
low over time if their values in the legislation are not 
increased to keep in line with inflation. When that happens, 
the practice in some systems is to stop strictly enforcing the 
exemptions and to allow debtors to retain more than their 
statutory entitlement. In some countries that have 
experienced hyperinflation, the system includes artificial or 
notional measures of value—i.e., a unit of value whose value 
is regularly updated by the Government—in order to avoid 
the problem. 
c) Standards-based approach in which the 
insolvency representative seeks to reclaim 
items of excessive value 
237. The standards-based approach approaches the issue 
from the opposite perspective of the first two approaches. 
Under this approach, all of the debtor’s assets existing at the 
time of the insolvency petition (or order) are exempt, and 
the burden switches to the insolvency representative 
/government regulator to petition to reclaim particular items 
of excess value that could be of value to the creditors and 
the estate.  
238. An underlying assumption of this approach is that most 
of debtors’ personal items are of greater value to them and 
their families than they are of economic value to their 
creditors. In systems in which most insolvent debtors have a 
limited amount of personal assets, this approach can be 
much more efficient. The insolvency 
representative/government regulator only needs to 
intervene in those cases in which the debtor has particular 




(ii) Specific exemptions by asset type 
a) Family home exemptions 
239. Debtors’ homes are usually their most valuable asset 
and, in many cases, the asset in which debtors have lost the 
most equity. It is arguably also the most important asset 
psychologically, for the home provides shelter for the family 
and serves as the family meeting point. Thus, losing one’s 
home in foreclosure or insolvency can take a significant toll 
on a debtor. The family home is thus arguably one of the 
most important assets to be protected.  
240. Although there is agreement as to the importance of the 
exemption for the family home, there is a great variety of 
limits that are permitted. In countries that have a more 
complicated state/federal system, there can be great variety 
even within a single country. For example, some states may 
have no limit at all on the amount of a family home 
exemption and even permit debtors to sell off other assets 
with a view to buying an expensive home. 
241. Another approach to the family home exemption that 
some systems have adopted is to provide that debtors and 
their dependents are entitled to continue residing in the 
family home for a specified period of time (e.g., six months) 
with the ability to apply for a further extension. Under this 
approach, the debtor is unable to exempt the family home 
from liquidation and distribution to creditors, but is able to 
ensure that that commencement of an insolvency case does 
not lead to the immediate eviction from the family home. 
242. The family home often involves complicated matters 
involving joint ownership and the related issues of whether 
(and how) creditors can seek a partition of the joint assets or 
a split of the assets between the insolvent and the non-
insolvent party (See section II.5.A(v) below.) 
243. In some systems, upon the granting of a discharge, the 
debtor’s assets that vested in the insolvency estate will not 
return to the discharged debtor. This rule caused 
complications in some systems in which the insolvency 
representative delayed selling the debtor’s home – in some 
cases until after the debtor was discharged – in the hope of 
getting a better price. There is one system in which this 
practice ended when an amendment was made to the law 
that provided that the debtor’s interest in the family home 
would revert to him three years after the commencement of 
the insolvency case if the insolvency representative had not 
realized the asset for the benefit of creditors or commenced 




b) Automobiles/mode of transportation  
244. The exemption of a debtor’s automobile or mode of 
transportation is another of the debtor’s most valuable 
exemptions. Depending on where debtors live, if they are not 
able to exempt their mode of transportation, they might be 
unable to get to work and could lose their job. 
c) Household furnishings  
245. In most cases, the debtor’s household furnishings have a 
de minimis value. Most countries adopting the individual 
category approach will set out both an overall amount of 
exemption for all household furnishings and a limit on the 
amount of exemption for any individual item.  
246. In those systems that adopt the standards-based 
approach, the debtor will generally be permitted to retain all 
of his household furnishings. The insolvency representative 
will be permitted to reclaim items of significant value for 
creditors. Similarly, some countries that adopt the exemption 
of particular assets by debtor approach specify that object 
above a certain value cannot be included as “household 
assets.” 
d) Exemption of part of salary/wages and 
pension/retirement plans 
247. Most systems allow the debtor to retain earnings from 
services performed by an individual debtor after the 
commencement of the insolvency case. Some systems then 
provide for the entering of an income payment order against 
the debtor or encourage the debtor to voluntarily agree to 
pay over to the estate a portion of his post-commencement 
earnings. (See the discussion of payment plans in section II.5 
B)). At a minimum, debtors are able to retain sufficient post-
petition income that is adequate to meet the debtor’s and 
their family’s reasonable domestic needs. Permitting the 
debtors to retain sufficient income is based on humanitarian 
concerns, but it also favors the creditors because it increases 
repayment capacity. 
248. At present, for many middle class debtors, the largest 
asset is their pension/retirement assets. The effect of 
insolvency law on pension rights is one of the more 
confusing and difficult areas of insolvency law, as the law 
tries to balance debtors’ obligations to pay off their creditors 
against the debtors’ fresh start and right to pension assets to 
assist with their retirement. 
249. Some systems make a distinction between (1) a debtor’s 




entered into with pension providers and (2) occupational 
schemes, which are pension trusts set up by employers. In 
systems that adopt this distinction, as a general rule the 
personal pension contracts vest in the insolvency 
representative. As for occupational schemes, the treatment 
is more confusing. In some systems, a forfeiture clause, that 
is, a clause pursuant to which a member’s interest would be 
forfeited upon insolvency and paid to the member (i.e., the 
debtor or spouse or dependent) would not be effective 
against an insolvency representative– subject to the 
language of the individual forfeiture clause. In some systems, 
in regard to pre-insolvency contributions, a distinction is 
made between the validity of forfeiture clauses as to the 
employer’s contributions (permitted) and the employee’s 
(insolvent debtor ’s) contributions (not permitted). As for 
post-insolvency contributions, there is a line of authority 
that post-insolvency contributions form part of the estate 
and thus, when they become payable to the debtor, should 
be paid to the insolvency representative. However, there is 
some uncertainty as to whether the insolvency 
representative must serve a notice related to after-acquired 
property. Another approach is for the insolvency 
representative to agree not to lay claim to the mandatory 
contributions of both the insolvent debtor and the employer 
as long as the funds remain in the general fund.  
250. Other systems take a simpler approach and allow for 
certain defined retirement schemes to be exempt either in 
full, or up to high limitations even exceeding very substantial 
sums. 
251. Overall, the situation in many systems is confusing and 
would require some type of legislative intervention to clarify 
whether the debtors’ pension or retirement assets should be 
made available for distribution to creditors –and if so, up to 
what amount-, or should be immune to creditor attack and 
preserved for the debtors’ eventual retirement.  
e) Exemption of professional books, 
implements, equipment, or tools of the trade 
252. Most systems exempt at least a defined amount of 
professional books, equipment or tools of the trade. 
Limitations might be in place in systems adopting the 
exemption of particular assets by debtor approach. Systems 
adopting the standards-based approach in which the 
insolvency representative seeks to reclaim items of excessive 
value would normally be more generous. With the increasing 
focus on the rehabilitation of debtors, it is logical that higher, 





253. In some systems, the exemption of an automobile is tied 
to arguments based on tool-of-trade exemptions. Exempting 
debtors’ cars will often make it easier for debtors to 
commute to work and thus be able to repay their creditors. 
See II. 5. A. ii b above.  
(iii)  The consequences of the exemption 
regime 
254. As can be seen from the discussion immediately above, 
there are significant consequences flowing from the choice 
of an exemption regime. Historically, the level of exempt 
assets for debtors left them but slightly above the poverty 
line. The modern trend is to enable debtors to have a true 
fresh start and the debate revolves around defining the level 
of sufficiency. The issue of retirement assets is one of the 
most important, given the large amounts that many debtors 
have in their retirement accounts. 
255. There are also significant differences in the efficiency 
and costs of administration. The approach based on the 
exemption of particular assets by the debtor can be more 
costly to administer than the standards-based approach in 
which the insolvency representative seeks to reclaim items of 
excessive value. However, the differences might be narrower 
in systems in which many debtors are in the middle-class and 
have numerous assets of excessive value. 
256. A factor to be taken into account in the design of an 
exemption regime is that the administrative costs incurred in 
liquidating low-value assets rarely represent an efficient use 
of resources.  
(iv) After-acquired property  
257. Most systems generally make a distinction between 
assets that a debtor has as of the commencement of an 
insolvency case (which are available for distribution to 
creditors) and assets that the debtor obtains post-petition or 
post-insolvency order, as the case may be (these assets 
usually remain with the debtor). However, insolvency 
regimes want to prevent debtors from strategically timing 
the filing of insolvency petitions to allow a debtor to escape 
from paying creditors 100 percent of their claims, yet benefit 
from post-petition or post-insolvency order windfalls such as 
inheritances. Thus, many countries provide that certain 
interests that the debtor acquires post-petition or post-
insolvency-order within a certain time period (for example 
180 days) becomes property available for distribution to 
creditors. These interests might include interests by bequest, 
devise or inheritance; as a result of a property settlement 




or final divorce decree; as a beneficiary of a life insurance 
policy or of a death benefit plan, or from lottery winnings. In 
the absence of rules providing for these occurrences, debtors 
could strategically file and keep the post-petition windfalls 
for themselves.  
(v) Family property and division of assets 
258. As noted above, joint ownership provides complicated 
legal issues for individual debtors, and such problems 
frequently arise in regard to assessing the interests of 
debtors and their spouses. The resolution of such issues will 
often depend on the relevant non-insolvency law and the 
ability to split such interests.  
259. In some systems, there is a presumption that in the 
absence of evidence to the contrary, upon the making of an 
order for insolvency relief, the one half of the property 
owned by the debtor as a join tenant shall be held by the 
insolvent debtor and vest in the insolvency estate (as long as 
the property is not exempt). Of course, it is a separate issue 
whether the insolvency representative will be able to sell the 
debtor’s interest in such property (especially where the 
property is being used by the debtor and his/her spouse). In 
other systems, the courts are less sympathetic to a creditor’s 
claim to sell a family home when the co-owner (spouse) 
objects, the creditor is unlikely to get a large financial benefit, 
and there will be significant dislocation and psychological 
and emotional injuries to the spouse and the dependents.  
260. Complicated issues can also arise in regard to the family 
home in regard to contributions by the non-insolvent spouse 
that were used to purchase the home or to pay the mortgage. 
Sales of joint tenancy or other co-owned property are easiest 
when the property is not the family home, where the co-
owners are not husband and wife, or where there is a large 
financial benefit to the creditors. 
B) Payment through a payment plan  
261. Because most natural person debtors have little value in 
available assets, existing insolvency regimes most commonly 
require some contribution from debtors’ future income in 
exchange for whatever benefit the system offers (usually a 
discharge of unpaid debt). Whatever the form and extent of 
relief offered, most systems envision an “earned start” for 
natural persons, rather than a simple “fresh start” with no 
contribution or exertion expected of debtors. Some of the 
most difficult questions in natural person insolvency policy 
arise in the context of formulating a payment plan, especially 
the twin issues of how long debtors should be required to 




should be required to pay during that period; that is, how 
much can they retain, with all “excess” applied to paying off 
debt. Once the plan is established, an effective insolvency 
regime must consider assigning responsibility for monitoring 
the debtor’s compliance and the possibility of modifications 
to the plan for changed circumstances. These issues are 
discussed in the following subsections. 
(i) Plan duration  
262.  Constructing a payment plan regime begins with a 
seemingly simple but devilishly divisive and challenging 
question: How long should debtors be expected to devote 
their surplus income to paying down their debts? 
Policymakers have long struggled to formulate a reasoned 
basis for choosing any particular time period, and no single 
choice has attracted a consistent following among existing 
systems. In part, the answer to this question depends on the 
desired goals of imposing a payment plan on debtors in 
exchange for a promise of insolvency relief. 
263. If the goal is simply to maximize payment to creditors, 
one might think that a longer term would be appropriate, 
but this immediately raises the most salient countervailing 
consideration here. Recall that several of the primary goals 
of insolvency regimes for natural persons generally relate to 
removing disincentives to being productive. A lifetime of 
liability can be a debilitating disincentive to productivity,  but 
even a limited repayment term can squelch the debtor’s 
motivation and delay the debtor’s rehabilitation and the 
attainment of the many other goals of the insolvency regime 
discussed earlier. The point of rapidly diminishing returns can 
be reached quite quickly when deciding on the proper 
repayment term. Moreover, experience in every major 
insolvency regime in existence has revealed that few debtors 
will have the wherewithal to produce anything substantial 
for creditors beyond covering the debtor’s basic needs and 
the administrative costs of the insolvency system, no matter 
how long or short the repayment period might be. Increasing 
the repayment period thus is likely to actually depress 
creditor returns and to reduce the numbers of debtors who 
can be helped by the system, sharply limiting the positive 
effects of the system. 
264. A more generally attainable goal is simply to inculcate 
payment responsibility and avoid moral hazard among 
debtors. Accepting that most debtors are unlikely to be able 
to produce a significant return to creditors, many existing 
systems seem to pursue primarily this sort of educational 
goal. Habituating debtors to regular budgeting, paying bills, 
and submitting tax returns has been regarded by some 
policymakers as a benefit in its own right. This approach is 




creditors. Returns to creditors can be easily quantified and 
measured, whereas making debtors more financially 
responsible represents a hidden battle with minds and 
attitudes. Whether or not an insolvency system can have a 
meaningful impact on debtor attitudes and behaviors is a 
question that eludes satisfying analysis. Nonetheless, 
available evidence suggests that it is all but certain that a 
longer repayment term will have a quite powerful 
suppressing influence on the number of debtors who seek 
and receive the relief and thus achieve the goals of such a 
system. Experience in many existing systems has shown that, 
once debtors discover the demands and rigors of an 
extended, multi-year payment plan, some will abandon the 
process for fear they will be unable to withstand the 
sacrifices, and many will be forced out by their actual failure 
to do so. 
265. Whatever plan duration term is ultimately chosen, there 
are at least two techniques for making that choice, and one 
is rather clearly less effective than the other: First, the 
decision might be left to the case-by-case discretion of a 
decision-maker, such as a judge, or second, it might be pre-
defined in the law and applied to all cases in like manner. In 
either event, as discussed in section II.4 B, above, creditors 
are seldom invited to participate in this decision-making 
process. 
266. The former, flexible approach has most often led to one 
of two undesirable and self-defeating results. First, early 
systems that took the flexible approach soon discovered that 
the decision-makers too often imposed overly extended 
repayment terms (e.g., more than ten years), all but assuring 
that debtors would fail to complete their plans. Few of the 
goals of an insolvency system can be achieved if the 
requirements for relief are practically unattainable. At the 
very least, if a flexible approach is to be taken successfully, 
the decision-makers must be properly educated on the 
variety of practical and behavioral impediments to debtors’ 
complying with payment plans that extend beyond a few 
years. 
267. The second and quite common result of the flexible 
approach has been a spontaneous and systemic 
standardization of the repayment term. This has been true 
especially in systems that have offered time period ranges as 
a “guideline” for the ultimate determination. More often 
than not, the actors in these systems have perceived too few 
benefits from adopting various approaches to various cases, 
and they have simply applied one single, more or less 
uniform approach to the repayment term in the 
overwhelming majority of cases. Two opposite examples 
illustrate this point. In one country, though the law allows for 
plans of between three and five years, practice quickly 




are set at the five-year term. In contrast, the law in another 
country as originally promulgated also assigned discretion to 
the judge to design plans extending over three to five years, 
but there, the lower end of the scale became the norm, as 
very few plans in that country have exceeded the standard 
three-year term. This rejection of flexibility and gravitation 
toward a standard can be observed even more prominently 
in determining the amount of payment demanded, as 
discussed below, but the same phenomenon has affected the 
plan repayment term, as well. 
268. If a single standard term is to be chosen for all plans, 
what might be the optimal length of time? Unfortunately, 
very little uniformity can be observed in existing systems.  
The most common repayment terms tend to fall between 
three and five years, with a notable congregation of laws 
with a standard five-year term. The rationales for these 
decisions, however, are seldom clear or particularly 
convincing. The choice of five years in one country, for 
example, was based on a scattered sampling of comparable 
practices, including existing norms for forgiveness of social 
assistance repayment debts in and general offer-in-
compromise practice by tax authorities, as well as the 
evolving norms in other countries’ laws.  The most empirically 
meaningful basis for selecting one term over another 
appears in the legislative history of another insolvency law, 
in which policymakers concluded that accumulated 
experience with voluntary workout arrangements indicated 
that expecting debtors to live longer than three years at a 
subsistence level would be “from a social point of view not 
responsible.”  
269. This is obviously a value judgment in one sense, but 
practically, lawmakers have also borne in mind the need to 
strike a balance between setting high goals and setting 
attainable goals. Practice in many countries has indicated 
that plans longer than three years produce more failure than 
success. In one large system, for example, a consistent two-
thirds of all payment plans fail before they reach the end of 
their five-year term. Unfortunately, very little empirical 
evidence exists on plan performance in most countries, so 
strong conclusions on the results of longer plan periods are 
not well supported by data. Existing evidence and 
widespread anecdotal reporting, however, consistently 
indicate an inverse relationship between plan length and 
plan success. Particularly in developing countries with 
economies marked by high levels of volatility and uncertainty 
(especially rampant inflation), rapidly changing economic 
conditions can make successful planning for even a short 
period all but impossible. 
270. The negative effects of longer plan terms might be 
mitigated, as illustrated by unique experience in two recently 




ingenious tactic for encouraging debtors to struggle through 
by offering debtors standard, graduated “motivation rebates” 
of 10% or 15% of their annual assigned income as a reward 
and incentive for making it through the later years of the 
extended payment plan period. In addition, to avoid the 
unintended problem of extending the payment period 
beyond the already longer than average standard term, its 
starting point was explicitly tied to the beginning of the 
sometimes protracted insolvency administration process, not 
its conclusion. 
271. More recently, policymakers in two systems have made 
or proposed a more thorough-going reform by reducing the 
payment term to three years. The latest proposal from one 
of these systems, however, imposes a quid-pro-quo 
requirement that excludes all but a small portion of debtors. 
It offers the shorter term only to debtors whose surplus 
income covers at least one-quarter of their debts. Given the 
often observed fact that the overwhelming majority of 
debtors in this system have insufficient income to make any 
distribution to creditors, the proposed reduction of the term 
for debtors who can pay a substantial portion of their debts 
in three years is most likely an all but illusory reform. 
272. Nonetheless, there is something to be said for the idea 
of adopting a sliding-scale approach, imposing a longer 
repayment term for debtors unable to make significant 
contributions, but releasing debtors early as a reward for 
making more substantial payments, thus creating a set of 
incentives for debtors. On the other hand, imposing longer 
repayment terms on chronically destitute debtors seems 
rather counterproductive. This approach offers few benefits 
to creditors, it only enhances the pain and sacrifice suffered 
by debtors, and it delays the real societal benefits of an 
insolvency relief system without an obvious countervailing 
benefit. This point will be taken up again below. 
(ii) Payments to creditors: Reasonable expenses 
and “surplus” income 
273. The common goal of imposing a payment plan on 
debtors is to encourage and extract debtors’ best efforts at 
servicing their debts during a defined—and limited—
repayment term. How much payment to expect or demand 
of debtors is a core issue that, like the determination of the 
repayment term, has divided policymakers along several 
different axes. Most agree, however, that proper resolution 
of this issue is less a matter of defining a predetermined 
benefit for creditors than defining a predetermined level of 
sacrifice for debtors. Whether from a moral or simply 
pragmatic standpoint, the determination of potential 




an amount to be reserved for the reasonable support of the 
debtor and those dependent on the debtor. Only income in 
excess of this, and probably all income in excess of this, 
represents “surplus” that might be assigned to creditors.  
There is mild disagreement even on this basic starting point, 
and beyond this, existing systems are divided on the details 
of evaluating both income and reasonable support expenses. 
a) Income: Actual or projected, exclusions and 
enhancements 
274. Because payment plans regulate future activity, an 
immediate complication arises with respect to determining 
the most basic term: How much income does the debtor 
have, from which reasonable expenses can be deducted to 
produce an offer of payment? Two broad approaches might 
be taken to this foundational question.  
275. One approach makes no projection and instead bases 
future payments on the debtor’s actual income in any given 
period. In the most prominent example of this simple and 
elegant approach, debtors formally (contractually) assign 
whatever portion of their future income exceeds the 
standard exemption, and these assignments are collected by 
an insolvency representative for distribution once per year 
among creditors. When the plan is confirmed, no one can 
predict exactly how much creditors will receive, but they are 
assured maximum payment based on the debtor’s income 
and the simple statutory exemption (discussed below, see 
paragraph 282 ff.).  
276. The other approach defines a specific payment for each 
creditor by projecting an income for the debtor over the 
repayment term. Though this is the most common approach, 
it has obvious weaknesses. Any projection of something as 
volatile as individual income over a period stretching three 
or five or more years into the future is bound to be wrong.  
The inaccuracy might be small, but it might be quite large.  
The projection might under- or over-estimate the debtor’s 
income, and either case presents problems. An 
underestimation leaves value with the debtor that might 
more appropriately have been distributed to creditors, while 
an overestimation may well leave the debtor unable to make 
the necessary payments from a smaller than expected 
income.  
277. Despite the complications of using an income projection, 
there are compelling reasons to accept these limitations and 
take this approach. The reason has little to do with offering 
creditors greater certainty. Even if creditors are involved in 
the process of accepting or rejecting a plan (which is rare, as 
discussed above), they should prefer a solution that offers 




actual abilities and income, not a projected return that might 
or might not square with the debtor’s actual means.  The 
primary complication with an “actual receipts” approach is a 
potentially significant monitoring burden. Someone has to 
calculate the fluctuating amount to be ceded to creditors 
each month (or other payment period). In systems where 
debtors are allocated a uniform allowance, this calculation is 
simple and might be done by employers, much like in the 
ordinary wage garnishment system. If employers cannot be 
relied on to perform this function—especially if the debtor is 
self-employed—or if concerns such as privacy or avoiding 
stigma prevent them from doing so, or if debtors’ expense 
allowances are not based on a simple and straightforward 
calculation, the periodic turnover of actual surplus income 
involves a significant monitoring and administrative burden.  
Thus, the optimal method for determining the debtor’s 
income is closely tied to the chosen method for determining 
reasonable expenses. In many cases, the compromise from 
both creditors and the system in general consequently is to 
accept greater uncertainty in exchange for avoiding a 
substantial administrative cost. Given the movement toward 
greater standardization of expense allowances, discussed 
below, it is not entirely clear that this compromise is justified. 
278. Even if projecting income is unavoidable, experience 
suggests that one particular approach to such projections 
should be avoided. A particularly problematic approach to 
anticipating future income emerged in one system that has 
drawn widespread criticism and produced a litany of 
unintended negative results. One aspect of this recently 
reformed system imposes payment plans on debtors if their 
current monthly income is sufficient to cover their allotted 
expenses and offer a minimum return to creditors. Projecting 
the debtor’s future income based on current income is 
problematic by itself, but “current monthly income” is not 
“current.” Instead, that term is defined to mean the average 
of the debtor’s monthly income over the preceding six 
months. Naturally, most debtors seeking insolvency relief 
have experienced an income disruption (e.g., unemployment, 
divorce, medical problem) that has depressed their income 
during the preceding six months. In addition, experience 
with this approach has revealed a substantial number of 
debtors who happen to have received an extraordinary 
income boost during that six-month period (a bonus, tax 
refund, sale of a large asset, gift, etc.). In either event, a 
future projection based on this exceptional six months of 
past income is very likely to produce substantial inaccuracy.  
A variety of actors have called for efforts to anticipate what 
the debtor’s actual future income will likely be, and in some 
cases, this approach was ultimately mandated by the courts. 
Though past experience can be useful in making projections 
of future income, the rigid approach described here has been 




279. In systems that make transfer payments to debtors 
through social assistance or social support systems, 
consideration should be given to whether these payments 
should be excluded from the debtor’s available income.  On 
the one hand, if the expense allowances in insolvency are 
coordinated with or even keyed to the social assistance 
standards, this might not be an issue at all.  Any income 
debtors receive from state transfer payments might be 
excluded by virtue of the fact that these debtors’ incomes 
are by definition below the level at which any “surplus” 
might be available to creditors. In many such systems, 
however, transfer payments are made to debtors without 
regard to incomes that exceed the “poverty” or “social 
minimum” level. For example, many countries in Northern 
Europe provide child allowances to families with children 
largely without regard to family income, and the same is true 
of social insurance pension payments in much of Europe and 
the United States. In such cases, these transfer payments 
might subsidize payments to creditors rather than flowing to 
their intended beneficiaries. If non-transfer income is 
displaced into creditor pockets because this “surplus” 
income is no longer necessary to cover basic expenses in 
light of the extra transfer payment, this might be less 
objectionable. But if low-income debtors wholly reliant on 
transfer payments receive child allowance or pension 
benefits that are diverted to creditors, the inevitable 
diversion of state funds to creditors might be regarded as 
problematic. The most recent revision of one individual 
insolvency law placed child allowance transfer payments 
outside the scope of “income,” while a neighboring country 
with a very similar system continues to consider these and 
other transfer payments as available income. In another 
system, transfer payments related to the “social security” 
system are excluded from consideration as “income.”  
280. Finally, since one of the main goals of an insolvency 
system is to encourage natural person debtors to be 
productive and avoid going “on strike,” consideration should 
be given to how the system might enhance the former effect 
and sanction the latter. The most prominent, fundamental, 
and effective way of encouraging debtors to be as productive 
as possible is simply to offer the relief of a discharge of 
unpaid debts. Most systems simply hope that this incentive 
will encourage maximum productivity by debtors. Rarely 
have existing systems done anything specific to address the 
possible moral hazard of debtors continuing to be 
unproductive until they have obtained relief.  
281. A few countries have prominently incorporated both 
incentives and penalties into their approach. As discussed 
above, two systems offer debtors an incentive to be 
maximally productive by refunding 10% or 15% of their 
incomes assigned during the later years of a payment plan. 




enhance the incentive already inherent in the insolvency 
system in general. On the other side, several systems require 
debtors to earn their discharge by at least seeking if not 
engaging in productive work. Debtors who fail to apply at 
least reasonable efforts can be denied the relief otherwise 
offered by the system. While rejections of discharge for 
failure to apply best efforts have been vanishingly rare, the 
mere statutory requirements add to the urgency of debtors’ 
engaging their best efforts in exchange for the extraordinary 
relief the insolvency system offers. Another system with a 
presumption of a four-year period leading up to discharge for 
debtors who are declared insolvent for the first time, offers 
an early discharge for debtors who cooperate and a delay in 
discharge for up to four additional years for those who do 
not.  
b) Expenses: Flexibility and standardization 
282. As mentioned above, the heart of any payment plan 
regime is the particularly sensitive issue of what resources to 
reserve for the support of debtors and their dependents. 
Given the depressed income-earning capacity and elevated 
cost of living faced by most insolvent debtors, the ultimate 
return to creditors will be determined predominantly as a 
function of how much of debtors’ income is placed beyond 
creditors’ reach. This crucial issue has challenged 
policymakers for centuries, and the evolving modern 
insolvency systems for natural persons have struggled 
mightily with the proper balance between providing 
adequate support for debtors and producing a desired 
benefit for creditors. Moreover, these systems have 
increasingly perceived a problem with unequal treatment of 
similarly situated debtors facing decision-makers in different 
areas. This poses serious problems for modern societies who 
prize equal access to justice and predictably equal treatment 
of citizens. 
283. Perhaps the most significant challenge in defining a 
proper reserve budget for debtors is deciding how best to 
achieve fair and equal treatment. Should equality be pursued 
through a flexible approach that seeks to meet each debtor’s 
specific, unique basic needs, or should this determination be 
made in like fashion for all according to some objective, 
neutral guideline as to basic needs, with only minor 
variations for specific circumstances? Many existing systems 
have begun from the former position, assigning responsibility 
to judges or other decision-makers to use their discretion to 
establish debtor budgets in a manner that ensures “human 
dignity” or some similar vague principle. Some of these 
systems have attempted to steer that discretion toward 
austerity, suggesting that decision-makers should use their 




hewed closer to a middle line, using subjective guidelines like 
“ordinary and necessary expenses” or “reasonable needs.”  
284. One lesson that seems to have emerged most clearly 
from the last three decades of experience is that a flexible, 
discretionary approach, while theoretically attractive, is 
practically quite problematic. When legislatures have 
delegated to judges the authority (broad or narrow) to 
define appropriate debtor budgetary guidelines, at least four 
serious problems have emerged. Legislators in many of the 
existing insolvency systems for natural persons have 
reformed their laws in the past several years in large part to 
address one of these four problems. 
285. First, a rather isolated problem has arisen in one system 
where, for a variety of historical reasons, the insolvency 
courts have to a substantial degree tended to regard their 
primary duty to rehabilitate debtors and thus to favor debtor 
interests. Consequently, when faced with the task of defining 
the “amounts reasonably necessary” to support the debtor 
and dependents, the insolvency courts often tended to take 
what many regarded as an extremely debtor-friendly 
position, interpreting “reasonable necessity” liberally to 
encompass a wider variety of expenses than many legislators 
(and policy commentators) regarded as appropriate. The 
legislature ultimately responded to this perceived imbalance 
in a particularly unconstructive way, as discussed further 
below, but an exercise of discretion overly favorable to 
debtors is one consequence, one might say potential danger, 
of a discretionary approach to debtor budgeting.  
286. Second, the opposite problem is even more undermining 
to the success of an insolvency system, as lawmakers in 
another country discovered. In the early years of this 
country’s new system for treating “individual over-
indebtedness,” the commissions in charge of this system 
exercised their assigned discretion to establish debtor 
budgets in a strikingly over-conservative manner. Proposed 
payment plans there often allocated less income to debtors 
than would be available to destitute recipients of social 
assistance. The commissions’ methods for determining 
debtor budgets ignored the modern realities of basic human 
needs for such things as utility service, insurance, and other 
basic non-food expenses. Analysts predicted that as many as 
three-quarters of these plans were destined for failure in 
light of these “scandalously low” budgets.  To prevent this 
disastrously counterproductive exercise of discretion from 
undermining the entire system, both the administration and 
ultimately the legislature had to intervene to establish 
clearer budgetary guidelines, as discussed below.  
287. A third problem with relegating debtor budgets to the 
discretion of system administrators is the inevitable variation 




discretion. While some variance is to be expected in light of 
natural differences among debtors and even judges, 
insolvency regimes have too often produced extreme 
regional differences, raising serious concerns of fairness and 
equality of treatment. A prominent study of payment plans 
in one system in the early 1990s revealed that different 
courts in the same jurisdictional division were imposing 
strikingly different demands for payment. Courts in one 
district might demand that debtors abide by budgets that 
would produce nearly full payment to creditors, while other 
courts had more realistic expectations of often quite modest 
payment. Another new insolvency system for natural persons 
underwent its first reform primarily to address a problem 
with extreme variation in payment plan budgeting practices.  
The original law in this system had vested the courts with 
discretion to establish budgets to support “modest” lifestyles 
for debtors. Even in this relatively small and homogenous 
country, different courts in different regions arrived at 
strikingly different conclusions as to the makeup of a 
“modest” budget. These extreme variations prompted some 
debt counselors to suggest that their clients move house 
from districts with especially miserly judges to nearby areas 
where insolvency relief was available on more livable terms. 
This problem has plagued many systems whose laws initially 
perceived flexibility and discretion as strengths, and the 
legislatures of many countries have since stepped in to 
constrain that discretion. 
288. Finally, in some instances, discretion has been set aside 
not by external regulators, but by the system actors 
themselves. In at least two particularly notable instances, 
judges and administrators who have had to deal with these 
cases on the ground have concluded that flexibility and 
discretion are not virtues given the relatively standardized 
nature of the financial problems to be addressed. Debtors’ 
reasonable needs do not deviate so far from a set of 
standards as to warrant a largely unbridled flexible approach. 
Moreover, the time spent carefully tailoring an appropriate 
budget for each unique case will most likely turn out to be a 
poor investment, as this expenditure of resources will 
consistently far outweigh the depressed maximum returns 
that might be extracted from debtors for creditors in these 
cases. In two particularly noteworthy examples, the law 
initially provided a base budgetary guideline (discussed 
below) designed simply to “guide” the decision-maker in the 
formulation of appropriate payment plans. In both systems, 
however, administrators rejected the discretion inherent in 
the suggested “guideline” and chose instead to develop a 
largely uniform approach across all cases. The legislatures in 
these two countries eventually confirmed this practice by 





289. The appropriate measure of sacrifice to be demanded of 
debtors in exchange for whatever relief an insolvency system 
offers is a crucial and inherently political decision. Such a 
central issue of public policy is likely better made by a 
legislature or other representative entity, rather than by 
insolvency system administrators. While the relevant judicial 
and executive actors indeed do have close contact with 
debtors and creditors and thus have insight into the specific 
needs of the people most closely impacted by the system, 
they are simply not in the best position to make the sensitive 
social policy decisions that drive an insolvency regime. As 
discussed below, discretion need not be totally eliminated, 
but experience suggests that it is probably better that 
politically responsible entities at least make a solidary and 
unifying choice as to an agreed baseline from which mild 
discretion might then depart.  
290. Selecting an optimal approach to payment plan 
budgeting is not a simple binary choice between wide open 
discretion and rigid, bright-line rules. Even if a standard 
budgeting rule or rubric is adopted, some discretionary 
element is likely desirable if not unavoidable. An example 
from one system illustrates a moderate compromise in this 
regard in two ways. First, as in many other systems, the base 
budgetary exemption is designed to cover all of a debtor’s 
expenses other than housing costs, which are separately 
allowed so long as they are “reasonable” according to 
guidelines developed by the Tax Service. In addition, however, 
the “standard” can be supplemented by non-standard 
allowances for debtors’ actual expenses for transportation to 
and from work, childcare expenses, as well as support and 
even sometimes extra medical expenses. A similar “lodestar” 
approach of allowing discretionary, case-by-case additions to 
a basic subsistence budget is taken in several other systems, 
as well. In addition, however, administrators in the example 
system highlighted here developed a practice of further 
supplementing debtors’ basic budgets with a small monthly 
“buffer” for possible unanticipated expenses. This second, 
mild incursion of discretion into an otherwise standard 
approach has been adopted elsewhere, as well. While 
administrators in another system were eventually required 
by law to allocate at least a standard minimum budget to all 
debtors, this minimum is described as “one part” of the 
necessary resources for supporting the debtor’s household.  
This bifurcated approach to budgeting represents a common 
and probably sensible compromise between the many 
undesirable effects of discretion and the undesirably 
constricting imposition of one inflexible norm. 
291. The easiest and most widespread approach to selecting 
the basic budgetary standard has been simply to regard the 
insolvency system as an extension of (indeed, a limitation on) 
the existing ordinary system of debt collection. The same 




income that would have applied in ordinary collections cases 
will also apply in defining available income for an insolvency 
payment plan. This is the straightforward approach taken in 
many current laws, though as mentioned above, at least one 
system defines this minimum budgetary reserve as only “one 
part” of a proper budget. Indeed, as discussed above, while 
some laws suggested that insolvency administrators simply 
consider the ordinary “exemption” law as “guiding,” that 
standard already allowed sufficient discretion to 
accommodate the mild variations among insolvency cases, so 
it was simply adopted as the norm.  
292. Co-opting an existing “minimum income” norm poses a 
substantial danger, however, as illustrated by experience in 
one system in particular. When this country’s insolvency law 
was implemented, the general wage exemption law had been 
revised only once each decade, and the exemption level had 
not been increased for inflation in many years. Expecting 
debtors to live on an income that might have been 
appropriate seven, eight, or even nine years earlier was 
obviously inappropriate in a country where consumer buying 
power was constantly eroded by rising costs, not to mention 
the effect of currency fluctuations on the many imported 
goods consumed by natural person debtors. Lawmakers 
responded quickly and responsibly by increasing the 
statutory wage exemptions substantially for most debtors 
and providing for indexation every other year to keep 
constant pace with inflation. 
293. A choice of one objective and uniform standard does not 
necessary entail a choice of one single figure to be applied to 
all debtors in all situations. Instead, existing systems 
commonly establish bands of uniformity, with debtors 
categorized into groups with various vital characteristics, and 
different exemption amounts are calculated for each of these 
groups, often with a possibility for increasing these standard 
amounts for specific, variable expenses. In many countries, 
the “exempt” income level is not one simple figure.  Indeed, 
it is not even a series of simple figures to be applied to 
debtors with and without spouse or children. Instead, 
various figures are often established for debtors with 
spouses and various numbers of children of various ages, and 
these figures are often supplemented by allowances for 
“reasonable” expenses for housing and child care, as 
discussed above. 
294. Because they apply in ordinary debt collection cases, 
these wage exemptions are perhaps the most common and 
appropriate standards for establishing repayment budgets in 
insolvency cases. If creditors are subject to the same 
restrictions on available income in both the ordinary 
collections system and the insolvency system, this approach 
clarifies exactly what the insolvency overlay is designed to do: 




approach of limiting all creditors to a much shorter 
prescriptive period (statute of limitations) for enforcing their 
claims, the insolvency system identifies a small subgroup of 
debtors for whom general collection activity will be limited 
to the term of the repayment plan. All creditors will share in 
the administrative costs of expropriating available income 
from debtors, and all will be included in the distribution of 
whatever would have been available to any creditor 
collecting on its claim in any event, but all creditors will be 
limited to whatever the standard collections process would 
have extracted from the debtor during a limited period (as 
discussed above, usually five years or less).  
295. In some countries, the “minimum income” that is 
insulated from seizure in ordinary collections actions is (or 
has later become) coextensive with the “subsistence 
minimum” income reserved for supporting debtors’ essential 
expenses. In one system, for example, the standard budget 
allowance for insolvency payment plans is defined by statute 
as 90% of the minimum income assured by the social 
assistance system. This ultra-depressed allowance would 
likely lead to mass failure of payment plans, even in light of 
the short three-year repayment term in this country’s 
practice. The unique application of this statute by local 
judges, however, is particularly ingenious. A national working 
group of insolvency judges boldly took the initiative to 
develop harmonized budgetary guidelines that would 
eventually be applied to both ordinary collections actions 
and insolvency payment plans. They started, as directed by 
law, with the baseline of 90% of the national social 
assistance minimum income, but in part to further 
encourage debtors to find productive work, this minimum 
reserve is augmented in virtually all cases by substantial 
supplements for debtors with full-time work, as well as for 
debtors with children and a variety of itemized expenses for 
such items as housing, transportation, and child care. Once 
again, choosing a standard baseline need not exclude 
salutary exercises of discretion to supplement the minimum 
budget allocation. Indeed, such supplementation may be 
necessary if the floor is set too low, as in the preceding 
example. 
296. Finally, if general enforcement restrictions or social 
assistance minimum incomes are unavailable or incompatible 
with social policy for insolvency cases, a basic budget 
standard might be built from scratch using the sorts of 
techniques that have produced these other guidelines. 
National statistical, labor, consumer, or taxing authorities in 
many countries have identified baskets of standard 
household items consumed by various family sizes during, for 
example, a month, and constructed a budget based on 
surveys of the costs of these items. Often these costs 
fluctuate, and subsequent surveys then track the fluctuations 




each year. The range of items that might be included in these 
baskets varies considerably from country to country based 
on local views of “necessity” and dignified existence. In one 
country, for example, a standard expense was recently added 
to the basket to cover charges for the use of cellular phones, 
and internet access has increasingly been regarded as a 
necessity in many parts of the world. To be sure, living 
standards vary significantly around the world, and simple 
access to basic food staples and water may well be a more 
pressing concern than internet access in many areas. The 
point is simply to observe that appropriate standard budgets 
can be developed on the basis of widely varying expectations 
in different regions and countries. Many examples of 
constructing a basic consumer budget in this way are 
available to policymakers interested in developing a sensitive 
and livable approach to payment plans. 
c) What to do with debtors with no income, no 
assets (NINAs) 
297. For some debtors, and likely many, the result of 
deducting the standard expense allowance from actual or 
anticipated income may well reveal little or no surplus.  
Indeed, a common and quite sensible approach to the 
administrative expenses of administering payment plans is to 
charge these expenses against any surplus before 
distributing the remainder to creditors. Whether or not 
debtor income is further reduced by administrative costs, 
substantial numbers of debtors will have no surplus income 
available for distribution to creditors. These debtors may 
well have sufficient resources to cover their basic needs, but 
they have no extra to pass on to creditors. Significant 
numbers of debtors in all insolvency systems for natural 
persons today fall into this category.  
298. Because these debtors produce no value for creditors, 
thus failing to achieve one of the most salient goals of an 
insolvency system, a minority of insolvency systems has all 
but excluded them from relief. One system in particular has 
long held firm to its “economic benefit” perspective of 
allowing relief only to debtors with sufficient surplus income 
to cover not only administrative costs, but also a minimum 
10% dividend to creditors. Another relatively new law is 
similarly restrictive, demanding at least a 30% projected 
dividend in order to confirm a payment plan. The former law 
allows for hardship relief for debtors stricken by specific, 
compelling, exceptional circumstances, but many no-income, 
no-asset debtors have been denied relief. 
299. The preferred position among both commentators and 
established insolvency systems, however, is to avoid this kind 
of discrimination and provide the same relief to all debtors, 




have consistently represented a significant portion of all 
“payment plans” in insolvency cases for natural persons. It is 
not uncommon for payment plans in one-third, two-thirds, or 
even a greater proportion of all confirmed cases to be purely 
symbolic, paying only the fees of the insolvency 
representative, if even that. In one well-established system 
in particular, early resistance by courts to confirming “zero 
plans” was quickly overcome, and such plans came to 
represent an estimated 80% of all individual insolvency cases. 
In another system where resistance to “zero plans” did not 
subside on its own, judicial intervention at the highest levels 
resolved the matter in favor of debtors with insufficient 
income or assets to offer creditors any dividend. This 
country’s constitutional court ruled that extending relief  only 
to debtors who could pay some portion of their debt violated 
the equality principle in this state’s Constitution.  It is 
probably both more honest and more meaningful to refer to 
these arrangements as “debt adjustment” plans, rather than 
“payment” plans, or better yet something like “rehabilitation” 
plans, to focus on their real purpose. 
300. Indeed, efforts have been made to help these 
particularly distressed debtors to overcome an ironic 
challenge. Given their depressed financial condition, these 
debtors might well be unable to afford the administrative 
costs of seeking relief, at least in systems that charge fees to 
debtors for access to insolvency relief. In one relatively new 
system, for example, barely 150 insolvency cases were 
opened for natural persons seeking discharge during the first 
three-and-a-half years of the new law, most likely because 
cases there are dismissed if the debtor’s income is 
insufficient to cover the anticipated insolvency 
representative’s fees. More established systems have 
struggled to find solutions to problems like this. Volunteer 
lawyers in one country often agree to waive their fees—the 
most substantial cost in this country’s insolvency system—for 
low-income debtors, and another system allows low-income 
debtors to delay paying the administrative costs of the 
insolvency case until after they have completed the six-year 
“good behavior period.” Authorities in another country have 
recently developed a formal solution for this particular 
problem. The multi-option menu of debt-relief processes 
now includes a low-cost alternative for destitute debtors. For 
individual debtors with limited debts, little income, and few 
assets, a low-cost administrative proceeding is available from 
the state authority charged with overseeing the insolvency 
system. By reducing the formalities and expenses of the 
court-based “insolvency” procedure, the new administrative 
process was specifically designed to make relief available to 
low- and no-income debtors for whom court costs would 




(iii) Plan implementation, monitoring and 
supervision 
301. The challenges do not end with confirmation of a plan. 
Debtors who struggled to budget and distribute proper 
payments to creditors before an insolvency procedure are 
likely to struggle afterward, as well. To facilitate the proper 
implementation of, and debtor compliance with, a plan, a 
neutral insolvency representative is most commonly 
appointed to monitor and even collect and distribute 
payments for creditors. Generally, the insolvency 
representative collects periodic payments made by debtors 
on their own, though some systems require or allow for plan 
payments to be formally assigned to the representative and 
automatically deducted from debtors’ periodic income to 
ensure timely payment. The insolvency representative also 
divides these collected amounts for distribution to individual 
creditors and is responsible for actually making the payments 
(often electronically). After early experiments with more 
frequent payments to creditors, many systems have settled 
on annual distributions, both to reduce cost and because 
more frequent distribution often results in very small 
payments to creditors. The processing fees for these 
payments can exceed the amounts transferred to the 
individual creditors unless larger payments are allowed to 
accumulate over a longer period. 
302. The qualifications and role of such an insolvency 
representative are mentioned above in section II.2.C, and in 
greater depth in the ICR Standard and other sources. In 
systems where insolvency representatives administer 
payment plans, this represents the most time- and resource-
intensive task that the insolvency representative generally 
fulfills. As mentioned above, the remuneration of the 
insolvency representative is most often drawn from 
whatever surplus income the system extracts from debtors, 
and only income in excess of the fee of the insolvency 
representative is then distributed to creditors. Often the 
deposited surplus is insufficient to cover even the fees of the 
insolvency representative, and in only a small minority of 
cases do creditors receive any significant distribution. A dual 
logic supports charging the fees of the insolvency 
representative against amounts otherwise destined for 
creditors. First, this operates as an incentive for creditors to 
agree to informal arrangements (workouts) with debtors to 
avoid an administrative transaction cost. Second, appointing 
an insolvency representative to manage these payments 
frees individual creditors from the time and expense of 
monitoring debtor performance, both in terms of payments 
and in terms of any other obligations the debtor might have 
under the plan, such as actively seeking work. Insolvency 




discharge or other relief at the conclusion of a plan term if 
the debtor has failed to adequately comply with the 
requirements of the plan. 
303. Not all existing insolvency regimes for natural persons 
invoke the aid of an insolvency representative, however. In 
some countries, payment plans developed in the natural 
person insolvency system are regarded simply as contracts 
like any other. Debtors receive no guidance or supervision in 
making the required payments, and creditors bear the 
burden of monitoring these payments and enforcing the 
debtor’s duty to perform via ordinary enforcement 
mechanisms. This approach might be explained in part by the 
fact that such payment plans arise only in cases involving 
mildly distressed debtors who remain fully solvent. Cases 
involving more distressed debtors generally result in global 
moratoria on collections and possibly a full discharge, with 
no ongoing payments under a rehabilitation plan. In one 
country in particular, however, even significantly distressed 
debtors are left on their own in collecting and distributing 
payments to creditors. 
304. One system has developed an admirable middle-ground 
approach of helping debtors to organize and process their 
payments, but leaving it to debtors themselves to make the 
appropriate deposits—leaving monitoring burdens on 
creditors. That system engages trustees to develop payment 
plans, but once the plan is confirmed, the insolvency 
representative’s job is complete. To help debtors to manage 
the payments by themselves, the insolvency representative 
at the beginning of the insolvency procedure opens a 
dedicated bank account to which debtor-applicants 
immediately begin depositing their disposable income, thus 
immediately starting the five-year payment plan clock and 
reducing the total period during which debtors are forced to 
live on depressed resources. For plans that are ultimately 
approved, the insolvency representative generally forwards 
to the bank a list of creditors, their account numbers, and 
the percentages of the debtor’s accumulated monthly 
deposits to be transferred to each creditor’s account once 
each year electronically. Debtors are encouraged to make the 
required deposits and payments through automatic bank 
transfers, but debtors generally retain free disposition of 
their income and are responsible for making the monthly 
deposits themselves. Despite the debtor’s freedom and 
creditor’s lack of ability to monitor monthly deposits, this 
arrangement had functioned quite well in practice. The 
cooperation of banks in supporting this system and charging 
more reasonable processing fees was required, however, not 




(iv) Modification of payment plans for changes 
in debtor’s circumstances 
305.  Finally, even if debt adjustment plans are reasonable at 
first, much can change over the long rehabilitation periods 
called for by many existing laws. If the debtor’s financial 
position unexpectedly deteriorates, the debtor will likely be 
unable to make the payments called for in the plan without 
undue sacrifice. Conversely, if the debtor’s financial position 
improves markedly, creditors might have a legitimate interest 
in sharing in that improvement, given that their future rights 
against the debtor will likely be curtailed.  
306. For payment plans that call for fluctuating payments 
based on the debtor’s actual income and expenses, this 
poses little problem. Such plans are inherently self-modifying. 
The debtor’s payment requirements change automatically as 
the debtor’s income rises and falls. This approach has been 
taken in a handful of countries. As mentioned above, the 
benefits of such self-modifying plans come at a potentially 
higher monitoring price. Creditors or the insolvency 
representative are responsible for tracking changes in plan 
payments and assuring themselves that these changes 
represent appropriate responses to changed circumstances, 
rather than simple debtor failure to fulfill the terms of the 
plan. 
307. The more common approach is to base future plan 
payments on projected income and expenses, so changes in 
circumstances lead to problems that call for affirmative 
solutions to avoid plan failure and possible repeat requests 
for relief. In such systems, the law usually anticipates the 
possibility of the debtor’s (or creditors’) application to 
modify plans prospectively to take into account the effect of 
deterioration or improvement in the debtor’s actual situation 
as compared to the projections embodied in the plan. One 
system takes a unique approach, allowing modification only 
in the debtor’s “most exceptional interest.” That is, 
modifications to reduce the debtor’s payment obligations are 
allowed, but creditors are not allowed to request an increase 
in payments if the debtor’s situation improves.  Indeed, as 
recently reformed, this system allows for plan modification 
to reduce the required payout to as little as zero.  
308. For systems that rely on debtors to pay for lawyers or 
court costs to request a modification, this may produce the 
ironic problem of debtors’ being unable to request a 
modification to allow them to pay less money because they 
do not have enough money even to ask for such relief.  Some 
policymakers have considered empowering (or requiring) the 
insolvency representative to request modifications on 




debtors’ positions may result in needlessly burdensome 
repeat filings seeking relief anew, which benefit no one and 
produce cost and resource burdens for debtors and the 
system. Policymakers in several regions have concluded that 
these burdens can and should be avoided by developing a 
more rational approach to modifying plans in case of 
unexpected complications.  
C) Advantages and disadvantages of the different 
approaches to payment 
309. To advance the primary historical goal of insolvency 
systems—enhancing efforts to achieve some return for 
creditors—most insolvency regimes for natural persons today 
combine the two approaches to payment discussed here. 
That is, they require both a turnover and liquidation of 
debtors’ non-exempt assets owned at the time of the 
procedure, in addition to a multi-year payment plan to 
access the usually much more significant value in debtors’ 
future earning capacity. While there are obvious advantages 
to combining the two approaches, proceeding through both 
stages in every case has arguably significant disadvantages, 
and not all systems force all debtors to proceed through both 
methods of value extraction. 
310. The basic disadvantage of each approach to value 
extraction is wasted cost in terms of time, money, and other 
resources of usually already thinly spread administrative 
resources. Consistently, the overwhelming majority of 
debtors in existing systems have been shown to have few if 
any non-exempt assets of any significant value. The 
realization costs for these assets often exceed their 
depressed value, to say nothing of the simple cost of 
investigation if an administrator is required to verify the 
debtors’ own descriptions of their assets.  Consequently, 
though most existing systems purport to make the value of 
debtors’ assets available to creditors, this provision is more 
theoretical than practical. Rather than extracting value from 
available assets, the primary benefit of the collective 
approach to insolvency in the context of natural persons is 
avoiding wasteful and unproductive pursuit of value. As 
discussed above in section I.9, one single official 
investigation can reveal the folly of pursuing the debtor’s 
low-value assets, and creditors can be convinced or at least 
prevented from wasting their own and society’s precious 
resources in a fruitless pursuit of illusory asset value—and 
they can be more effectively prevented from destroying the 
purely personal value of the debtor’s household items.  Asset 
investigation in the insolvency of natural persons most often 
results not in the discovery of value for creditors, but in the 
confirmation for the collective that further pursuit of 




311. Much to the frustration of creditors and policymakers 
alike, the same has very often held true of mandatory 
payment plans. As discussed above, though the majority of 
debtors have some future income, most have insufficient 
future income to cover their own reasonable living expenses, 
the costs of administering a payment plan, and a distribution 
to creditors. In the majority of existing systems, in which 
fewer than one-fifth of cases initiated each year will produce 
any return to creditors at all, it is highly questionable 
whether the administrative costs of the “good behavior 
system” are justified. Many commentators and even 
legislators have questioned the value of imposing plans on 
individuals who have little or no ability to pay simply as a 
result of feelings of retribution.  
312. For the great majority of cases in most areas, the 
payment plan process achieves no financial goal beyond 
funding its own operation. Indeed, many of these systems 
fail to achieve even self-sufficiency, relying on subsidization 
from other government funds to meet basic operating costs. 
Even in areas where more debtors manage to produce some 
distribution for creditors, very seldom do these distributions 
amount to more than about 10%-15% of creditors’ claims, 
even when accruing interest is halted and several years of 
surplus income are accumulated. 
313. Careful empirical study of the situation in one country in 
particular reveals that the result of the payment plan process 
may be even more troubling when debtors realize the 
magnitude of their sacrifices. Debtors in this one unique 
system self-select into the payment plan track, and only 
debtors with “regular income” are even allowed to petition 
for relief in this track. Only about one-third of all debtors 
choose the payment plan track, and one would thus expect 
these to be among the most viable candidates for successful 
completion of a payment plan. Unfortunately, a consistent 
two-thirds of these payment plans have failed. Most debtors 
have simply not been able to withstand the rigors of a multi-
year plan on a strictly limited budget. Granted, these dour 
figures may be explained in part by the fact that the payment 
plan track in this country is often used by debtors simply as a 
short-term delay tactic to prevent foreclosure on a home 
mortgage or car loan, and most debtors have the free option 
to change their minds and seek relief in the less demanding 
one-time-asset-liquidation track. Nonetheless, decades of 
unsatisfying experience cast significant doubt on the 
effectiveness of payment plans to achieve the goals of 
natural person insolvency. 
314. That being said, required payment plans have remained 
extremely popular with legislators in many areas, especially 
those that have extended insolvency relief to natural persons 
only in the last few decades. As mentioned above, these 




even if these plans serve a financial purpose only poorly at 
best, they at least serve an important moral or educational 
purpose. Multi-year plans remind debtors and those around 
them that everyone must do their best to fulfill their 
obligations, whatever that “best” is, and relief from one’s 
duly undertaken obligations does not come lightly and 
without sacrifice. More than exacting a monetary return for 
creditors, these plans inculcate good payment morality 
among debtors. One country’s government and parliament 
made this point explicitly, noting that zero-payment plans 
have a “symbolic character,” with debtors demonstrating 
worthiness for discharge by subjecting themselves to the 
plan’s constraints and furnishing an effort to pay their debts 
over several years. While legislators in more and more 
countries have concluded that lifelong indebtedness and 
social exclusion for debtors are not reasonable expectations, 
legislators in all but a handful of countries continue to 
adhere to the position that creditors might legitimately 
expect debtors to apply their full disposable payment 
capacity over a reasonable period of time to service their 
debts—however modest that payment capacity might be. 
315. Thus, few existing systems allow significant percentages 
of debtors to receive relief without passing through both an 
asset liquidation and a payment plan. In particular, the idea 
of affording relief without at least offering creditors a 
possibility of payment from debtors’ future income is widely 
regarded as unjustified. But several systems notably do 
provide relief to many debtors without one or another of the 
two value-extraction approaches. 
316. For example, in two long-standing systems, an 
administrator evaluates the future earning capacity of each 
debtor, and only about one-fifth of debtors are required to 
make substantial payments from future income in exchange 
for insolvency relief. Debtors with depressed incomes are not 
required to make future contributions; they are routed 
immediately to a liquidation of any non-exempt assets 
(usually none) and an eventual discharge. A somewhat 
similar approach is taken in another system. Since the late 
1990s, a rising proportion of especially distressed debtors—
exceeding one-quarter in recent years—have been routed by 
the system administrator into a full or partial discharge of 
their debts without a payment plan. Indeed, while the assets 
of most of these debtors are inventoried and any non-
exempt assets are sold, some debtors avoid even this step. 
After the most recent revision of this system, the 
administrator can conclude, based simply on the paperwork 
filed by the debtor that no significant value is reasonably 
likely to be realized from an asset sale, and a discharge 
should be offered with neither a payment plan nor a 
liquidation of assets. In each of these systems, an 
administrator can and often does make the decision that 




inappropriate expenditure of time, effort, and other 
resources given the likelihood of no return to creditors.  
317. One long-standing and particularly robust insolvency 
system represents one of the last holdouts in continuing the 
practice of allowing debtors to self-select into either a 
liquidation track or a payment-plan track. This is likely the 
product of path dependence resulting from decades of 
gradual system development, rather than a carefully 
measured policy decision. In any event, leaving this choice to 
debtors has created significant problems, and attempts to 
develop a standard for imposing payment plans on “can pay” 
debtors have proven counter-productive. After creditors 
demanded that some mechanism be put in place to force 
payment plans on debtors whose future income might 
provide creditors a respectable return, the legislature revised 
this system to impose a complex new test for identifying 
debtors with sufficient “means”—that is, future disposable 
income—to make some reasonable payment to creditors. 
The costly and complex test for establishing “ability to pay” 
revealed only a small fraction of debtors with substantial 
“means,” and implementing this screening mechanism 
saddled the system with a substantial administrative sorting 
burden and sustained litigation about which debtors should 
gain access to relief on what terms. Moreover, this approach 
achieved little if any long-term effect on increasing the 
percentages of debtors in payment plans. This system’s 
experience underscores the importance of basing any 
screening mechanism on the reality of debtors’ ability to pay, 
rather than on presumptions of ability, and it illustrates the 
difficulty—or as many have argued, futility—of trying to 
steer debtor choice rather than assigning the sorting 
function to other, disinterested actors. 
D) Special consideration of the payment of mortgages 
and other secured loans  
324. In general, secured credit does not play a very 
important role in systems for addressing the insolvency of 
natural persons. Most debtors have few valuable assets that 
have been used or could be used as collateral for debts, and 
secured creditors have usually already seized whatever 
collateral had formerly secured certain debts by the time 
when a debtor files for insolvency relief. If a debtor has 
assets that serve as collateral for a claim, these assets 
usually have to be sold before relief can be offered or a 
payment plan can be confirmed, as the plan does not leave 
room for payment of claims secured by these items. In many 
countries the starting point of the insolvency legislation is 
that debtors do not and should not have secured debt or 




325. In some other countries, especially where insolvency is 
more of a middle-class phenomenon, the attitude towards 
certain assets and secured debt is not so restrictive. In some 
countries, assets that are important for the debtor ’s post-
insolvency existence, such as a home, a car and necessary 
household items, may under certain conditions be 
encompassed within the insolvency procedure even when 
they are collateral for a debt (on exemptions, see section 
II.5.A above).  
326. Even so, secured creditors are in principle protected in 
insolvency procedures. The strong position of secured 
creditors is deemed justified to protect the credit markets.  
Also the constitutional right to property can be invoked as a 
principle that limits the possibility to restrict the rights of 
secured creditors in insolvency cases.  
327. Policymakers generally fear that any undermining of the 
rights of secured creditors will have a broad and deeply 
detrimental effect on the availability of credit to finance 
important social activities, especially home acquisition. In 
societies where home acquisition lending is widespread, 
such high-value lending activity is often a central component 
of national financial markets and a foundation for a healthy 
economic system. A broad array of benefits flow both from 
the activity of lending and the stability that broad-based 
home ownership provides as a societal support for economic 
activity. As lenders collect large portfolios of claims secured 
by home mortgages, the value of these rights to collect—and 
the value of the home assets backing up the right to collect—
becomes a vital component of the balance sheets and 
financial health of these banks. In many countries, it has 
been argued that any significant weakening of the value of 
creditors’ rights to collect claims secured by home mortgages 
could have devastating impacts on the health of broad 
segments of the lending sector and the financial stability of 
entire national economies. 
328. Despite these fears, and within legal limitations, some 
countries have found solutions that respect the interests of 
debtors and the rights of secured creditors in the insolvency 
procedure. Several distinct systems have developed to 
balance, for example, the competing fears of destabilizing 
the mortgage credit markets and displacing significant 
numbers of debtors from their homes, especially in light of 
the negative effects of mass mortgage foreclosure activity in 
depressing home values. 
329. The key to understanding the motivation behind these 
systems is that policymakers have acknowledged that the 
financial damage and the losses they fear have already 
materialized. A properly structured system for relieving 
insolvency or mortgage distress does not cause losses to the 




rather, these losses already exist, created by the unavoidable 
fact of debtors’ inability to service their debts properly, 
sometimes exacerbated by chronically depressed collateral 
values, especially homes. Policymakers who have taken one 
or more of the approaches described below have most often 
been motivated by a desire to force creditors to acknowledge 
the reality of their debtors’ long-term distress and the long-
term loss of value of the collateral, including homes, securing 
their claims. Real healing at a macroeconomic, societal level 
is delayed by allowing creditors to maintain the illusion of 
debtor’s capacity to pay, or worse yet, the illusion that 
collateral values either have not fallen or will eminently 
return to previous inflated levels. Worse yet, healing is 
actively undermined by unchecked foreclosure actions that, 
in large volumes, cause substantial downward pressure on 
collateral values, especially for homes, resulting in a 
downward spiral of ever falling home values and rising 
defaults.  
330. These systems are to a greater or lesser degree designed 
to compel creditors to accept the bitter reality of the 
distressed state of debtors and/or collateral values, accept 
whatever payment capacity debtors realistically have to offer 
to finance whatever value is realistically present in collateral, 
and avoid taking rash action to enforce rights in collateral 
and create further avoidable losses. By introducing systems 
to debunk illusions of value, establish real values based on 
current market conditions, and crystallize and limit losses, 
policymakers in a number of areas have sought to use legal 
levers to break unhealthy impasses and force creditors and 
debtors to move on toward healthy and sustainable 
economic relationships, for the sake of the many benefits 
discussed above in section I.9.  
(i)  Home mortgages 
331. Home mortgages differ from other secured debts of 
natural persons in importance to the debtor, as well as in the 
value and nature of the collateral. The most important 
secured debts for households are those that have collateral 
in the house or apartment of the debtor. Since debtors who 
file for debt adjustment are very seriously over-indebted, the 
point of departure in most insolvency systems for natural 
persons is that debtors do not own their homes or, even if 
they do, they will not be able to keep the home in the 
personal insolvency procedure. Therefore, in most countries, 
the debtor’s home is sold either before or during the 
personal insolvency procedure. Usually the creditor can sell 
the home or file for forced sale if the debtor is in default on 
secured debt irrespective of a personal insolvency procedure. 
After the sale the outstanding debt for a now-unsecured 





332. In some other countries, protection of homeownership 
is considered a noteworthy value even in insolvency cases. 
Protection of homes and access to housing are fundamental 
elements of human well-being (see paragraphs 239-243 
above). To some degree they have even been recognized in 
human rights instruments, such as the UN Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966 (article 11). 
Many countries rely in their housing policy on private 
ownership to such an extent that alternative housing is not 
easily available. It is also acknowledged that notable 
economic value may be lost if large amounts of foreclosures 
take place at the same time during an economic crisis. These 
considerations have led countries to adopt either temporary 
protection measures in times of crisis or to include some 
degree of protection of homeownership even in the 
insolvency law. 
a) Crisis measures   
333. The post-2007 worldwide economic crisis was at its core 
a mortgage crisis in which millions of homeowners were no 
longer able to continue servicing their mortgage debts. 
Property prices collapsed in many countries and foreclosure 
rates hit levels not seen since the Great Depression. The high 
levels of foreclosure, in turn, led to the collapse of many 
financial institutions in several countries. The crisis showed 
very clearly the connection between the indebtedness of 
individuals and the stability of financial systems.  
334. In many systems, policies have been implemented to 
support the housing market and assist homeowners in 
retaining possession of their homes. Most of these responses 
were aimed at debtors in the worst financial predicament; 
i.e., those debtors with negative equity (where the value of 
the homes is less than the amount of the mortgage debt) 
and debtors in serious arrearage in the payment of their 
mortgage debts. There has been a broad range of responses 
to facilitate the restructuring of home mortgage 
indebtedness. Many have been out-of-court; others have 
been administrative or court-based. Many involve alternative 
dispute resolution (ADR), some on a mandatory basis and 
others on a voluntary basis. Some initiatives have been 
undertaken by government entities or with government 
financing; others have been undertaken on a voluntary basis 
by financial institutions either individually or on an industry-
wide basis.  
335. Of course, these measures put a heavy burden on 
financial institutions if substantial numbers of homeowners 
seek to modify the terms of their mortgages. For this reason, 
many systems have limited the scope and/or duration of such 




with such measures in the absence of financial industry 
support. 
336. Among the policy measures that have been 
implemented, the following ones are relevant for the 
treatment of the insolvency of natural persons: 
i) Broad variety of moratoria 
ii) ADR mechanisms 
iii) Reduction of interest rates and/or extension of 
repayment periods 
iv) Principal reduction 
i) Broad variety of moratoria 
337. Moratoria responses have been aimed at delaying, or 
stopping, foreclosures by staying the enforcement of 
mortgages. In the midst of a financial crisis, it is often 
difficult for lenders to find purchasers for foreclosed property, 
as there is a severe liquidity crunch, and as more and more 
foreclosed property comes on the market, prices continue to 
fall, and the crisis worsens. Moratoria are intended to slow 
down this spiral and provide a breathing spell for both 
debtors and lenders, perhaps enabling them to work out a 
solution to their differences. The moratoria are more likely to 
prove successful where they are in place for as long as the 
relevant debtors are affected by the crisis. These kinds of 
temporary crisis measures are usually implemented and 
regulated through the laws on property or enforcement of 
obligations, instead of in insolvency law, but temporary 
measures may be considered in the context of insolvency law 
as well. 
ii) ADR mechanisms 
338. Like the moratoria, the ADR mechanisms are a 
procedural device to slow down the foreclosure. There are 
many variants of this approach, but what they have in 
common is that they attempt to get debtors and lenders to 
sit down and talk to each other with a view to finding a 
constructive compromise arrangement for moving forward 
and avoiding the many negative effects of a foreclosure 
action. 
339. ADR mechanisms might be enacted independently or 
jointly with moratoria measures. 
340. Each of these first two mechanisms – the moratoria and 
the ADR mechanisms – are likely to be more effective against 
a backdrop of severe systemic distress in which lenders are 




depressed prices. They often fail to gain the support of 
lenders when the property markets are operating more 




iii) Reduction of interest rates and/or extension of 
repayment periods  
341. These measures have been implemented either on a 
large-scale out-of-court basis or through inclusion in 
insolvency laws. These measures are aimed at debtors who 
are unable to meet their current repayment obligations but 
who will likely be able to meet modified, smaller monthly 
financial obligations. These measures are more likely to 
prove effective when they provide substantive overall relief 
(e.g., lowering the total amount of debt through the 
lowering of the interest rate). Where the debt extension 
merely enables the debtor to pay out the debt over a longer 
period of time, the ultimate resolution of the debtor’s 
financial problems is often merely delayed – and months or 
years later the debtor finds that it is necessary to again try to 
re-negotiate with the financial institution. One system in 
particular has faced this “revolving door” phenomenon, and 
policymakers revised this system to include more aggressive 
relief to make debtors’ first pass through the door more 
effective. 
iv) Principal reduction 
342. For many homeowners, merely being able to lock in a 
lower interest rate and pay back the loan over a longer 
period of time will not solve the longer-term problems and 
might well burden the debtors with a lifetime obligation that 
they are never able to repay. Moreover, in situations where 
home values have fallen broadly, homeowners face powerful 
negative incentives to making maximum efforts to maintain 
their home loan obligations. They may perceive it as 
unjustified to continue to “throw good money after bad” by 
paying an inflated price for an asset, the value of which has 
declined precipitously and has little prospect of returning. As 
a matter of fact, one reason why some financial institutions 
are reluctant to sit down and re-negotiate mortgage terms 
with their borrowers during a financial crisis is that the 
bankers fear that once homeowners realize that they will be 
in debt forever - or that it is unlikely that the value of their 
homes will ever exceed the amount that the homeowners 
borrowed to buy their homes - the homeowners might 
decide to simply default and walk away from their mortgages, 
which might well be the rational decision to be made. 




likely to prove insufficient in the absence of a reduction in 
the principal amount owing by a debtor on the mortgage 
loan.  
343. Of course, reducing the principal amount of the debt 
forces financial institutions to write off parts of their loans 
and to mark down the value of their mortgage collateral. This, 
in turn, puts greater pressure on the financial institutions’ 
balance sheets and might well force the financial institutions 
to seek additional capital at the very time that sources of 
additional capital are hard to find. In addition, financial 
institutions fear that if such relief is too easily granted to 
debtors it will create the perverse incentive for some “can-
pay” homeowners to “strategically” default with the hope of 
having the principal amount of their debts reduced.  
344. As discussed above, however, writing down claims and 
marking down the value of mortgage collateral may in many 
cases represent a simple acknowledgement of unavoidable 
reality, not the creation of losses or balance sheet pressure. 
If the true value of the home collateral or the debtor’s ability 
to repay is compromised, the “value” of full recovery on such 
a loan is not value at all, but simply an illusory hope of value. 
Practically, a loss already exists, and the bank’s action in 
finally recognizing this and taking appropriate remedial 
action by modifying the principal balance of the loan is a 
starting point for healing, not the cause of further distress.  
The process of acknowledging such pre-existing losses may 
be painful, but maintaining an illusion of non-existent value 
simply delays—and perhaps complicates—the healing 
process. 
345. To make proposals for reducing the principal of secured 
loans acceptable to the financial sector – and to take into 
account that such a change would adversely affect financial 
institutions’ rights as secured creditors – proposals have 
been made to allow financial institutions to share in a certain 
percentage of any future increase in the home’s value over a 
certain period of time. For example, a lender who had 
written down the principal of a home loan might regain the 
right to collect some of the written-off claim if the home’s 
value increased during the next five years (whether or not 
the debtor sold the home during this period). In this way, the 
creditor would be granted a potential future benefit in 
exchange for the reductions in interest and principal.  
346. The four groups of measures that have been described 
are among the most frequently discussed responses to the 
crisis. Another possible solution is to transfer ownership of 
mortgaged property to the lender, with the possibility of the 
debtor retaining possession of the property under a lease. 
This solution, of course, comes at a great financial and 




institution into new business lines (e.g., property 
management), for which the institution may be ill-equipped.  
347. Another proposed solution to the mortgage crisis that is 
relevant to personal insolvency involves a rebalancing of 
pension and insolvency policies. Normally, a debtor with 
retirement assets would not be allowed to draw upon those 
assets to avert mortgage foreclosure, under the reasoning 
that such funds are intended for the debtor’s retirement.  
However, as noted above (see section II.5.A (ii)(d)), in many 
systems, debtors’ retirement assets are increasingly of 
substantial value. One proposal is that during times of 
systemic crisis, debtors should be able to either receive a 
distribution or borrow from pension/retirement assets 
(perhaps up to a certain limit) to enable them to avert 
mortgage foreclosure. An advantage of this proposal is that it 
enables debtors to draw upon their own funds without the 
need to enter into perhaps lengthy or contentious 
negotiations with third parties. A major disadvantage is that 
raiding retirement savings might well leave the debtor with 
insufficient support during retirement, possibly externalizing 
the burden of supporting the debtor in retirement onto a 
public support system. Some have argued that it is 
unjustified for creditors to recover full payment in the 
present at the expense of a future burden on society, 
especially if a reasonable compromise arrangement could 
avert both a foreclosure and future complications with the 
debtor’s retirement. 
348.  Lastly, when considering the effectiveness of possible 
remedial measures in a given system, it is important to take 
into account whether mortgage lending is recourse or non-
recourse; that is, whether the debtor remains personally 
liable for the home mortgage loan if the home is sold in 
foreclosure for less than the amount of the secured loan. In a 
system where mortgage lending is recourse and it is difficult 
for a debtor to get a discharge, the result can be unlimited 
liability for a debtor from which there is little likelihood of 
escaping. In such systems, the pressure for some sort of 
relief from this burden is particularly acute. In contrast, in a 
system where mortgage lending is non-recourse, at some 
stage debtors can walk away from their mortgage obligations 
(and leave the financial institution with the property) and try 
to start over even in the absence of specific insolvency relief.   
b) Home mortgages in personal insolvency  
349. Informal measures have proven largely unsuccessful in 
achieving solutions to the systemic problem of large numbers 
of distressed home mortgages. Though proposals have been 
put forth repeatedly over the years in many different 
countries, only a few systems have developed special 




systems have arisen in countries that rely strongly on 
homeownership in their housing policy. When protection of 
homeownership in insolvency law is adopted on a permanent 
basis, the starting point has been that the rights of the 
secured creditors are protected, but subjected to some 
modification. What kind of modification is allowed is subject 
to a number of difficult considerations.  
350. The requirements for retaining homeownership through 
the insolvency procedure vary. In some systems, the only 
allowed modifications involve reductions of interest rates or 
extensions of the payment period. In others, an insolvency 
case prevents the continuation of initiation of a foreclosure 
action, but regular payments on the mortgage loan must 
continue, along with some payment plan for any arrearage. 
Another variation is to allow the debtor to pay only interest 
during the first years of the plan, while resuming normal 
payments thereafter. In some cases the payments are 
debited first to the outstanding capital and last to the 
interest (usually this measure is equivalent to the lowering of 
the interest). 
351. The most aggressive form of relief is to modify the 
principal owing on a home mortgage loan. Where 
modification of the principal is allowed in an insolvency case, 
the first issue to address is whether the home mortgage is 
treated as a unified whole or whether it is divided into to a 
secured part that is covered by the value of the collateral 
(home) and an unsecured part. If the home mortgage debt is 
considered as a unified whole, the debtor is usually required 
to pay the whole debt according to the original contract. In 
some systems this is based on specific insolvency regulations, 
in some others, the law is silent on homes and home 
mortgages but the courts may allow debtors to keep their 
homes if that alternative is not economically less favorable to 
the creditors than selling the home. Such a situation may 
occur when the home has little economic value and the living 
costs in it are low.  
352. In those systems in which the home mortgage debt is 
divided into a secured part and an unsecured part, the 
unsecured part may be treated in personal insolvency like 
any other unsecured claim. The unsecured part of the debt 
may also be subject to a liquidation test; that is, the debtor 
has to pay at least as much of the unsecured part of the debt 
as he or she could have paid in an insolvency in which the 
home would have been sold. Such a test may be quite 
complicated in design, however. As a basic rule, the secured 
part of the debt has to be paid in full or with some 
modification.  
353. To avoid unfairly depriving the mortgage creditors of a 
future increase in home value, two systems allow for 




to the value of the home, but the value of the home is 
enhanced by a buffer of ten percent over its market value 
(110% of current market value). In other systems, proposals 
have been made to provide for a recapture or “claw-back” of 
any future rise in value, automatically increasing the secured 
creditor’s claim by all or a declining percentage of this 
increase in value over time. No such recapture proposal has 
been enacted as law yet. Policymakers continue to search for 
appropriate compromises, however, as a counterbalance to 
any proposal to reduce the principal owed on a home 
mortgage in light of a reduction in the value of the home.  
354. To guarantee that the secured debt is paid in full (or with 
some modification) the payments often have to be extended 
up to twenty years or more. Thus, the payment plan 
concerning the secured debt may be much longer than the 
plan for the unsecured debt, which usually has an upper limit 
of five years (see above, section II.5 B)(i)). Obviously, there is 
the risk that the debtor will face other hardships during such 
a long time, possibly leading to the loss of the home after 
considerable sacrifice. This danger is generally accepted, as 
no current system is designed to keep debtors in homes 
despite their long-term inability to service proper repayment 
of the real value of the home.   
(ii) Debt secured by other household assets  
355. Other assets besides homes might serve as collateral for 
a secured loan, particularly the debtor’s automobile, and 
some systems allow debtors to retain these assets in the 
event of personal insolvency. Such items might include those 
that are necessary for the debtor’s household or for earning 
his or her living. The debtor may often keep them as 
protected assets (beneficium; see the discussion on 
exemptions at section II.5.A).  
356. These assets often have very little real economic value 
to creditors. Almost invariably they have a far higher utility 
value to debtors and their families as compared to their 
economic value to the creditors. Moveable items like cars 
often experience steep value depreciation that makes them 
of very little value to a foreclosing creditor, especially taking 
into account the costs of foreclosure. 
357. Especially for assets that are necessary in a normal 
household, the payments that the debtor has to make on the 
secured loan may be included in the household budget as a 
necessary living cost (as opposed to a debt payment). Thus, 
some systems allow debtors to maintain such items by 
paying the secured loan as a reasonable allowed living cost.  
358. At least one system allows the court discretion to modify 




secured by movables, such as automobiles. Such loans are 
divided into a secured portion (backed by real collateral 
value), which must be paid in full, and an unsecured portion 
(not backed by real value), which is paid pro rata along with 
other unsecured claims. Even in this system, however, the 
rules for bifurcating such claims into secured and unsecured 
portions are subject to exceptions for newer items, allowing 
bifurcation only for cars and other items purchased in the 
more distant past. 
II.6. Discharge  
A) Purpose and characteristics of the discharge  
359.  One of the principal purposes of an insolvency system 
for natural persons is to re-establish the debtor’s economic 
capability, in other words, economic rehabilitation. 
Rehabilitation can be said to include three elements. First, 
the debtor has to be freed from excessive debt. The benefits 
of the discharge have been extensively discussed from the 
point of view of the debtors, creditors and the society in 
section I.9, above. Second, the debtor should be treated on 
an equal basis with non-debtors after receiving relief (the 
principle of non-discrimination). Third, the debtor should be 
able to avoid becoming excessively indebted again in the 
future, which may require some attempt to change debtors’ 
attitudes concerning proper credit use.  
360. The most effective form of relief from debt is a fresh 
start, which in historical usage refers to a straight discharge; 
that is, to the possibility to be freed from debt without a 
payment plan. Several recently implemented systems have 
moved away from requiring payment plans of all debtors, 
offering an immediate “straight” discharge to at least the 
most impecunious debtors. In contrast, in one system in 
particular, the concept of fresh start can be identified with 
the ideology of a nation of immigrants, many of whom 
started a new life after having left everything, including 
debts, in their old home countries. After a recent reform of 
that system, however, the discharge for some debtors is no 
longer so “straight,” as debtors are subject to closer scrutiny 
of their attempt to receive a discharge without offering 
creditors payment from future income, and some debtors 
with payment capacity are now required to pay part of their 
debts according to a payment plan before they receive a 
discharge.  
361. Most systems continue to reject the notion of a straight 
discharge. Most set as a condition for discharge a partial 
payment of debts, or at least a period of time during which 
the debtor’s economic life is regulated by  a debt adjustment 
plan or payment plan that lasts usually from three to five 




is considered reasonable for the debtor to pay. Instead of a 
fresh start we could speak of a delayed or earned new start. 
(On different plan models, see section II.5.B).  
362. A small number of systems require or at least expect 
some kind of minimum payment from debtors as a pre-
requisite to obtaining a discharge. Such minimum payment 
would usually be in proportion to the debt, perhaps ten 
percent, or maybe even a symbolic payment of some modest 
amount. As many debtors have very few assets and little 
income, this kind of rule invariably produces undesirable 
results. Significant numbers of “honest but unfortunate” 
debtors who otherwise qualify for relief have been denied a 
discharge because of their inability to make minimum 
payments to creditors in the few countries that impose such 
a requirement. In some countries, the courts have found 
such requirements to be discriminatory against debtors with 
little or no means. Another variation is that the length of the 
payment plan is related to the amount of payment. If the 
debtor pays a certain percentage of the debt, the payment 
period may be shorter than the normal one. This variation 
has impacted very few insolvency procedures for natural 
persons, however, given that only a small fraction of debtors 
in such systems have been able to produce the larger 
payments to creditors necessary to benefit from the reduced 
payment period. 
363. The payment plan is often assessed from the point of 
view of its (quite modest) yield to creditors. In many 
countries the payment plan seems to have a different nature; 
it is considered “the price” of an earned new start 
(discharge). There are different views on how high this “price” 
should be. When a country is considering introducing a new 
law on natural person insolvency, an onerous payment plan 
is easily considered as congruent with the general principle 
of private law, such as pacta sunt servanda. A realistic view 
of debtors’ situations, however, often leads to prioritizing 
more lenient and shorter payment plans, as discussed above 
in section II.5. B)(i)-(ii).  
364. The benefits of a discharge may remain illusory, however, 
unless the discharge is respected after the insolvency 
procedure has concluded. Thus, two other elements are 
sometimes included as ancillary support for the concepts of 
discharge and rehabilitation.  
365. First, the principle of non-discrimination is an important 
consideration in achieving the full benefit of a discharge. 
Since payment plans last for several years, discrimination 
both during the plan and after its completion may be a 
problem that warrants careful attention. Actually, 
discrimination issues have rarely been discussed in this 
context and there seems to be no explicit prohibition against 




natural persons. Data protection regulations in some 
countries prohibit the registration and use of information on 
completed payment plans, which is in effect a prohibition 
against discrimination. In many other countries, however, 
any insolvency filing is reflected among other “negative” 
credit entries, at least for a limited number of years following 
conclusion of an insolvency case, which often gives rise to 
discrimination against former natural person debtors who 
have undergone insolvency procedures. It would be 
advisable that both researchers and legislators pay attention 
to the principle of non-discrimination in the future.  
366. Second, inculcating more healthy and responsible use of 
credit as a goal and a result of a debt relief procedure is 
much more difficult to achieve or measure. One indication of 
the idea that one should not run into debt again after 
obtaining relief is the virtually universal bar (prohibition) of a 
repeat filing for debt relief. Different attitudes are reflected 
in the length of such a bar. In most countries, a new filing is 
possible only after a period of years, while in some others, 
consumer debt adjustment is generally regarded as a “once 
in a lifetime” event, sometimes with exceptions for 
extremely compelling cases.  
367. In the past decade there has been growing interest in 
financial education, the importance of which is 
acknowledged both in school systems and in adult 
educational facilities. The fact that a debtor has filed for debt 
relief is sometimes taken as a sign of financial 
mismanagement. While the reasons for debtors’ economic 
failure may vary, there is evidence that a considerable 
portion of debtors have insufficient financial skills.  
368. In the context of an insolvency system for natural 
persons, instilling better credit use habits in debtors is often 
sought either through individual debt counselling or imposed 
financial education. As explained in section II.1, many 
countries require the debtor to engage with budget and debt 
counsellors and/or enter into prior negotiations with 
creditors before filing for a formal debt relief procedure. 
While the debtor in such negotiations is almost always 
assisted by a debt counsellor, this is an opportunity to assist 
the debtor in financial planning. However, the focus of the 
work of debt counsellors is often the insolvency procedure, 
and resources for individual budget advice are often limited. 
Some countries have resorted to classroom financial 
education for consumer debtors in insolvency proceedings. 
The efficacy of these required classes, the likelihood of 
behavior modification and the obligatory nature of such 
courses are contested issues, but this is a field for ongoing 
development work and research.  
369. The fulfilment of the payment plan is, in a way, proof of 




countries, debtors also have a special obligation of “good 
behavior” during the plan. That is, the debtor is obliged to 
work during the plan or look for a job if he or she is 
unemployed. This obligation is a legal one, and the creditors 
may claim that the debtor has not fulfilled it and ask for 
denial of the discharge at the end of the payment plan if the 
debtor has not fulfilled the obligation. Where such a system 
of pre-discharge scrutiny has been imposed, creditors have 
proven reluctant to expend time and money objecting to 
relief, and the more likely source of such objections has been 
the appointed insolvency representative. 
370. Along the same lines, the principle of good faith is 
present in almost all insolvency laws. A central idea of 
insolvency law is to help unfortunate but honest debtors. In 
principle, all laws require that debtors who abuse the system 
be denied discharge. If the debtor has incurred debt in a 
fraudulent manner, it is very difficult to obtain a discharge in 
any country. Even more severe is the attitude towards fraud 
during the insolvency procedure. Such fraud leads to denial 
of discharge and perhaps to criminal prosecution. The 
standards on disclosure are also quite stringent. Debtors are 
required to disclose their economic affairs in the insolvency 
procedure on the penalty of being denied a discharge.  
371. Moral hazard from the debtors’ side, that is, risky 
borrowing that is not fraudulent per se, is more difficult to 
assess. Though simple “irresponsibility” in borrowing too 
much generally does not lead to denial of relief, some 
countries deny discharge when the debtor has incurred debt 
in an unscrupulous manner or in a way that the court regards 
as obviously and objectively reckless or speculative. This 
leads to denial of discharge on the basis of debtor behavior 
and may lead to denying discharge to debtors who genuinely 
need it. On the other side, granting discharge to high-flyers 
and risk takers can seriously undermine the legitimacy of the 
system. For a discussion of moral hazard and fraud, see 
section I.10, above. 
B) The scope of the discharge  
372. For rehabilitation it is important that as many as possible 
of the debtor’s debts be included in the discharge. The more 
debts that are excluded from the effect of the discharge, the 
less effective the insolvency regime can be in achieving the 
debtor’s rehabilitation and the many related goals outlined 
above in section I.9. The old insolvency law principle of 
equality of treatment of creditors is another important 
principle in natural person insolvency. Most insolvency laws 
for natural persons continue in a general way to adhere to 
the principle of equality of creditors so that very few claims 
are excepted from the discharge. There are some exceptions 




“debtor-friendly.” Some debts that are not created in the 
market context are in many systems excluded from the 
discharge. In particular, maintenance debts to the debtor’s 
children, and sometimes to a former spouse, are often 
excluded from discharge. Similarly, taxes, fines, and other 
public obligations are often excluded, though the recent 
tendency has been to eliminate special treatment for debts 
owed to public bodies. These exceptions are discussed next.  
(i) Maintenance: child/spousal support 
373. The most important and common exceptions apply to 
maintenance obligations to children and perhaps former 
spouses. These debts are generally excluded from the 
discharge for several closely related reasons of fundamental 
public policy. Insolvency policy generally concerns proper 
allocation of responsibility and burden, and most systems are 
simply unwilling to allow the debtor’s most fundamental 
responsibility, to family, to be avoided, nor to allow debtors 
to externalize this burden onto other, equally vulnerable 
parties. The creditors in family support claims are regarded 
as among the most sensitive to disruptions in their rights, 
and depriving them of their claims to necessary support 
would endanger their basic welfare and undermine a public 
policy of family support just as fundamental as the policy of 
freeing the debtor from undue financial burdens. The notion 
of family responsibility creates a “non-market” obligation 
that is regarded as outside the appropriate realm of 
insolvency relief. While many non-business and even non-
financial debts are included within the discharge for natural 
persons, the focus of insolvency relief remains largely 
concentrated on debts created in the commercial 
marketplace, rather than within the intimate confines of the 
home and family relations. 
374. Various systems take a variety of approaches to 
excluding maintenance obligations from discharge. Either all 
maintenance is excluded, including alimony to a former 
spouse, or only child support. In some welfare states, if a 
debtor has missed maintenance payments, especially to a 
child, the state steps in and pays the support to the child’s 
guardian] and is then subrogated to the rights of the child to 
collect the overdue support from the debtor. In such systems, 
the state’s right to step into the shoes of the maintenance 
claimant by subrogation is excluded from discharge just as 
the claimant’s direct claim would have been excluded. 
(ii) Fines and other sanctions 
375. Another quite common exclusion concerns fines and 
other liabilities that are a consequence of a crime. A few 




restitution arising from personal injury or even property 
damage caused to another person. Here again, the 
underlying policy concerns proper allocation of responsibility.  
Insolvency relief is designed to offer relief to “honest but 
unfortunate” debtors, casualties of volatile economic and 
social conditions beyond debtors’ control.  Debts related to 
fines are all but universally regarded as not falling within this 
paradigm. Debtors can avoid incurring fines simply by 
abiding by societal rules, and very few systems are willing to 
allow debtors to evade punishment for violations of public 
rules. Fines are thus even less “market-based” than family 
maintenance obligations, and these debts are thus generally 
regarded as not appropriate subjects for the extraordinary 
relief of an insolvency discharge. 
376. Only a few systems extend this reasoning to personal 
and property damage claims. Of those that do, often the 
excluded claims are based on some level of culpable conduct, 
such as intoxication or reckless disregard for the welfare of 
others. Claims for simple negligence that unfortunately 
resulted in harm to another person or property are very 
seldom excluded from discharge. 
(iii) Taxes and other government debts 
377. While taxes and other non-punitive liabilities towards 
the state have been commonly excluded from discharge in 
the past, a notable trend has emerged to abolish the 
exception for such debts. Taxes and other government claims 
are still excluded from discharge in many countries, 
apparently for the same reasons as the exclusion for family 
maintenance debts: taxes and government debts are part of 
the fundamental obligation of citizens to support their 
society. These are not simple debts arising in bi-lateral 
relations in the marketplace, but rather higher-order debts 
owed to society as a whole to support the operation of 
government. Allowing individual debtors to evade this 
fundamental responsibility not just to one creditor, but to 
society, is widely regarded as unjustified.  
378. A number of countries in recent years, however, have 
repealed special priorities and exceptions to discharge for 
taxes and other government debts for at least two reasons.  
First, taxes in particular are often among the largest debts 
contributing to a debtor’s insolvency, especially for current 
and former small business people. If government debts are 
not subject to discharge, that undermines the entire 
insolvency relief system, depriving debtors, creditors, and 
society of the many benefits of relief discussed in section I.9, 
above. More and more legislatures have accepted that, if 
they are willing to force “ordinary” creditors to forego their 
legitimate claims against debtors, then the state, too, should 




system, at least for non-punitive debts like taxes and fees. 
Second, if taxes are not excluded from discharge, they are 
probably also entitled to a privilege that entitles them to 
payment before any other creditor. This has been criticized 
as quite unfair against other creditors, and as legislatures 
have been convinced to repeal the privilege for taxes, so also 
their exclusion from discharge has been repealed, at least in 
some cases. Indeed, some countries that retain the privilege 
and exclusion from discharge for taxes in business insolvency 
have abolished it in relief procedures designed for natural 
persons engaged in little or no business activity.  
(iv) Educational loans 
379. Only a few countries exclude educational loans from the 
discharge, even though this is a hotly debated topic. The 
policy underlying such an exclusion seems to be that 
educational debts represent a current investment that is 
designed to be paid off from the future benefits flowing 
directly from this investment in education. Allowing debtors 
to accept all of the future benefit of income growth 
attributable precisely to that educational support, while 
leaving the entire burden on lenders, is regarded in some 
countries as unfair and unjustified. Also, since these debts 
can be quite large, and often one central state authority is 
responsible for extending such loans, allowing such loans to 
be discharged would potentially impose a very heavy burden 
on the state lending authority. Few countries have identified 
any evidence of newly examined professionals, such as 
medical doctors and lawyers, filing for debt adjustment to 
discharge their study loans, however. The general good faith 
tests have been sufficient in most countries to stop such 
behavior. On the other hand, some debtors with no prospect 
of significant incomes have serious problems repaying 
student loans. Depriving these debtors, their other creditors, 
and society of the many benefits of insolvency relief is, 
therefore, not regarded as the best solution in most systems.  
(v) Reaffirmation agreements  
380. There are basically two opposing views on agreements 
between the debtor and individual creditors during the 
insolvency procedure to exempt individual debts from the 
operation of the discharge. In some countries, such 
individual contracts are strictly forbidden as unjustified 
violations of the principle of equality of creditors. The 
favoring of certain creditors in the event of insolvency is held 
null and void. In some cases such favoring of one creditor 
even constitutes a criminal act. In some other countries, so 
called reaffirmation agreements between the debtor and a 




an agreement should serve the interests of the debtor, and 
the debtor should voluntarily affirm such an obligation.  
(vi) Post-commencement debts 
381. The discharge generally affected only debts arising 
before the commencement of a formal insolvency case (pre-
petition debts). If the debtor incurs new debts during the 
court proceedings or the repayment period of the plan, 
these debts have to be paid in full. Because of the stringent 
conditions of the payment plan, most debtors must be very 
careful not to incur new debts before the plan is completed. 
It has to be remembered, however, that a rescheduling loan, 
which is used to pay off an agreed part of the debts, is a very 
useful tool in debt restructuring. Its legal status, however, 
depends on the national law.  
C) Discharge and guarantees, co-debtors and third 
party collateral 
382. Insolvency is always a problem for the debtor’s entire 
family. Sometimes family members and others close to the 
debtor are drawn into the debtor’s economic crisis because 
they have personally guaranteed the loan of the debtor or 
given their property as collateral for a loan. Since payment 
can be quite easily demanded from the guarantor or from 
the value of the collateral if the principal debtor does not 
pay or is insolvent, guarantors often face payment claims on 
the eve or after the opening of an insolvency procedure. The 
legal position of the guarantor has been found to be quite 
hard in many countries.  
383. There seems to be very little quantitative or qualitative 
information or legal research on such guarantees. A 
questionnaire distributed to the member states of the 
Council of Europe in 2004 collected information on the legal 
position of the guarantor in the context of consumer debt 
adjustment (insolvency proceedings involving natural 
persons). The legal situation seems to be fairly similar in the 
states surveyed and can be summarised as follows.  
384. Personal guarantees extended by—as well as collateral 
security owned by—family members are commonly accepted 
to secure loans in many countries, with few legal restrictions.  
Few laws on insolvency of natural persons contain any 
specific provision on the effect of an insolvency case filed by 
the main debtor on the guarantor’s legal position. Because 
payments are at that point usually late, the creditor may 
collect the debt from the guarantor or from the value of the 
collateral that a third person has given for the loan. After the 
guarantor has paid the loan he or she has the same right 




practice, the guarantor will be one of the creditors that 
receives a partial payment according to the plan. A co-signer 
of a loan is treated in the same way as the guarantor. When a 
third person has given property as collateral, the same 
applies up to the value of the collateral. To summarise, the 
insolvency procedure and discharge have no alleviating effect 
on the liability of the guarantor.  
385. The specific concern of co-obligors was raised in the 
legislative discussion of one country’s law, but protections 
for guarantors and other co-obligors were intentionally 
excluded from the effects of the principal obligor’s 
insolvency proceeding, since guarantors and other co-
obligors could simply apply for relief under the personal 
insolvency law themselves in case of need. In very few 
systems has the plight of guarantors been specifically 
addressed in the natural person insolvency legislation. In one 
system, only natural persons and gratuitous sureties are 
covered, but such people are allowed to petition for a 
discharge of a suretyship obligation implicated in the 
principal obligor’s pending natural person insolvency case if 
the surety’s resulting obligation is “disproportionate to his 
revenue and patrimony.” In another system, guarantors may 
file a specific alleviation procedure in which the guarantee 
obligation may be given an extended payment period. Such a 
procedure does not cover the guarantor’s other debt 
obligations.  
386. In a voluntary debt settlement, the rules may be the 
opposite. According to the private law of many countries, a 
voluntary agreement on the payment of the debt, including 
partial forgiveness of the debt, is valid against the guarantor 
as well. 
387. Many guarantors and co-debtors have been bitter over 
their legal position in insolvency. They have felt that it is 
unfair that they have been obliged to pay the loan in full 
when the debtor is discharged and the guarantor only gets a  
meager portion of the payment back according to the 
principal debtor’s payment plan.  
388. The rationale of personal guarantees or third-party 
collateral is to ensure that the creditor gets paid in case the 
principal debtor turns out to be insolvent. When the debtor 
files for insolvency he or she is obviously insolvent and, thus, 
the guarantor’s liability comes into the picture. If the 
guarantor’s liability would be adjusted in such a situation, 
the creditors would be less protected and less willing to give 
credit.  
389. The difficult situation of family members as guarantors 
has given reason to consider the economic argumentation 
anew. The problems have often emerged in the courts when 




have argued that they have given the promise under duress 
or without adequate information or that the guarantee is 
simply unreasonable. The courts have in some cases had 
sympathy with the guarantors, and consequently the duties 
of the creditors at the time of signing the contract have been 
strengthened. Especially, the creditors have a responsibility 
to give adequate and detailed information to the guarantor 
in many countries. In one country, the Constitutional Court 
has even imposed some restrictions on what kinds of 
guarantees a spouse, a child or other dependent person can 
validly give. It is argued that the persons who are dependent 
or have strong emotional ties with the debtor need some 
protection against exploitative contracts. 
390. There are persuasive arguments in favor of the 
information rights of guarantors and restrictions on the use 
of guarantees by family members. As long as guarantees are 
used, however, the guarantor’s position in the debtor’s  
natural person insolvency case remains a problem. This may 
be a problem for which there is no good solution. There are, 
however, some possibilities to mitigate the situation:  
a) First, the insolvency procedure might include some 
regulations that give time to the parties to adjust and 
negotiate. The guarantors, co-debtors, and those who have 
given collateral on behalf of the debtor could be protected 
by the stay of debt enforcement measures that the opening 
of an insolvency procedure for a natural person imposes on 
the creditors, though this would be an extraordinary 
departure from the approach of the ICR Standard in business 
insolvency cases. If the guarantor hides property, the court 
could give the creditor the right to enforcement. 
b)  Second, the guarantor’s and the debtor’s liability could 
be divided in the debt adjustment. For example, the 
guarantor could be made liable only for that part of the debt 
that exceeds what the debtor pays according to the plan to 
the creditor. This could give the debtor an incentive to pay 
more.  
c)  Third, the guarantor’s payment could also be adjusted in 
the main debtor’s debt adjustment procedure, for example, 
into instalment payments.  
d)  Fourth, the courts could be given discretion to favour the 
reimbursement claims of individual guarantors in the 
payment plan if the guarantor has made great sacrifices to 
pay the debt. This may sound unfair to other creditors but is 
not necessarily so. If the guarantor has lost his or her home 
to pay the debt and the other creditors are institutions, it is 
not unjustified to favour the guarantor in the payment plan.  
391. These proposals mean that the guarantor’s liability 




European Union in an early draft of the 2008 Consumer 
Credit Directive made proposals that go in the same 
direction, though these early proposals were ultimately not 
adopted. According to that proposal, the creditor could take 
action against the guarantor only after the debtor has been 
in default for three months. In addition, the proposal aimed 
at furthering rescheduling agreements on the payment of 
debt. These proposals are in line with a greater flexibility for 
the guarantor’s position in the debt adjustment.   
 
III. Summary and Conclusions  
 
392. Lawmakers have struggled in recent decades with 
addressing the multitude of negative effects caused by a 
rapidly rising tide of debt distress among natural persons.  
These problems have swept across regions that differ widely 
in terms of not only culture, history, and social structure, but 
also economic and financial development. Developed and 
developing countries alike have suffered from broader and 
deeper penetration of insolvency among natural persons, 
especially as access to finance has expanded to larger 
segments of society. As more people enjoy the benefits of 
access to financing for both entrepreneurialism and 
consumption, the urgency of dealing with the inevitable 
economic casualties presses ever harder. Excessive 
indebtedness poses serious economic problems, in terms of 
loss of productivity of ample segments of the population 
under the burden of debt, which saps the initiative of 
individuals and depresses their productive capacity.     
393. Traditional insolvency laws have often proven 
unsuitable for these new problems, as these laws commonly 
arose under different circumstances and for different 
purposes. To be sure, many of the goals of the two types of 
insolvency regimes overlap, such as increasing and more fairly 
distributing payment to creditors, streamlining procedures, 
and enhancing economic performance for the ultimate 
benefit of society. However, traditional insolvency laws 
gravitate around the protection of credit and business, and 
the personal element is often disregarded. The desire to 
relieve individual suffering is more direct and more central in 
the context of natural person insolvency.  
394. This report provides guidance on the characteristics of 
an insolvency regime for natural persons and on the 
opportunities and challenges encountered in the 
development of an effective regime for the treatment of the 
insolvency of natural persons. The report is explicitly non-





395. Any consideration of a regime for addressing the 
insolvency of natural persons should take into account the 
surrounding context of laws, policies, and practices with 
which such a regime must necessarily coordinate. 
Policymakers should be aware of the social, legal and 
economic peculiarities that may affect the functioning of a 
regime for the insolvency of natural persons.  
396. One of the main objectives of this report is to raise 
awareness about the importance of the development of a 
regime for the treatment of the insolvency of natural 
persons. This document presents a list of issues that policy 
makers should analyze in their own legal systems to better 
understand the effects and benefits of the various policy 
choices in designing an effective system for the treatment of 
the insolvency of natural persons. This report thus endeavors 
not to convince policymakers throughout the world to follow 
the example of the various regimes existing today, but rather 
to enrich their own independent development process.  
397. This report identifies common challenges as well as 
time-tested strategies for overcoming those challenges.  
There is a wealth of ideas and practical solutions with the 
overarching objective of achieving a system that provides 
benefits for debtors and their families, for creditors, and for 
society as a whole. No single answer or best solution can be 
advanced that would address all of the competing 
considerations for any given community, but these issues 
should be on the agenda of policymakers in any community in 
search of sensible solutions for problems related to excessive 
personal debt. Any search for the best way forward should be 
informed not by conjecture and anecdote, but by a distillation 
of actual observations of existing experience. It is premature 
to identify best practices in this area. 
 
Scope, Goals and Characteristics of an Insolvency Regime for 
Natural Persons 
398. An insolvency regime for natural persons is expected to 
meet a wide range of goals in contemporary societies.  No 
longer a simple creditor-oriented mechanism for the forcible 
collection of debts from insolvent commercial entities, 
insolvency laws now contemplate benefits flowing to natural 
person debtors themselves. Providing relief to “honest but 
unfortunate” debtors has long been a primary purpose of 
insolvency regimes for natural persons. Additionally, and 
more importantly, such a regime provides benefits to society 
as a whole. Therefore, a regime for treating the insolvency of 
natural persons not only pursues the objectives of increasing 
payment to individual creditors and enhancing a fair 
distribution of payment among the collective of creditors, 




relief to debtors and their families and addressing wider 
social issues. In achieving those objectives, a regime for the 
insolvency of natural persons should strive for a balance 
among competing interests.  
399. By preventing creditors from pursuing destructive and 
practically fruitless collection efforts and by offering debtors 
an incentive to reveal and even produce value for creditors 
and society, a well-structured insolvency regime can both 
avoid waste and facilitate productivity.   
400. The benefits for creditors and debtors have wide 
spillover effects on society. These benefits include:  
-Establishing proper account valuation;  
-Reducing wasteful collection costs and destroyed value in 
depressed asset sales;  
-Encouraging responsible lending;  
-Reducing negative externalities produced by inaccurate 
risk assessment;   
-Concentrating losses on more efficient and effective loss 
distributors;  
-Reducing social costs of illness, crime and unemployment;  
-Increasing production of taxable income; 
-Maximizing economic activity;  
-Encouraging entrepreneurship; and  
-Enhancing the stability and predictability in the financial 
system and the economy.  
Indeed, the most powerful driving concerns behind an 
insolvency regime are about ameliorating the negative 
systemic effects of unregulated distressed debt. This 
contributes not only to a healthier and more stable domestic 
economy, but also to greater international competitiveness in 
an increasingly global market. 
401. The specific context of natural person debtors also calls 
for fresh consideration of the impediments to achieving 
these goals. Fraud, stigma and moral hazard operate in 
markedly different ways for natural person debtors with 
complex lives combining emotion, consumption, and 
commerce, as opposed to juridical business entities. Cultural 
and historical variations among different nations may call for 
divergent responses to these issues, but the context of 
natural person insolvency demands careful consideration of 




negative systemic consequences. Moral hazard and fraud 
concerns have been overcome in many existing insolvency 
systems, and these concerns need not stand in the way of 
legislators hoping to reap benefits for creditors, debtors and 
society that characterize modern systems for the regulation 
of the insolvency of natural persons. 
402. A much more intractable challenge relates not to the 
problem of keeping undeserving debtors out of the 
insolvency system, but to enticing honest but unfortunate 
debtors into the insolvency system. Even in well-developed 
insolvency regimes, significant numbers of debtors continue 
to avoid seeking relief or seek relief far later than would be 
optimal—for themselves and the other beneficiaries of an 
insolvency system. Attitudes about debt and cultural stigma 
change slowly, and relatively little can be done to 
immediately change such attitudes, but policymakers can 
make and have made choices to minimize stigma. Reduction 
of the stigma associated with insolvency requires public 
campaigns of education and awareness, which can correct 
misimpressions as to new options for relief. The elimination 
of judgmental language in legislation and the repeal or 
substantial reduction of historically long lists of punitive 
measures, civil disabilities and restrictions following an 
insolvency case also have a positive effect and contribute to 
a decrease in the stigma associated with seeking relief. 
Similarly, the  enactment of discharges from debt and the 
liberalization of property exemption have a similar effect. 
Such steps over time may create incentives for natural 
person debtors to seek relief. 
 
Core legal attributes of an insolvency regime for natural 
persons 
403. The development of a legal regime for the insolvency of 
natural persons requires careful consideration of many 
issues unique to the context of treating the insolvency of 
natural persons, whether or not such debtors are or have 
been engaged in commercial activity. It is also necessary to 
consider that the system of insolvency of natural persons is 
intertwined with the basic rules for consumer and 
commercial credit.    
404. There are a series of core legal attributes of regimes 
designed to deal with the insolvency of natural persons. 
These include: its relationship to informal settlement 
processes; the role of courts, agencies, and intermediaries; 
the conditions for access; and the price that a debtor must 
pay -if any- for discharge. This report describes those 
attributes and analyzes the consequences of the policy 




405. In the design and implementation of an insolvency 
regime for natural persons, it is most likely the case that one 
size does not fit all. However, there are tangible advantages 
and disadvantages in the different solutions to the numerous 
practical issues that arise in the design of an insolvency 
regime for natural persons, and those aspects have to be 
considered and assessed by policy makers. 
406. The overall objective is achieving a properly functioning 
insolvency regime, which in the view of most policy makers 
means the provision of relief only to those debtors in need, 
and the delivery of relief in a brief and not overly 
cumbersome procedure. 
 
General regime design: procedural options and the relation 
with informal workouts 
 
 
407. An essential aspect of the design of a regime of formal 
insolvency treatment for natural persons is its interaction 
with informal systems for resolving financial distress 
amicably. One important function of a formal insolvency 
system is to encourage informal negotiation and resolution of 
situations of personal over-indebtedness.  
 
408. In many countries, legislators have prioritized the 
prevention of formal insolvency proceedings, in part by 
favoring negotiated solutions to debt problems. There are 
advantages to negotiated solutions: avoiding stigma; less 
adverse impact on debtors’ credit scores; less cost relative to 
formalized insolvency proceedings; better outcomes for 
creditors; preparatory work being done by debt counsellors 
at lower cost; greater flexibility to serve the needs of the 
debtor and the creditors; and more willingness to renegotiate 
loans by financial institutions. 
  
409. Indeed, voluntary conciliation between creditors and 
debtors is even more desirable in the context of natural 
persons, but it has also proven more elusive, especially as 
creditors frequently have shown little interest in active and 
constructive engagement in such processes. In practice, it is 
not easy for debtors to reach voluntary settlements with all 
their creditors: some creditors demand enforcement of their 
claims and make negotiations impossible, vetoing negotiated 
approaches. Among these, some public creditors, including 
the tax authorities, are generally reluctant to accept 
negotiated approaches. Financial institutions may have few 
incentives to engage in meaningful restructuring negotiations 
because of the impact of regulations imposing requirements 
for writing off debts and deducting losses. For other 
creditors, passivity is an important issue, as is the treatment 
of third-party guarantees in informal debt settlements. Policy 




be addressed by making voluntary settlements binding on 
minority and non-participating creditors, preserving, in any 
case, the rights of minority creditors to defend their rights in 
court. 
410. Experience in many systems suggests that successful 
procedures for negotiating informal alternatives to formal 
insolvency include several elements that promote plan 
confirmation. Professional assistance is essential—provided 
at low or no cost—and advisors should have experience in 
negotiations with creditors. To achieve maximal 
effectiveness, negotiations must proceed without an 
immediate threat of enforcement of debt.   
411. Any system for treating the insolvency of natural 
persons implicates fundamental legal issues affecting the 
rights and obligations of creditors and debtors, both in 
relation to debtors and their creditors and among creditors 
generally. The right to a fair trial, the right to the protection 
of property, and, in addition, the right to work and fair 
remuneration and the basic social rights are at issue in an 
insolvency regime of natural persons. These rights and their 
enforcement are generally within the ultimate adjudicative 
authority of courts. 
The institutional framework 
412. A well-functioning institutional framework for the 
insolvency of natural persons should minimize overall social 
costs. These include error costs in determining the validity of 
debts and levels of repayment, and costs to creditors, debtors 
and third parties. The institutional framework should provide 
timely outcomes and achieve confidence in its operation by 
stakeholders and the general public.  
413. In constructing a formal, coercive relief system, the 
large numbers and relative homogeneity of cases to be 
treated prompt a reconsideration of the appropriate legal-
administrative framework to be applied, especially in terms 
of financing that framework.  Experience suggests that as the 
numbers of individual debtors needing insolvency relief 
increases, individual insolvency usually becomes a routinized 
process.  
414. Policy makers generally seek the following goals in 
choosing a particular structure for a system of insolvency for 
natural persons: similar treatment for individuals similarly 
situated, prevention of fraud and abuse, and reduction of 
unnecessary bureaucratic requirements. 
415. Institutional frameworks exist on a continuum ranging 
from: systems in which an administrative agency dominates; 
to hybrid public/private systems where public processing of 




court-based systems primarily serviced by publicly funded or 
private intermediaries. 
 
416. The majority of countries have court-based systems for 
personal insolvency and restructuring. Several high-income 
countries have adopted administrative approaches with 
courts providing a backdrop for disputed cases. 
Intermediaries play also a very important role in many of 
these systems. Public agencies play a significant role in 
several countries in sorting, processing and administering the 
insolvency of natural persons. Hybrid public-private models 
also exist where the primary actors are private insolvency 
practitioners who assess, administer and investigate debtors, 
but there is close supervision through a public regulator 
which licenses practitioners and may also intervene in the 
process. The design of an institutional structure must take 
into account the context of existing institutions and the 
availability of professional intermediaries in any particular 
country. 
 
Access to the formal insolvency regime 
 
417. Many individuals have difficulties in financing access to 
insolvency. There are five basic approaches to financing 
access to insolvency relief: (1) state funding of the process; 
(2) cross-subsidization of low value insolvencies by higher 
value estates; (3) state subsidies to professionals involved in 
the process and writing off court costs where there is an 
inability to repay; (4) levies on creditors, such as taxation of 
distressed debt to fund those cases where individuals have no 
ability to pay; and (5) no state support beyond any general 
public good funding of the court system. Financing issues can 
be softened by addressing the expense side of the system, 
using summary procedures and harnessing information 
technology. 
 
418. The standards for access to individual insolvency and 
restructuring procedures should be transparent and certain 
while ensuring against improper use by either creditor or 
debtor. Open access may be defined as the idea that an 
individual who meets an insolvency test such as the inability 
to pay debts as they fall due may, without more, gain access 
to an insolvency procedure permitting an ultimate discharge 
of debts. However, many systems include further 
requirements, often to address the problems of moral hazard 
and debtor fraud. One method of addressing potential moral 
hazard is to limit the frequency of access to insolvency. 
Addressing the issue of debtor abuse of the insolvency 
system relies on the general concept of “good faith”, which is 
an explicit criterion for access in several countries.  
  
419. Access criteria may be a combination of rules and 
standards, the latter generally requiring greater expertise to 




result in a large number of individuals being in a state of 
“informal insolvency” that may affect individuals’ incentives 
to participate as productive citizens. These costs should be 
balanced against the protection from moral hazard achieved 
through such measures. A distinction may be drawn between 
those systems that create high initial barriers to access based 
on a debtor’s conduct and those where individuals may be 
permitted to enter the system but may be sanctioned for 
their conduct. An opportunity for a creditor or agency to 
challenge a discharge or otherwise sanction a debtor provides 
protection against moral hazard and adds legitimacy to a 
system of individual insolvency by increasing participation by 
creditors.  
 
420. The questions of access are especially important in 
those systems in which there is a variety of options (“multi-
track insolvency systems”). Sorting debtors into a particular 
track may be made by an administrator, or a debtor may have 
some choice as to the relevant track. The more complex an 
insolvency system is, in terms of distinct and overlapping 
procedures, the greater will be the difficulties facing an over-
indebted individual, who may be in a vulnerable position in 
making an effective choice. Impartial intermediaries can 
assist individuals. In some countries, access may be 
dependent on a legal requirement of consulting an 
intermediary and obtaining advice on alternatives to 
insolvency. Some systems use initial screening based on 
income criteria to determine the debtor’s choice. Some 
systems restrict access to debt relief to individuals with 
consumer rather than business debts.  
 
Participation of creditors 
 
421. In the insolvency of natural persons, creditor 
participation does not assume the important role it normally 
has in business insolvency. Given the fact that in insolvency 
procedures for natural persons very little value is usually 
available, creditors normally play little or no role in the 
procedure. An especially important contrast with business 
insolvency is that creditors may oppose discharge but the 
discretion over discharge and confirmation of a payment plan 
is vested on the courts or other judicial body. 
 
422. Some element of contractual freedom and creditor 
participation continues to play a central role in many 
insolvency systems. Sometimes, important creditors, such as 
the tax authorities, major banks, or debt collection agencies 
that have brought a large number of claims, make policy 
decisions to oppose all or most categories of insolvency filings 
by natural persons. There is a problem of creditor passivity, 
and lack of information by creditors of the debtor’s 
circumstances and situation. Finally, creditors may also find 




ability to make a rational judgment about the consequences 
of insolvency proceedings for the debtor.  
 
423. An increasing number of systems have done away with 
submission and verification of creditor claims entirely in 
cases involving natural person debtors, except in cases 
where a system administrator establishes that value is 
expected to be available for distribution to creditors. This is in 
response to the challenges that creditor participation 
presents. 
 
Solutions to the insolvency process and payment of claims 
Payment through liquidation of the estate 
424. Maximizing returns for creditors continues to be an 
important goal of the insolvency process, but in the context 
of natural person debtors, experience has revealed 
significant complications in the process of extracting 
payment not only from current assets but also from future 
income. Most modern systems continue to take the approach 
of focusing on the debtor’s assets, at least initially, but this 
traditional focus on assets to be liquidated raises long-
standing concerns about leaving natural person debtors with 
a sufficient basis from which to recover their productive lives.  
425. In virtually every system, a public administrator or 
trustee of some kind is appointed to assess the scope of the 
debtor’s estate and to inventory, collect, and sell the 
debtor’s assets (where available) to produce value for 
creditors. However, the overwhelming majority of debtors in 
every existing system of insolvency for natural persons have 
few if any assets of any value that are available for liquidation 
and distribution to creditors. Consequently, several systems 
have all but abandoned the step of attempting to liquidate 
the debtor’s available assets unless the debtor appears to 
have substantial assets to warrant the significant 
administrative expenses of the inventory and liquidation 
process. 
 
426. Another important aspect of the legal regime refers to 
exemptions. This is not only an issue relevant for insolvency, 
but for debtor-creditor regimes in general. The notion of 
exempting some of the debtor’s property from liquidation 
and distribution to creditors is closely tied to the discharge 
principle and the notion of the fresh start. The idea is that 
when debtors receive a discharge, exit from insolvency, and 
obtain a fresh start, they should first be provided with 
sufficient property to meet post-insolvency minimum 
domestic needs for themselves and their families and, where 
necessary, minimum business needs. In some systems, 
property exemptions function as an imperfect alternative to 




have played the role, historically, of alleviating the condition 
of the insolvent debtor, especially in the absence of a 
discharge. However, the effects of exemptions themselves 
are insufficient to provide debtors with a real opportunity for 
starting anew.  
 
427. There are primarily three different approaches for 
deciding which property may be exempted. The first 
approach is to set aside a range of assets with a value up to 
a specified limit that the debtor may seek to get exempted 
from the property of the estate. A second approach currently 
adopted by many systems modernized the first approach and 
set out categories of particular assets (and values for these 
assets) that the debtor may seek to get exempted. The 
burden is on the debtor to establish an exemption for these 
assets. The third approach, also adopted in many systems, is 
based on a more general standard: most of the property from 
the estate is exempt, and the burden is on the system 
administrator to object to the exemption of valuable 
domestic or household assets so that such assets may be 
brought back into the estate.  
 
428. Exemptions can also be analyzed in terms of the assets 
covered by them: the family home; automobiles; household 
furnishings; post-commencement salaries; retirement plans; 
and professional equipment are the primary examples. The 
approaches to specific assets vary according to the 
importance that each of the assets has in a particular society. 
Historically, the level of exempt assets for debtors left them 
but slightly above the poverty line. The modern trend is to 
enable debtors to have a true fresh start, and the debate 
revolves around defining the level of sufficiency. There are 
also significant differences in the efficiency and costs of 
administration of the exemption regime.  
 
Payment through a payment plan 
 
429. As most natural person debtors have little of value in 
available assets, existing insolvency regimes most commonly 
require some contribution from debtors’ future income in 
exchange for whatever benefit the system offers  (usually a 
discharge of unpaid debt). Whatever the form and extent of 
relief offered, most systems envision an “earned start” for 
natural persons, rather than a simple “fresh start” with no 
contribution or exertion expected of debtors.  
430. Expanding the search for distributable value to 
encompass future income raises fundamental issues of 
humanitarian treatment of flesh-and-blood debtors who 
must maintain sufficient resources to meet their families’ 
basic needs. Seemingly simple questions of how to determine 
fair and reasonable payment expectations, especially with 




payment plans, have proven far more complex and difficult 
than anticipated. 
431. Indeed, some of the most difficult questions in natural 
person insolvency policy arise in the context of formulating a 
payment plan, especially the twin issues of how long debtors 
should be required to toil for the benefit of their creditors, 
and how much debtors should be required to pay during that 
period; that is, how much should debtors retain, with all 
“excess” applied to paying off debt. Once the plan is 
established, an effective insolvency regime must consider 
assigning responsibility for monitoring the debtor’s 
compliance and the possibility of modifications to the plan for 
changed circumstances.  
432. The answer to the question of the duration of a 
payment plan depends on the desired goals of imposing a 
payment plan on debtors in exchange for a promise of 
insolvency relief. 
433. There is a growing trend towards uniformity in the 
duration of payment plans, but there are still substantial 
differences in the length of those plans. Those differences 
can be linked to social and cultural differences, and bring with 
them advantages and disadvantages. There is no uniform 
answer to the question of the optimal length of time for a 
payment plan. It is necessary to strike a balance between 
setting high goals and setting attainable goals. Practice in 
many countries has indicated that plans longer than three 
years produce more failure than success.  
434. The negative effects of longer plan terms might be 
mitigated by measures such as (1) using a sliding-scale 
approach, or (2) imposing a longer repayment term for 
debtors unable to make significant contributions, but 
releasing debtors early as a reward for making more 
substantial payments, thus creating a set of incentives for 
debtors. On the other hand, imposing longer repayment 
terms on chronically destitute debtors seems rather 
counterproductive.  
435. The other fundamental issue in payment plans refers to 
the determination of an amount to be reserved for the 
reasonable support of the debtor and those dependent on 
the debtor. A payment plan needs to be based on an 
assessment of the income that the debtor is going to 
generate during the implementation period of the plan. In 
this regard, the two main approaches are to base such 
calculations on current income or projected income. 
436. Incentives to productivity of debtors play a major role 
in payment plans. Since one of the main goals of an 
insolvency system is to encourage natural person debtors to 




incentives for the productivity of the debtor, and avoid the 
opposite effect of debtors deciding not to make significant 
efforts to generate income. Both incentives and penalties can 
be used to create a positive dynamic in payment plans.  
437. Basic expenses of the debtor are a relevant factor that 
needs to be accounted for in payment plans. In designing the 
regulation of payment plans, the equation must also take into 
account that debtors need to be able to retain sufficient 
funds to cover at least their basic expenses and those of their 
dependents. One of the most significant challenges in 
defining a proper reserve budget for debtors is deciding how 
best to achieve a fair and equal treatment. The appropriate 
measure of sacrifice to be demanded of debtors in exchange 
for whatever relief an insolvency system offers is an 
inherently political decision. In any case, selecting an optimal 
approach to payment plan budgeting is not a simple binary 
choice between wide open discretion and rigid, bright-line 
rules. A combination of rules and discretionary elements is 
desirable and probably also unavoidable.  
438. The easiest and most widespread approach to selecting 
the basic budgetary standard has been simply to regard the 
insolvency system as an extension of the system of debt 
collection, and use the same rationale as applies to 
exemptions. A choice of one objective and uniform standard 
does not necessary entail a choice of one single figure to be 
applied to all debtors in all situations. Instead, existing 
systems commonly establish bands of uniformity, with 
debtors categorized into groups with various vital 
characteristics, and different exemption amounts are 
calculated for each of these groups, often with a possibility 
for increasing these standard amounts for specific, variable 
expenses. 
439. One of the most pressing problems is the treatment of 
debtors who cannot generate significant disposable income 
for the duration of the plan. These debtors, commonly 
referred to as “NINAs” (No Income, No Assets), may have 
sufficient resources to cover their basic needs, but they have 
no extra resources to pass on to creditors. Significant 
numbers of debtors in all insolvency systems for natural 
persons today fall into this category. Because these debtors 
produce no value for creditors, thus failing to achieve one of 
the most salient goals of an insolvency system, a minority of 
insolvency systems has all but excluded them from relief.  
Other systems avoid this kind of discrimination and provide 
the same relief to all debtors, regardless of their financial 
means. Reducing the formalities and expenses of insolvency 
proceedings may be a useful way of assisting in the resolution 
of this problem.  
440. The challenges of the insolvency of natural persons do 




to budget and distribute proper payments to creditors before 
an insolvency procedure commences are likely to struggle 
afterward, as well.  A plan requires monitoring tools, and may 
have to be modified if the circumstances of the debtor 
change, especially if the approach taken by the law is to 
establish a long rehabilitation period for debtors. 
441. There are approaches that combine liquidations and 
payment plans. To advance the primary historical goal of 
insolvency systems—enhancing efforts to achieve some 
return for creditors—most insolvency regimes for natural 
persons today combine two approaches to payment: they 
require both (1) a turnover and liquidation of debtors’ non-
exempt assets owned at the time of the commencement of 
the procedure and (2) a multi-year payment plan to access 
the usually much more significant value in the debtors’ future 
earning capacity. While there are obvious advantages to 
combining the two approaches, proceeding through both 
stages in every case has arguably significant disadvantages, 
and not all systems force all debtors to proceed through both 
methods of value extraction. 
442. The basic disadvantage of each approach to value 
extraction is wasted cost in terms of time, money, and other 
resources of thinly spread administrative resources.  In many 
cases, although these systems do achieve many of the goals 
of natural person insolvency for debtors and society, payment 
plans do not provide a significant financial return to creditors. 
The experience of many systems casts doubts on the 
effectiveness of allocating administrative resources to a 
process that often produces no direct economic returns for 
creditors. 
443. However, even if payment plans are not especially 
effective from a financial point of view, they do serve 
important moral and educational purposes. More than 
exacting a monetary return for creditors, these plans are 
often regarded as inculcating good payment morality among 
debtors. Thus, few existing systems allow significant numbers 
of debtors to receive relief without passing through 
liquidation and/or through a payment plan.  
Payment of mortgages 
444. An important specific issue in the insolvency of natural 
persons is the treatment of mortgages. The particular 
concerns of home finance pose especially difficult challenges 
that continue to elude simple resolution.  
445. In many systems, the rights of secured creditors are 
either unimpeded or not implicated at all. Most debtors 
have few valuable assets that have been used or could be 
used as collateral for debts. In cases involving secured claims 




usually already seized the collateral by the time a debtor files 
for insolvency relief, or the system allows for this to occur 
even after a filing.  
446. Mortgages are special in that the collateral is usually 
the most precious personal asset of the debtor, as well as 
the most valuable, and plays an important, broader social 
role. At the same time, and because of its economic 
importance, an efficient mortgage regime, including the 
effective enforcement of secured loans, is a fundamental 
element in the financial system of a country. 
447. Some countries have found solutions that respect the 
interests of debtors and the rights of secured creditors in 
the insolvency procedure. The starting point has been that 
the rights of the secured creditors are protected, but 
subjected to some modification. What kind of modification is 
allowed is subject to a number of difficult considerations.  
448. Several distinct systems have developed to balance, for 
example, the competing fears of destabilizing the mortgage 
credit markets and displacing significant numbers of debtors 
from their homes, especially in light of the negative effects 
of mass mortgage foreclosure activity in depressing home 
values in times of systemic crisis. These systems are to a 
greater or lesser degree designed to compel creditors to 
accept the reality of the distressed state of debtors and of the 
values of the mortgaged property, and also accept the 
payment capacity that debtors can realistically have to offer, 
and avoid taking rash action to enforce rights in collateral and 
create further avoidable losses. Among the policy measures 
that have been implemented, those that have been used 
more frequently are the following: moratoria, the 
introduction of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, 
reduction of interest rates, extension of repayment periods 
and, eventually, reductions in the principal of the loans.  
Discharge 
449. Discharge is one of the most salient characteristics of 
modern systems for the regulation of the insolvency of 
natural persons. As stated before, one of the principal 
purposes of an insolvency system for natural persons is to re-
establish the debtor’s economic capability, in other words, 
economic rehabilitation.  
450. Rehabilitation can be said to include three elements: 
discharge of debts, non-discrimination, and avoidance of 
excessive indebtedness. First, debtors are in most cases freed 
from excessive debt. The benefits of the discharge have been 
extensively discussed from the point of view of debtors, 
creditors and society. Second, effective rehabilitation is 
facilitated by debtors being treated on an equal basis with 




non-discrimination. Finally, to ensure lasting relief, debtors 
should be in a position to avoid excessive indebtedness in the 
future, which may require some attempt to change debtors’ 
attitudes concerning proper credit use.  
451. The most effective form of relief from debt is a 
“straight” discharge of debt, which provides an immediate 
and unconditional fresh start for the debtor. However, most 
systems continue to reject the notion of a straight discharge, 
and, especially, the possibility to be freed from debt without 
a payment plan. 
452. The principle of non-discrimination is an important 
consideration in achieving the full benefit of a discharge, 
though existing systems have paid little regard to this 
important factor. One of the problems is that any insolvency 
filing is reflected among other “negative” credit entries, at 
least for a limited number of years following conclusion of an 
insolvency case, which often gives rise to discrimination 
against former natural person debtors who have undergone 
insolvency procedures.  
453. In an attempt to avoid repeat filings as debtors again 
become excessively indebted in the future, many systems 
attempt to inculcate more healthy and responsible use of 
credit. Some systems conceive the insolvency of natural 
persons as a “once in a lifetime” occurrence. Other systems 
prohibit a discharged debtor from initiating insolvency 
proceedings for a defined period of time. As a goal and a 
result of a debt relief procedure, changes in debtor attitudes 
are much more difficult to achieve or measure.   
454. To avoid the abuse of discharge, and problems of moral 
hazard and fraud, the principle of good faith is present in 
almost all insolvency laws. A central idea of an insolvency 
regime for natural persons is to help unfortunate but honest 
debtors.  
455. For rehabilitation it is important that as many as 
possible of the debtor’s debts be included in the discharge . 
However, there are debts that may be excluded from the 
discharge due to important social or economic 
considerations. Among these excepted debts, the more 
frequent are: child and spouse support; fines and other 
sanctions; taxes; and educational loans. Normally, the 
discharge does not affect debts arising after the 
commencement of the insolvency proceedings. 
456. One of the problems that discharge presents is that the 
indebtedness situation very frequently affects not only the 
debtor, but also other members of the debtor’s family. 
Sometimes family members and others close to the debtor 
are drawn into the debtor’s economic crisis because they 




their property as collateral for a loan. Since payment can be 
quite easily demanded from the guarantor or from the value 
of the collateral if the principal debtor does not pay or is 
insolvent, guarantors often face payment claims on the eve or 
after the opening of an insolvency procedure. The legal 
position of the guarantor has been found to be difficult in 
many countries, and there are signs of a trend towards 
greater flexibility for the guarantor’s position in the debt 
adjustment. 
 
 
